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ABSTRACT 
This is the abstract of my thesis entitled 'Contribution of al-
Ash'ari to Islamic Thought and His Influence on the later Ilm al-
Kalam'. 
I have mentioned in my thesis, in its preface, a short account 
of Asha'ri's biography. In his biographic account I have mentioned 
about his life and works and how he converted to his own school of 
thought, named after his name, from M'utazilism. Abu Ali al-Jubbai 
was his teacher and he acquired education from him and remained 
with him for about forty years of his life. Abu Ali al-Jubbai, being a 
M'utazilite, stressed more on reason than revelation. Asha'ri also 
had followed his path, but he was not satisfied. 
He again and again put his perplexity and anxiety before him, 
especially when he was defeated by his opponents in any assembly 
discussion (munazara). He, ultimately, decided to abandon 
M'utazilism, or the attitude of giving more importance to reason 
Abstract 
than revelation. God helped al-Ash'ari, as He always does, by 
sending His Prophet in his dream who guided him to follow the path 
of righteousness. Ultimately Ash'ari decided to defend orthodoxy. 
He posed the question of three brothers (for details see the thesis), 
where he wanted to justify that reason is not enough to solve every 
problem. 
In the Introduction, first chapter, I discussed 'Ilm al-Kalam', 
its meaning, sources and influences. Under the heading of sources I 
have mentioned Islamic and Non-Islamic sources. Islamic sources 
comprise the Qur'an and the Tradition where there is emphasis on 
knowledge and its acquisition. Thereafter I have mentioned Greek 
and Indo-Persian influences under the heading of Non-Islamic 
sources and influences. In this section I wanted to show how 
scholasticism originated and how the translators got access to Greek 
learning that influenced Muslim mind. 
In the second chapter I discussed different schools of thought 
existed before al-Ash'ari. I, in this chapter, depended mostly on 
Ash'ari's book 'Maqalat al-lsla miyin wa Ikhtilaf al-MusUiyin'. 
Abstract 
Ash'ari has mentioned ten schools but I chose only six that are 
very important for further discussion. I have divided 'Ilm al-Kalam 
into early and later phases. In the early phase I included Jubriyah, 
Qadariyah, Khawaij, Shi'aism and Murji'ah, while I discussed 
M'utazilism under the later phase of Kalam. 
I devoted third chapter for the discussion of Ash'arism. Here I 
depended most on Ash'ari's books 'al-Ibana 'an Usui- al-Diyanah 
and 'Kitab al-Luma' fi Radd 'a I a Ah! al-Zarigh wa al-Bida' and 
Istihsan al-Khawzfi 'Ilm al-Kalam. 
'Kitab al-Luma' and Risalah on Ilm al-Kalam were translated 
by Mc Carthy under one title, 'The Theology ofAl-Ash 'ari'. In most 
cases I have quoted this book. 
In this chapter I have shown how al-Ash'ari justified God's 
Unity and His attributes and that these attributes are neither identical 
nor separate from His Essence. Ash'ari justified the Qur'an being 
uncreated, while M'utazilites believed it to be created. Ash'ari 
justifies man to be acquirer of his deeds while M'utazilites advocate 
of his being creator of his deeds. Ash'ari justifies beatific vision 
while M'utazilites denied it. Ashari briefly, justifies revelation while 
Abstract 
M'utaziles justify the supremacy of reason. This practice, I mean, 
justification of supremacy of revelation over reason, was followed 
by later Ash'arites. These later Ash'arites I have included in the last 
chapter. 
In this chapter I have mentioned Baqillain, Juwaini and 
Ghazali. Baqillani built metaphysical and epistemological bases for 
his schools of thought. He says that world is composed of 
substances and accidents. These substances and accidents are 
transitory and always need a Creator for their existence. 
In his epistemological theory he divides knowledge into 
necessary and acquired, and gives importance to necessary ones. In 
this necessary knowledge he includes intuitive as well as 
authoritative knowledge. In this authoritative knowledge Divine 
knowledge interferes. He justifies this authoritative knowledge to be 
the most authentic one. Al-Juwaini followed him and al-Ghazali 
extendrd this school of thought. Ghazali not only refutes the 
philosophers and their beliefs on the basis of reason but also justifies 
Islamic tenets. 
Abstract 
Ghazali in his Tahafat' describes propositions of the 
philosophers and denies them to be true. He chooses three out of 
them and charges the upholders of them with infidelity and 
irreligiously. According to him those who believe, even a Muslim, in 
the (i) eternity of the world, and deny (ii) God's knowledge of the 
particulars and (iii) resurrection of bodies are infidel. Apart from, 
they are not infidels but heretics. In this book, he rationally proves 
that the philosophers are not true in their claims and beliefs. 
He also rejects their theory of causation, especially the 
principle that everything is necessarily related to cause effect nexus 
and that only one thing can proceed from one. This is necessary 
because one cannot justify the occurrence of miracles. Miracles play 
an important role in Islamic Shariah. 
In his endeavor he doubts sense perception, because he is a 
true seeker of the Truth. Truth is something where there is no 
possibility of error. He believes in reason but revelation is more 
important than reason, because reason is a human effort while 
revelation is Divine knowledge that he justifies in his 'Ihya 'Ulum 
ai-Din' (Revivification of the sciences of the religion). 
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Preface 
The present study has been taken up to critically examine the 
contribution of Abul Hasan 'Ali b. Isma'il al-Ash'ari to Muslim thought. 
He has rendered many invaluable works, some of which have been 
carried to us and others unfortunately have become extinct. All the 
available works have also not been translated into English and the ones 
which have been rendered into English are not translations up to the 
mark. We will mostly depend, in the body of our work, on the original 
Arabic versions of his works. We will make our best efforts to bring 
home the potentials that al-Ash'ari possessed. He indeed enjoys a pivotal 
position in the History of Islamic thought. He wanted to present the mid-
way between the rationalists and the orthodoxy; both the schools played 
an important role in the growth of knowledge and development of Islamic 
civilazation. We have to examine this mid-way-solution which ultimately 
came closer to the Orthodoxy and resulted into puritanical endeavour to 
save Islam of all outside influences. Al-Ash'ari made a beginning to 
achieve this objective but, as we shall see later, he never wanted, perhaps, 
to overlook philosophy as his successors did in the later ages. He, 
however, averted the trend of rationalism which dominated for long the 
scene of Islamic thought. 
In the proceeding lines we will give an account of his life and 
works to substantiate what has been said earlier. 
AI-Ashari's biographical account is found in several books such as 
Ibn 'Asakir's^ ''Tabyin-al-Kadhib-al-Muftari fi ma Nusiba ila al-Imam 
'Abi-al-Hasan al-Ash'ari" (The Exposure of the calumniators lying 
concerning what has been inputed to the Imam Abu-al-Hasan al-Ashari) 
summerized in English by Mc Carthy with the tittle "Ibn 'Asakir's 
Preface 
Apology^' Ibn Khalqan's "Wafayat al-Aayan wa Anba, 'Abna al-Zaman " 
and al-Subki's "Tabaqal-al-Shafiyiyah al-Kubra" V.II. Out of these Ibn-
A'sakir's book is the basic source of his life and works. This book is 
devoted to the vindication and glorification of al-Ash'ari and all other 
biographers do not have much to add to the accout presented by Ibn 
'Asakir except some stray events which we will point out during the 
course of our discussion. 
Most of the biographers agree that al-Ash'ari was a descendent of 
Abu Musa al-Ash'ari, a Companion of the Prophet (P.B.U.H) and a 
famous arbitrator in the Battle of Siffin between Ali and Muawiyah. Abu 
Musa al-Ash'ari was the ninth forebear of Abul Hasan a-Ash'ari in the 
ascending line. Ibn 'Asakir does not agree with the geneology given by 
al-Ahwazi who does not believe that al-Ash'ari was the descendent of 
Abu Musa al-Ash'ari, but his account may not be reliable for other 
biographers seek no 
concurrence with the thesis. Rather, reacting upon this Ibn 'Asakir says: 
"(besides mentioned earlier) in another (testimony) reported from Abu 
baker b. Uthman b. Muhammad, the Imam of Baghdad, the genealogy is 
traced back through eight intermediaries to Abu Musa" . 
One great grandfather of Abu Musa al-Ashari was bom with hair 
on his body and hence was called al-Ash'ar (hairy), thus the generation of 
al-Ash'ari whose name was otherwise Nabt, was then called al-Ash'ari. 
Al-Ash'ar was the twelfth forebear of Abul-Hasan al-Ash'ari in the 
ascending line'. 
Al-Ashari's name is Ali and Abul-Hasan is his nickname 
(kunniyat). Abul-Hasan's lineage is as follows : Abul-Hasan 'Ali b. 
Isma'il b. Abu Bashr Ishaq b. Sahm b. Isma'il b. 'Abdullah b. Musa b. 
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Bilal b. Abi Burdah 'Ainir b. Abi Musa al-Ashari (the companion of the 
Prophet) b. Qais b. al-jamahir b. al-Ashar b. Odad '*. Ibn khalqan adds 
two more names to his pedigree after Odad b. Zaid b. Yashjab"^. 
Al-Ash'ari was bom in Basra in the year 260/873-4. Though there 
is difference of opinion regarding his date of birth, yet Ibn ' Asakir firmly 
ascertains 260 A.H. as his year of birth . But Ibn Khalqan is not certain 
about the year, rather he agrees to his being bom between 260 and 270 
A.H I 
It is believed that after the death of his father Ismail, al-Ashari was 
entmsted to the care of the shafi'te jurispmdent Zakariya (b. Yahya) al-
Saji.^ Dhahabi^"^ holds that "he aquired the knowledge of Tradition from 
Zakariyah (b. Yahya) al Saji*^ '"^  and Knowledge of Polemics (Jadal) and 
reasoning (nazr) from Abu-Ali al-Jubbai . Ibn Khalqan saya that al-
Ash'ari used to sit in the meeting of Abu Ishaq al-Marvazi* '^^ ^ every Friday 
in the Masque of al-Mansoor in Baghdad '^ . 
From the foregoing testimonies we can identify al-Ash'ari as a 
man of Tradition and jurispmdence. Subki also estabhshes his being a 
Traditionist and juris-consult by referring to some of the traditions and 
judicial interpretation, stating with asnad, carrying to the Prophet 
He was, however, reputed as a Mutakallim, rather the Imam-al-
Mutakallimin. He started his career as a Mutazilite and continued to be 
the same for forty years of his life. He was an erudite disciple of Abu Ali 
al-Jubba*-^\ the chief of the Mu'tazilites in Basra, and al-Ash'ari lived 
with him under his training for forty years of his life defending the 
Mu'tazilities beliefs. He then being dissatisfied with this movement and 
commanded by the Prophet three times in dreams in the month of 
Ramadan, abandoned the Mu'tazilism and began to defend the Orthodoxy 
iii 
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with the help of reason. Al-Ash'ari's conversion seems to have taken 
place in the year 300/ 912-13/^ 
About his conversion many stories have been narrated, but all the 
account, related from the six ways (Turuq), have a common theme with 
some differences. In the following lines we will try to justify this claim. 
About his perplexity and dissatisfaction it is said that after the 
Shaikh Abul Hasan had gone deeply into the Mu'tazilite Kalam and 
mastered it he used to propose questions to his masters but when he got 
no satisfactory answer to his questions he became perplexed. 
The evidence about his perplexity may be seen in this account : Al-
Ash'ari was the disciple of al-Jubbai, under whom he studied and from 
whom he acquired learning, never leaving him for forty years. He was a 
master of learning in the assemblies and boldly attacked opponents. So 
when the necessity of attending the assemblies weighed heavy on him he 
used to send al-Ash'ari as his representative. That went on for a long 
time. One day al-Ash'ari was representing al-Jubbai in an assembly when 
another disputed with him and overcame him in the dispute. A companion 
of al-Ash'ari, one of the common people, started sprinkling ahnonds and 
sweetmeats on him. But al-Ash'ari said to him,. "I have done nothing. My 
opponent has triumphed over me and explained the argument and reduced 
me to silence. He is more deserving of your favour than I am". After that 
1 -> 
incident he manifested repentance and changed his belief . 
This repentance is said to have manifested in seeking guidance 
from Allah. Consequently, He helped al-Ash'ari by sending His Prophet 
to him in dreams three times in the month of Ramadan. 
This prestigious event occurred in the following way : "And it is 
related of him (al-Ash'ari) that he said : one night there occurred to my 
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mind a dogmatic question which had been occupying me. So I rose and 
prayed two rakas and after asking God to guide me along the straight 
path, I fell asleep. While I slept I saw the Apostle of God and I 
complained to him about the matter which was perplexing me and the 
Apostle of God said, you must hold fast to my Sunna! Then I awoke and I 
compared the theses of Kalam with what 1 found in the Quran and the 
Traditions and I affirmed the latter and cast all else away" ^ ^. 
The detailed account of this dream is as follows : Al-Ash'ari said : 
while I was asleep during the first decade of Ramadan, I saw Mustafa and 
he said : O' Ali, defend the doctrines related fi"om me, for they are the 
truth". When 1 awoke I was considerably perturbed and gave much 
anxious thought to my vision and my pre-occupation with elucidating the 
proofs concerning the contrary position, then came the second decade and 
I saw the Prophet in my sleep and he said to me : "What have you done 
about what 1 commanded you?" 1 replied : O Apostle of God, what could 
I do in view of my having opposed the doctrines related fi^om you in ways 
based on the interpretation of Kalam and my having followed the sound 
proofs which are applicable to the Creator? And he said to me : Defend 
the doctrines related fi-om me, for they are the truth?" Then I awoke, 
much saddened and disheartened and resolved to give up Kalam. And I 
applied myself to Tradition and the recitation of the Quran. 
On the night of the twenty Seventh (lailalvl Qadar), and it was our 
custom in Basra for the Reciters and men of learning and virtue to meet 
for a global recitation of the Quran during that night, 1 remained among 
them in accordance with our custom. But 1 grew so overpoweringly 
sleepy that I rose and went home and slept, regretting the splendid 
occasion which 1 was missing. Then I saw the Prophet and he said to me: 
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what have you done about what I commanded you? I answered "I have 
given up Kalam and have adhered to the Book of Allah and to thy 
Sunna". And he said to me, "I did not command you to give up Kalam, 
but I commanded you to defend the doctrines related from me, for they 
are the truth ! "I said, O Apostle of God, how can 1 leave a system after 
having thought about its questions and known its proofs for thirty years, 
because of a dream?" And he said to me, "Were it not for my knowing 
that God will give you his special help, I should not leave you untill 1 had 
given you a full explanation of those things. You seem to think that this 
my coming to you is a mere dream. Was my vision of jibril a mere 
dream? You will see me no more about this matter so be earnest in it, for 
God will give you His special help". 
"Thus he spoke and I awoke and said : "After truth there is only 
error"^ and I began to defend the Traditions on the vision of God, the 
intercession of the Prophet, the lawfijlness of speculation and other 
points. And there used to come to me something which I swear I had 
never heard from an adversary nor read in any book, and I knew that it 
was due to the help of God which the Apostle of God had foretold me" ' . 
In another account Abul Hasan al-Ash'ari was reported to have 
said ; "I saw the Apostle of God in my sleep at the beginning of 
Ramadan. He said to me "O Abul Hasan, have you written Traditions ? "I 
rephed," Certainly, O Apostle of God "Then he said," Have you not 
written that God Most High will be seen in the next hfe? "1 answered," 
Certainly, O Apostle of God "Then he said to me, "Then what prevents 
you from holding that doctrine? 1 replied," Rational proofs have 
prevented me and therefore I have interpreted the Traditions. And he said 
to me, "Do you not find that there are rational proofs which prove that 
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God Most High will be seen in the xi^yl life ? I answered, "Certainly, O 
Apostle of God, but they are only doubts" He said to me, "Reflect on 
them and examine them most carefully; they are not doubts but they are 
proofs." And he disappeared, and I awoke in great fear and began to 
reflect on what he had said. And I preserved and found the matter to be as 
he had said. The proofs of affirmation grew strong in my mind, while 
those of negation grew week. So I kept silent and revealed nothing to 
men, remaining the while in great perplexity over my position. 
Then in the second decade of Ramadan I saw the Apostle of God 
again. He approached me and said, "O Abul-Hasan, what have you done 
about what I said to you? I replied, "O Apostle of God, the matter is as 
you said, and power is on the side of affiraiation." Then he said to me, 
"Reflect on the other questions and be mindfiil of them." Then I awoke 
and rose and collected all my Kalam books and set them aside and 
devoted my self to books on Traditions, Quranic exegesis, and the legal 
sciences. However, 1 did ponder the other questions in accordance with 
his command. 
And after we entered the third decade I saw him again on the night 
of Power (LailatuI Oadar) and he said to me, with an appearance of 
exasperation, "What have you done about what I said to you? I answered" 
O Apostle of God, I kept reflecting on what you said and continued to 
think about and ponder the questions. However, I have rejected and 
turned aside fi-om all kalam and I have devoted myself to the legal 
sciences." Then he said to me angrily, "and who commanded you to do 
that? Compose books, and reflect in this wa)/ which I have commanded 
you, for it is my religion and truth which I brought," and I awoke and 
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thence forth began to compose books and to defend and expound the true 
doctrine" ^\ 
Being convinced of "after truth there is only error" and that he 
would be helped and guided by Allah and after composing books in 
defence of the Orthodoxy in accordance with the command of the 
Prophet, al-Ashari prepared himself to be exposed as a follower and 
defender of the Orothodoxy on the basis of Kalam and as the fiercest foe 
of the Mu'tazilites and their beliefs. This exposure, for the first time, took 
place in this way : 
"Al-Ash'ari held the Mutazilite views for forty years and was one 
of their Imams. Then he withdrew from the society of men into his own 
house for fifteen days. After that he went out to the mosque, ascended the 
pulpit, and said, "O men, 1 withdrew from you for a while simply because 
I had reflected and found the proofs equal in my mind, the true and the 
false being exactly balanced so far as I could see, so 1 sought guidance 
from God, Most Blessed and High, and he has guided me to the belief in 
what I have confided to these books of mine. And I strip myself of all that 
1 used to beheve just as 1 strip myself of this garment." And he stripped 
himself of a robe that was upon him and cast it aside and handed over the 
books to the people. Among them were the KJtab-al-Luma, and a book in 
which he exposed the short comings of the Mu'tazilah which he called 
"kitab Kashf al-Asrar wa Hatk al-Astar"^''^ and others '^ 
Another account states that al-Ashari after Friday prayer, ascended 
the pulpit of the mosque of Basra and said, "Be ye my witnesses that 1 
have not been following the religion of Islam and that 1 now embrace 
Islam, and that I repent of the Mu'tazilite views which I held", then he 
came down"^'! Hamudah Gharaba^'"^ is of the opinion that the basic 
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reason of his conversion was his perplexity, and the cojninand of the 
Prophet in dreams was the immediate cause ^°. In other words, al-Ash'ari 
was not satisfied and this was why he was proposing questions again and 
again to his master but when the Prophet came into his dream, he was 
supported and consequently took a decision finn and strong, composed 
books and came to the mosque and declare that he had given up 
Mu'tazilite views 
Whatsoever the cause of al-Ash'ari's conversion might be but the 
fact is that he was disappointed and dissatisfied with the Mu'tazilite 
Kal am, because this kalam was dominated by logical reasoning and it 
was assumed that nothing could occur without a genuine purpose and 
expected advantage, even Allah cannot do anything at random and 
without intending human welfare, and reason can resolve the 
purposefiilness of Allah's Acts and that reason can solve every problem 
therefore reason must be superior to revelation. This was the attitude of 
the Mu'tazilites and whoever believed in this attitude was regarded as a 
Mu'tazilite^ ^  
Al-Ash'ari, attacking this attitude just after his conversion, 
proposed in an assembly to al-jubbai, his fonner Mu'taziHte master, the 
problem of three brothers, one being a believer, the other being an infidel 
and still another being a child who is not obligated of Divine injunctions 
and asked him, "what is their aftennath?" al-Jubbai answered, 'The 
believer would be in the men of rank and file and the infidel would be in 
the men of doom and perdition and the child would be in the men of 
salvation". Al-Ash'ari went on asking fiirther, "Could the child be among 
the men of rank and file" ? Naturally al-Jabbai's answer was negative, 
upon hearing it, al-Ash'ari interrogated 'why'. Al-Jubbai asserted that the 
IX 
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believer had earned this status while the child had not. Al-Ashari made a 
pertinent remark saying that the death of the child in his early age was not 
of his choice, he died as God willed him to dixQ. Al-Jubbai answered that 
God knew the fate of the child that he would grow as a sinner and He, 
therefore , deemed it fit m his well-being to let him die in the childhood. 
Al-Ash'ari, then, remarked that the infidel would ask God as to why He 
did not care for his well-being even after having the knowledge of his fate 
of growing as an infidel and dA^i^ not let him die as a child. Al-Jubbai was 
then silent . 
In this way, the first offence from al-Ash'ari was upon the 
authority and supremacy of reason. By doing so al-Ash'ari tried his best 
to prove that reason cannot solve every problem and that Allah can do 
acts which may be not graspable by reason. One should therefore, rely on 
revelation. In other words, this was an attempt to justify the supennacy of 
revelation over reason. 
Al-Ash'ari was promised by the Apostle of Allah, in dream, to be 
helped and guided by Allah. This resulted in the way that al-Ashari, 
though was suitable to attend the assemblies, yet "he was not a writer. 
Whenever he took the pen in his hand he produced either nothing, or a 
kalam that was disagreeable" . But after his conversion, he wrote many 
invaluable books, which exceed, according to one account, upto three 
hundred '^^. But this number is not agreed upon by the biographers. Ibn 
Hazm, for example, speaks of fifty five only , while Ibn Asakir provides 
a hst of hundred and six books . But when we look into the coimnentary 
of Mc Carthy (author of "The Theology of Al-Ash'ari pp. 211-30) on 
different books, we come to the conclusion that the correct number of 
works ascribed to al-Ash'ari should not be more than fifty five. 
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But most of them unfortunately have become extinct. The available 
books of al-Ash'ari are as follows : 
Maqalat-al-lslamiyin M'Q Ikhtilaf ~ al- Musalliyin, (The Views of 
the Islamists and Disagreement of those who Pray) 
Kitab-al-Ihanah 'an Usui - al~Diyanah (Exposition of the 
Fundamental Principles of the Religion). 
Kilab-al-Luma fi-al-Radd 'aid Ahl al-Zaigh wa al-Bida' 
(Highlights of the Polemic against Deviators and Innovators). 
Risalah Istihsan al-Khaud Fi Tim Al-Kalam (A Vindication of the 
Science of Kalam). 
Maqalat the most comprehensive book consisting of two volumes, 
has not been rendered in any language while Ibanah, though translated by 
W.C. Klein with the little "77ze Elucidation of Islam's foundation" in 
"American oriental Series", Vol. 19, 1940, is not available. 
Both Kit ab-al-Luma and Risalah on Kal am, both the books have been 
translated by Mc Carthy under one title Theology ofal-Ash 'ari". 
When the innovators like the Mu 'tazilites, the Jahamites and 
others introduced their doctrines into the tenets of Islam and Islam thus 
became an amalgam, the Quran and the Traditions were interpreted with 
the help of and on the basis of absolute and abstract reason. God, His 
Attributes like power, knowledge, hearing, seeing and speech were either 
denied or interpreted otherwise. Al-Ash'ari, at that time, defended them 
by fuller explanation and proved them sound from the view point of 
reason. In other words, al-Ash'ari reinforced the behefs and tenets of 
Islam. It is, therefore, believed that al-Ash'ari was the Renewer of the 
Faith in the third century A.H. Abu Huraira, a famous companion of the 
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Prophet stated a tradition of the Prophet, "God will indeed send to this 
community at the beginning of every hundred years a man who will 
renew for it its religion" . 
Though there is difference of opinion about the persons having the 
status of Mujaddid (Renewer of the Faith) in these centuries, Ibn 'Asakir, 
along with other theologians confimis the status of Mujaddid to Umar b. 
Abdul 'Aziz,^ ™'^  Imam al-Shafe'i^*''^  and al-Ash' ari in their respective 
centuries^ . 
Regarding the fiqh and method of inquiry of al-Ash'ari we again 
find a difference among his biographers. Some believe of his being 
shafi'ite^^ while others classify him with Mahkites,^° but the fact is that 
he followed the way of the Salaf, the path of righteousness. This is 
substantiated in the words of al-Baihaqi : Our Shaikh, Abul Hasan al-
Ash'ari, introduced nothing new into the rehgion of God, nor did he bring 
into it any innovation. On the contrary, he accepted the doctrines of the 
Companions, Followers and later Imams on the fundamental principles of 
religion. These he defended by fuller explanation and exposition, and 
showed that those doctrines on the fundamental principles and what has 
come by way of divine positive law are sound from the view point of 
reason, contrary to the specious claims of the heretics that some of those 
doctrines do not square with the conclusions of reason. His exposition 
was both a corroboration of what had not been proved by any member of 
the ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamaah and a defense of the doctrines of former 
Imams". Such fonner Imams were Abu Hanifa,^ -^* Sufiyan al-Thawri,^ ^ -^* 
al-Awza'i,^ ^^^^ Malik,^ ^"^ al-Shafi'i, Ahmad b. Hanbal, '^''"^ al-Laith b. 
Sa'd,^ '^^  al-Bukhari, '^'^ ''^  and Muslim b. al-Hajjaj^'''"^-''. 
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Al-Ash'ari was pious and upto some extent an ascetic, yet he could 
not agree with many mystic bounds. To prove his piety it is said that he 
used to observe his morning prayer with the night ablution, and that he 
never spoke about his zeal to anyone. In the words of Ahmad b. Ali, "I 
served the Imam Abul Hasan in Basra for several years and I was 
continually in his company in Baghdad until he died. I never met a 
godlier man or one who kept his eyes averted more, and 1 never saw a 
Shaikh more restrained concerning the things of this world or more active 
about the things of the next world^ . 
It is also said that al-Ash'ari's yearly expenditure amounted to 
seventeen dirhams^^. But according to Ibn Khalqan'^ ''^ "'^  who cited al-
Khatib, his expediture was seventeen dirhams per day ^ . And this seems 
to be more convincing. 
There is difference of opinion about the year of his death. Some are 
of the view that he died in Baghdad somewhere in between 320/932 and 
330/943. Others are specific about the year of his death and say that he 
died in 324/935-6. Some of his contemporaries speak of his death falling 
a little after 330 A.H. But, according to Ibn 'Asakir, 324 A.H. is the year 
of his demise . 
In the light of his biography, the eminence of Abul-Hasan al-
Ashari is well established. Particularly after his self-conversion from the 
Mu'tazilite school he wrote prolifically on various issues concerning 
philosophy and theology. From the point of view of strict definition of 
'Ilm al-Kalam, al-Ash'ari alone is an eminent genuine Mutakallira. He is 
rightly called Imam al-Mutakallimin (chief of Mutakallimin). This has 
been acknowledged by various scholars of eminence. Baqillani, Isfrani 
and many others, who themselves were men of edified repute have 
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exaltedly admired Abul-Hasan's scholastic prudence. Baqillani says, "By 
God the best of my circumstance is that I understand the Kalam of Abul 
Hasan'"'. This was retorted when someone said to him that his kalam was 
better than that of al-Ash'ari. Isfrani holds, "By the side of the Shaikh 
Abul-Hasan al- Bahili, I was Like a drop of water in the sea, and I have 
heard the Shaikh say that by the side of the Shaikh Abu - Hasan al-
Ash'ari he was like a drop of water beside the sea" . 
In order to have a fiiller comprehension of al-Ash'ari's philosophy, 
the nature of arguments and the method that he adopted to avert the 
innovative trends in Islam, we shall now discuss the meaning, definition 
and sources of llm-al-Kalam. 
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CHAPTER - 1 
Islam, an Arabic word meaning peace, is, as a religion, a complete 
code of life, comprising theoretical as well as practical teachings and 
guidance. The word Islam is derived from its root letters slm. Islam, thus, 
is a religion that guarantees peace for human beings in both the lives; 
here as well as hereafter. Religion is called in Arabic din which means 
obedience and submission; as Allah says, "Religion with Allah is Islam"\ 
Thus Islam also means submission and obedience. In other words, since 
Islam is a religion given by Allah to man, therefore, Islam means a 
complete submission of man to Allah in every field of life, political, 
social, ethical, etc. Accordingly, the Muslim is one who submits, who is 
obedient and who beheves in the sovereignty of Allah. 
There is a delicate difference between Islam and Imam. For this 
purpose, we should refer to the Quran and the Tradition of the Prophet 
(P.B.U.H.). The Quran distinguished between Iman and Islam as it said 
addressing the Bedouins (the desert Arabs) who had only submitted their 
wills to Allah and followed the practical teachings of Islam, who had 
neither known Iman nor had confirmed it by their hearts "The desert 
Arabs say, 'We belive', say 'ye have no faith (Iman) but ye (only) say, we 
have submitted our wills to Allah, for not yet has faith entered your 
hearts' " .^ 
The Tradition, in this regard, was narrated by Omer b. al Khattab, 
the second caliph of Muslims and collected by al-Bukhari in his book, al-
Jame-al-Sahih-lil-Bukharf which says that the holy angel Gabriel 
appeared in the garb of a Bedouin and sat very close to the Prophet 
touching his knees to the knees of the prophet and asked him about Islam 
and Iman (as well as Ihsan, but we are not concerned here with that). 
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Clarifying Islam the Prophet said, "Islam is to confinn that there is no 
God but Allah, that I am a messenger of Allah, to observe prayer, to pay 
zakat, to have fast in the month of Ramadan and to perform the hajj if you 
are able to do so". And defining Iman, he said, "To beheve in Allali, His 
angels, His books. His messengers, the day after death, and to believe in 
Qadar, in its goodness and badness." 
In the light of the Quran and the Tradition mentioned above, we 
can say that Islam is an outward submission of the slave to his lord, while 
Iman is inner one. In other words Islam includes the utterance of 'There is 
no God but Allah' by the tongue, prayer, fast, zakat and hajj and Iman 
comprises of the belief in one Allah, His angels. His messengers. 
Scriptures, in the Last Day and belief in predestination either good or bad, 
and it is obvious that the belief is an act of heart. More clearly we can say 
that Islam is an act of tongue and limbs or an act of body while Iman is an 
act of heart. However since religion is a complete way of life that consists 
of two kinds of duties, duties of body (al-taka/if al-badaniyah) and duties 
of heart (al-takalif al-qalabiyah), therefore, if we use the word 'Islam' in 
the name of a religion, it will encompass both types of duties. In other 
words, Iman will be included in Islam (and vise versa), because the 
religion given by Allah to us is called Islam by Allah Himself in the last 
verse revealed chronologically and it will be absurd to say that Islam, 
here, means just outer submission to Allah. The Quran says, "This day I 
have perfected your religion for you, completed my favour upon you, and 
have chosen for you Islam as your religion" . Therefore, the tenn Islam, 
when commonly used, is all comprehensive, including Iman in its 
connotation. Nevertheless, from the view point of philosophy, the 
difference between Iman and Islam is significant. 
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If the religion, Islam is divided into two types of duties, as Ibn 
Khaldoon does, duties of the body are the subject of Fiqh and duties of 
the heart are concerned with 'Ilm al-Kalain. "The former kind (duties of 
the body) consists of the divine laws that govern the actions of all duty-
bound Muslims and this is Fiqh....the latter kind of duties concern with 
faith (Iman) which is defined as an affirmation by the heart in agreement 
with what is spoken by the tongue and is said to consist of six articles 
the belief in (1) God (2) His angels (3) His scriptures (4) His Apostles 
(5) the last Day and (6) the behef in predestination (al-qadar), be it good 
or bad. Thus, kalam means theology in contradistinction to Fiqh, which 
means juris prudence. It is the discussion of these articles of faith {al-aqa 
'id al-imaniyyah) that, according to Ibn Khaldun, constitute "the science 
ofthekalam"^ 
If the religion Islam is held to be 'knowledge' and action {ilm and 
'amal respectively) and in the words of al-Shahrastani, m 'arifah and 
fa 'ah (knowledge and obedience) m 'arifah is the subject of kalam and 
fa'ah of Fiqh. 
The another distinction made by Shahrastani himself is the 
distinction of Usui and Fum. Usui is the subject of Kalam and Furu is the 
subject matter of jurisprudence. Shahrastani says, "Some theologians say 
that Usui means the knowledge of God in His oneness and His attributes 
and the knowledge of the prophets with their signs and proofs, but in 
general, every question whose discussion leads to the detennination of 
truth belongs to usual. Now since religion consists of knowledge 
(jn'arifah) and obedience (ta'ah), knowledge being the root {asl) and 
obedience the branch ifara), whoever treats of the knowledge and unity 
of God is an usuli (theologian) and whoever treats of obedience and law 
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is a funi'/' (Jurisconsult). Usui is the subject of scholastic theology and 
furu is the subject of jurisprudence" . 
Keeping this in view, we may conclude that the theoretical aspects 
of Islam dealing with the knowledge and Usui vis-a-vis the duties of heart 
is the subjectmatter of scholastic discourse (Kalam). 
Definition 
The word 'Kalam' means 'speech' and therefore the Quran is 
called 'Kalam al-Alldh' denoting the fact that the Quran is the speech of 
Allah. But, as a term, kalam has several implications. As Wolfson 
indicates, "The terni Kalam, which literally means 'speech' or 'word' is 
used in Arabic translations of the works of Greek philosophers as 
rendering the tenn logos in its various senses of 'word', 'reason', and 
'argument'. The term kalam is also used in those Arabic translations from 
the Greek in the sense of any special branch of learning, thus the Greek 
expression "discussions" about nature is translated by 'the physical 
kalam'. Greek term for 'theologians' is translated by 'masters of the 
divine kalam" . 
Explaining the kalam, De Boer says, "An assertion, expressed in 
logical or dialectical fashion, whether verbal or written, was called by the 
Arabs generally, but more particularly in religious teaching, a kalam and 
those who advanced such assertions were called Mutakallimun. The name 
was transferred from the individual assertion to the entire system and it 
covered also the introductory, elementary observations on method, and so 
on"^ 
Though, kalam literally means 'speech' or 'word' but it has 
several, and special by nature, implications which render kalam as a tool 
of theological polemics. This is why some persons have translated it as 
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simply 'theology' or 'speculative theology'. In the Encyclopaedia of 
Islam it is pleaded about kalam that it is "one of the religious sciences of 
Islam. The tenn is usually translated as an approximate rendering of 
'theology"^. Mohsin Mehdi, on the other hand, translates Ihn al-Kalan as 
"the science of speculative theology" . 
Since Kalam is dialectical in its nature, therefore, it was also 
translated as "dialectics" and the Mutakallimin (practitioners of the 
Kalam) as "dialecticians". De Boer says, "Our best designation for the 
science of the Kalam is "theological dialectics" or simply 'Dialectics', 
and in what follows we may translate 'Mulakallimun' by 
"Dialecticians"^ \ If the Kalam is dialectical in its nature, it is polemic in 
its method. A Mutakallim always presupposes an opponent and tries his 
best to defeat him by his argumentation. In other words, the methodology 
adopted by the Mulakallimin to estabhsh their view-point was polemical, 
therefore, some persons had translated it as 'polemic theology'. Mc 
Carthy, for example, says, "In the present work, it might well be 
translated by 'polemic theology'. Most Muslim theology is polemic, and 
kalam seems to mean the kind of plemic which makes considerable use of 
rational argument"'^. 
"In his 'Ihsa-al-Ulum', al-Farabi regards ilm al-kalam as a science 
which enables a man to procure the victory of the dogmas and actions laid 
down by the legislator of the religion, and to refute opinions 
contracticting them. The doctors of Kalam {Mutakallimun) themselves 
were to take a very similar view. This is one of many well-known 
definitions. Kalam is the science which is concerned with firmly 
estabhshing religious beliefs by adducing proofs and with banishing 
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doubts (from 'Mawakif of al Idji 18*/14'^ century). Ibn Khaldun and 
Mohammad Abduh are also of the same opinion. 
"Ilm al-kalam is the discipline which brings to the service of 
rehgious beliefs (aqa'id) discursive arguments, which thus provides a 
place for reflexion and meditation and hence for reason, in the elucidation 
and defense of the content of the faith. It takes its stand firstly against 
"doubters and deniers" and its function as defensive ''apologia" cannot be 
over-stressed. 
"Another interpretation sometimes suggested explains ilm al-kalam 
as "science of the Word of God". The attribute of the Word and the nature 
of the Quran were indeed among the first themes treated, the discussions 
on this subject continued throughout the centuries. But this was by no 
means the first question undertaken, nor that later treated at most length. 
It seems much more likely that kalam referred at first to discursive 
arguments, and the mutakallimiin were reasoners". This was the case as 
early as the rime of M'abad al-Djuhani (d. 80/699-700). Kalam became a 
regular discipline when these arguments and discussions dealt with the 
content of the faith. It is this character of discursive and reasoned 
apologia which was to attract the attacks both of the traditionalists and of 
falasifa.'" 
One thing should be clarified here, viz, why kalam was called 
Islamic scholasricism. For this purpose we should refer to its origin. 
Scholasticism was derived from Latin word scholasticus meaning the 
master of a school. St. Augustine^ '^^ -' (354-430) was the first Clirisrian 
philosopher who, on individual level tried his best to defend Christianity 
and the dogmas of its faith with the help of logical proofs and rational 
arguments. And in the medieval period in Europe, this footstep was 
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followed by some other philosphers like Abelard^^^ and Thomas 
Aquinas '^™-'. They attempted to harmonize between reason and revelation 
and defended the dogmas of Christianity on the basis of reason. Thus 
scholasticism was introduced in philosophy and theology as a defense 
method. C. G. Nonn defines Scholasticism as, "A set of scholarly and 
structural techniques developed in western European schools of the late 
medieval period, including the use of commentry and disputed question, 
scholasticism is derived firom Latin scholasticus, which in the twelfth 
century meant the master of a school. The scholastic method is usually 
presented as beginning in the law school and as being then transported 
into theology and philosophy by a series of masters including Abelard 
and Peter Lombard^''^'^"^^ 
Since the Kalam aims to establish Islamic behefs and dogmas with 
the help of reason and to harmonize between reason and revelation, 
therefore it was also called 'scholasticism'. But in order to distinguish the 
kalam from that of Christianity it was named Tslamic scholasticism'. 
Islamic scholasticism is used for Kalam that generally covers the kalam 
of the Qadarites, the Jabarites, the Mushabbiha, the Mujassima, the 
Sifatis, the Khawarij and the Shi'ites but more particularly, it covers the 
kalam of the Mu'tazilites and the Ash'arites. Whereas the Mu'tazilites 
and the Ash'arites chiefly differ on the point of priority of reason and 
revelation. The former emphasize the importance of reason and the latter 
believe in the authority of revelation. Nadvi, for example, says, "It is 
clear that, though the Arabic word 'Kalam' meaning science of reason 
includes both Mu'tazilism and Ash'arism, the word 'scholasticism' which 
is generally used as an English equivalent for kalam, is not wide enough 
to cover the two. To avoid the confusion, therefore, I shall refer to 
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Mu'tazilism as a rationalistic school and Ash'arism as a scholastic 
school"^^ 
Accordingly, we can say that the Mu'tazilites were not the 
Mylakallimin in the real sense, rather they were the philosophers of this 
Ummah. Because Mutakallimun are those who take the truth of Islam as 
their starting point and they do never deny any of its dogmas at any cost. 
On the other hand, "a philosopher does not take them as his starting point 
but follows a method of research independent of dogma, without, 
however, rejecting the dogma or ignoring it in its sources" . 
We can infer that the Mu'tazilites could not strictly follow this 
methodology, that is, they could not take the truth of Islam as their 
starting point and if they did so they could not justify the dogmas of the 
Faith. For example, they denied the very existence of Attributes thinking 
that this was contrary to the unity of God, or this did entail the plurality of 
the Deity and so on along with the fact that they stressed more on reason 
than revelation. Consequently, they were called rationalists rather than 
Mutakallimun. Abu Zuhra^'^"-', on the contrary, regards the Mu'tazilites 
to be the real Mutakallimun . But in our opinion, the Ash'antes are the 
Mutakallimun in the real sense Nevertheless, the Mu'tazilites can also be 
regarded Mutakallimun at least in some respects, because they tried their 
best to defend the dogmas of faith and their efforts remained confined to 
the Islamic framework. Further, it were the Mu'tazilites who had 
introduced the terni 'Kalam', as a special branch of learning in Islam. 
Their aim was to propound a science of their own, as a counterpart of 
Mantiq (logic) of Greek philosophers. Shahrastani says, "The Mu'tazilite 
leaders studied the works of the philosophers as they became available 
during the reign of Mamun. They then introduced the methods of the 
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philosophers into theology, which they made into a branch of science. 
They gave it the name of kalam: either because the chief question on 
which they spoke and disputed was that of kalam (Gods Word), by which 
the whole discipline was called; or in imitation of the philosophers, who 
so called one of their branches of learning logic, for logic and Kalam are 
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Briefly, Kalam includes in its connotation different methods of the 
study of theology including discourse, dialogue, defense, 
philosophication, etc., resulting into theosophical efforts to justify faith 
and beliefs of the religion either with the help of reason or revelation. 
Kalam passed through three stages: in its primary and first stage it 
was directed only to refute the arguments of new converts against Islam 
and to prove Islamic tenets by quoting Quranic verses and traditions of 
the Prophet. In the second stage it became rationalistic in the hands of the 
Mu'tazilites, but in its final stage it was reduced to mere scholasticism 
aiming at a reconciliation between reason and revelation on the basis of 
reasoning that is the work of the Ash'rities. 
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Sources and Influences 
So for as philosophy is concerned, in the pre-Islamic Arab society 
there is not much to captivate our attention. But after the auspicious event 
of the dehverance of the message of God, called Islam, the life-style of 
the Arabs went through a progressive transformation resulting into a rapid 
development in all walks of life. The history of Muslim philosophy 
virtually commences from the advent of Islam when they had a respite 
from the earlier life which engaged them in conflicts and quarrels arising 
out of very trivial matters. They devoted themselves to profundity, depth 
and sobriety. The Quran to which they owed their religion invited them to 
enter into the realm of the search of truth. This message of the Quran 
encouraged them to contemplate on various questions related to the world 
and beyond. This marks the beginning of philosophy in Islam. The Arabs 
carefriUy studied the Quran, analyzed the tradition and went through the 
classical works of other countries. We will discuss the sources, Islamic 
and non-Islamic, in the proceeding lines to present the rise of 
philosophical thought in Islam. 
Islamic sources 
Many of the orientalists, as usually they do, are of the opinion that 
'Ilm-al-Kalam, a purely Muslim science, has its roots in the western 
sources like Greek philosophy and Christian theology. Thinkers, like 
Wolfson, include some Judaic sources of its origin, but we believe that 
Ilm-al-kalam is an outcome of categorically Islamic sources, the Quran 
and the Tradition. 
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Islamic sources are mainly comprised of the Quran and the 
Traditon and out of them, the Quran stands as the most primary one. The 
very first revelation of the Quran "Read ! in the name of thy Lord and 
on 
Cherisher who created" is a discourse of God with the Prophet, asking 
him to read which gave the Prophet a moment of perplexity, for he could 
not read, as he was unlettered (ummi), but the subsequent verses relieved 
him of his bafflement when he knew that God had taught man what he 
was not cognizant of This first revelation talks of knowledge as a bounty 
which God has imparted to man for His cognition and comprehension. 
Therefore, during the course of revelation, many other verses were 
revealed to the Prophet emphasizing the acquisition of knowledge, 
application of reason for understanding the world and the use of 
knowledge in the proper direction. "Allah will exalt, in degree, those of 
you who believe and who have been granted knowledge and Allah is 
aware of what you do"^\ The Prophet was commanded to ask for 
knowledge as Allah said, "Say, my lord increase me in knowledge" . 
Allah said, "None will grasp their meanings except those who have 
knowledge" and Allah also said, "Are those who know equal to those 
who know not" ? It means that the knowledgeable and the illiterate are 
not equal. 
If we carefully study the Quran, we find that the very purpose of 
the Quran is to impart knowledge to man. The Quran encouraged man to 
reflect upon the world, its objects and their movements and to take 
admonition. "Behold in the creation of the heavens and the earth; in the 
alternation of the night and the day. In the sailing of the ships through the 
ocean for the profit of mankind ; In the rain which Allah sends down 
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from the skies, and the life which he gives there with to an earth that is 
dead. In the beasts of all kinds that He scatters through the earth ; in the 
change of the winds, and the clouds which they trail like their slaves 
between the sky and the earth, (Here) indeed are Signs for a people that 
are wise . Quran invites people to study it carefully and encourages those 
who ponder upon . "Do they not ponder on the Quran ? Had it been from 
other than Allah they would surely have found therein much 
discrepancy ". If we study the Quran we fmd that Allah has encouraged 
those who are wise and intellectual and use their intellects in proper 
direction. 
Allah has used, at forty-two places, different verbs of the root word 
'aqr, denoting the fact that those who use their intellect properly will 
grasp the truth and one should use one's intellect. We also find that the 
word 'Hikmat' or similar words are used at eighteen places. All prophets 
were granted wisdom. In the Sura, 'al-Inam', Allah has mentioned 
Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Noah, David, Solomon, Job, Joseph, Moses, 
Aaron, Zakeriya, John, Jesus, Elias, Ismial, Elisha, Jonas, and lot, and 
says of them,"These were the men to whom We gave the Book and al 
Hukm and prophethood" Here al~ 'Huhn' means wisdom as in the Sura, 
al-Nisa He says, "It is not possible that a man to whom is given the Book, 
and Wisdom, and the prophetic office, should say to people 'Be ye my 
worshipers rather than Allah" . In both the verses, the Arabic word al-
Hukm is used to mean wisdom. The prophet Muhammad was also granted 
wisdom by Allah as He says, "It is He Who has sent amongst the 
unlettered a Messenger from among themselves to rehearse to them His 
Signs, to purify them, and to instruct them in the Book and Wisdom, 
although they had been, before, in meinfest error" . The Prophet was 
guided by Allah to call people by the way of wisdom. He says, "Invite 
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(all) to the way of thy Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching and 
argue with them in ways that are best and most gracious. " Commentmg 
upon this verse Arberry says, "This verse would be taken to confirm 
Aristotle's threefold differentiation of proof into demonstrative, rhetorical 
and dialectical'^'". 
From the above citations of the Quran, it is quite clear that the 
Quran emphasizes the acquisition of knowledge which can be attained 
through various sources comprising of the testimony of both types, the 
divine and the personal, the personal one of the Prophet who was sent to 
impart to the people the knowledge of the Book and Hikmah (wisdom). 
Wisdom, again, to acquire the knowledge of the world through various 
signs that God concealed in the earth and the skies, and perception, 
reason, experience and intuition. But all these sources that man is blessed 
with must be used in the right direction for the pursuit of path of 
righteousness. 
The Quran particularly speaks of three categories of knowledge 
acquired through different sources, each of them having its own sphere 
and domain. They are the empirical knowledge, the rational knowledge 
and the intuitive knowledge. To substantiate our claim, we mention here 
the verses relevant to each. 
1. Empirical knowledge {aauml-yaqin) : "Ye shall see it with 
certainly of sight" 
2. Rational knowledge {ilm-al-yaqin) : "Nay, were ye to know with 
certamty of mmd, (ye would be aware)" 
3. Intuitive knowledge {haqqul-yaqin) : "But verily it is truth of 
assured certaintv"^'^. 
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These forms of knowledge include in their domain the knowledge 
of the past, the present and the future. Knowledge of future, of course, is 
a living issue in philosophy, sometimes negating and sometimes 
affirming the possibility of its acquisition. But the Quran unequivocally 
admits the possibility of its attainment posing God as being Alim-al-ghaib 
(the Knower of the unseen), having power to impart as much knowledge 
of future as He desires. "Nor shall they compass ought of His knowledge 
except as He willeth^ ". At another place He says, "Of knowledge it is 
only a little that is communicated to you (O, men)." 
The Quran, thus, I dare say, is the first to lay so much emphasis on 
the socialization of knowledge and this, consequently, led to a rapid 
growth of knowledge for centuries in the Islamic era. 
Besides, the Quran is the first stylistic book in the Arabic language. 
It is the best model of eloquence and rhetoric, and it has been stated that 
the Quran is the primary source of the rehgious and the worldly sciences. 
The Arabic grammar which existed, at most, in a dormant state was later 
compiled in accordance with the eschatology of Quranic language. 
Lexicography also started with the word-morphism of the Quran. 
Needless to say, before the Quran there were three other divine 
revelations known to mankind but none of them had the impact which the 
Quran did in the rapid growth of various sciences of positive and 
normative nature. 
Although, the Arabic language was known for its tapestry even 
before the advent of Islam,, particularly rich in poetry, yet it was in its 
fonnative state, and rules were emerging for its guidance and foundation. 
The Quran put on them a seal of authority and determined its semantics. 
The style of the Quran is unique in its nature. At the time of revelation it 
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neither resembled the commonly known form 'saja' which in its earliest 
days, was used by camel-drivers nor did it correspond to the most 
prevalent fonn of literary verse. It includes the elements of both these 
forms and has a versified structure and is therefore commonly known as 
the Quranic verses, having the structure of 'saja' and rhythm of poetry. 
The grandeur and the gorgeousness of its style baffled the Arabs of 
its time and forced them to believe it to be the work of God and not the 
creation of the Prophet. The Quran clearly asserts that the man chosen as 
the prophet was a completely unlettered person and was one from the 
masses. This fact was emphasized to clarify that such a perfect creation 
was not possible by the man who knew even no letters. "So believe in 
Allah and His Messenger, the unlettered Prophet, who believeth in Allah 
'in 
and His words; follow him that (so) ye may be guided" . 
Many of them, however, took it as a challenge to copy the verses 
of the Quraan in its unique style but had to bear the agony of failure and 
distress and finally had to admit it as the work of God which man, by no 
means, could copy. 
The Quran itself threw the challenge to the Arabs to copy even its 
smallest sura, "Or do they say, 'he forged it' ? Say, bring then a sura like 
unto it, and call (to your aid) anyone you can, besides Allah, if it be ye 
speak the truth," and it was, as the Prophet instructed, hung on the wall 
of the Ka'aba for quite a long time and many noted Arabs, who were 
proud of their language and style tried their best to compose such verse 
but had to acknowledge that "it is not the work of man". 
The Muslims rightly claim that the Quran includes, in its content, 
the signs and symbols related to all walks of life and thus covers the 
various sciences of different nature acknowledging man as their nucleus. 
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The Muslims, then, in the first place studied the Quran carefully, and 
profoundly involved themselves in its contents where they got access to 
various sciences inviting them to further probe and investigation. Thus, 
before consulting any other source, the Quran served them as the primary 
source for the growth of knowledge. 
The earhest problems of philosophy which lead to the origin of 
Ilm-al-kalm are definitely rooted in the Quran itself The Arabs were fully 
cognizant of their language. They understood the subtleties and 
intricacies of the language and were able to interpret the verses of the 
Quran. It has been stated elsewhere that the Quran has two types of 
verses, one clear in meaning and the other ambiguous, known in the 
Quranic terminology as Muhkamat and Mutashabihat .^ In the verses 
clear in meaning, there is no room for interpretation but the verses 
ambiguous in nature need interpretation posing challenge to the human 
wisdom and intellect. Such verses became more important for the non-
believers. And they, more often than never offered ridiculous 
interpretations which in no way could be acceptable to the Muslims. The 
delusion led to the controversies and debates in which the Muslims had to 
involve themselves, perhaps, even against their will. The Quran itself 
anticipates such controversies and warns the believers not to indulge in 
them. In the beginning, it was avoided for long, but notwithstanding the 
warning of the Quran, Muslims could not abstain from participating in 
these controversies. The ambiguous verses were pondered over and 
interpreted to answer the harsh and unfounded criticism of the non-
behevers, including the Christians, the Jews and the infidels. 
One of the discussions of the Quran was regarded its being a 
miracle. We have already pointed out that the Quranic language, its style, 
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its rh>thm and its composition, which is amazingly beautifiil, convinced 
the behevers of its being miraculous. Many scholars supported the claim 
and others denied it. The Quran, however, is treated as one of the 
miracles of the Prophet by most of the scholars and common MusHms. 
Those who did not believe in its miraculous nature, denied the occurrence 
of all miracles which again led to another controversy about miracles and 
their occurrence. The Quran, thus, in brief, is an important factor in the 
development of many religious and worldly sciences. It developed the 
interest in philology, phonetics and semantics, grammar and 
lexicography, rhetoric and dialectics, hermeonatics and many auxiliary 
sciences, dealing with and contributing to their growth. Thus one may not 
agree with the orientalists who erroneously search out the source for the 
origin of these sciences in Greek philosophy. The Quranic discourse has 
introduced us to many philosophical problems regarding the essence and 
attributes of God, justice, freedom of will and those concerning the 
articles of faith. The roots of all these questions leading to latter 
philosophical discourse lie in the Quran itself and we need not look for 
the sources elsewhere. Thus the emphasis on knowledge, contemplation 
in the issues related to the world and beyond, human fate and its 
implications have been the source of many philosophical inquiries which 
resulted in the emergence of Ilm-al-kalam. 
The Tradition 
Next to the Quran are the Traditions of the Prophet which include 
his sayings, doings and confirmations representing three categories : 
Hadith-e-Qauli, Hadith-e-Fe 'ali and Hadilh-e-Taqriri respectively. 
It is believed that the Traditions of the Prohet are the application of 
the Quran in the personal and the social life of man. The Prophet has been 
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declared to be the Ideal person for human beings, especially for muslims : 
"Ye have indeed in the Messenger of Allah an excellent exampler for him 
who hopes in Allah and the Final Day and who remember Allah much"^ * .^ 
The Quran, verily confirms the Tradition, especially his sayings, as being 
a revelation too: "Your companion (The Prophet) is neither astray nor 
being misled, nor does he say (aught) of (his own) Desire. It is no less 
than revelation {wahy) sent down to him"'^\ The Quran and the Tradition 
are differentiated by describing the categories of 'wahy' as 'Matlu' and 
Ghair-e-Matlu, the first being Wahy-e-Matlu (recited revelation) and the 
other being Wahy-e-Ghair-e-Matlu (Non-recited revelation). This makes 
clear that the Tradition, like the Quran, emphasizes the acquisition of 
knowledge and has served as a cause of inspiration for the seekers since 
the advent of Islam. The Traditions that substantiate our contention are 
given below: 
1. "Virtue is nature, importunity against is vice, whomsoever Allah 
wills to deliver good to others. He blesses him with the knowledge 
of the religion". 
2. "Whosoever follows the path of knowledge, God makes his way to 
Paradise easy, the angels lower down their wings for his bliss, all 
the creatures on the earth and in the skies including the fish in the 
water seek God's forgiveness for him, the savant is superior to the 
worshiper like the moon being superior to all other stars, the 
savants are the successors of the Prophets, the Prophets leave 
naught in succession barring knowledge, whosoever obtains it may 
aquire upto the brim". 
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3. "To seek knowledge is obligatory for every Muslim and passing it 
out to the undeserving is like adorning the swine with gold 
necklace having precious jewels and pearls". 
4. "One who has the knowledge of something and if he conceals it 
upon being asked he will bear the reins of Fire on the day of 
judgement""^^. 
From these Traditions one can easily conclude that Islam has 
encouraged Muslims to acquire knowledge. A Muslim whose main target 
is Paradise and salvation from hell is inspired in the way that if he 
acquires knowledge his way to Paradise becomes easier and if he 
conceals knowledge he may be punished in Hell. Here in the Traditions, 
we see that the word ilm (knowledge) has been used in its general form 
and it is not true for anyone to confine it within any particular religion or 
theology. Rather, this knowledge covers all types of knowledge viz. 
knowledge of theology and other sciences, applied or theoretical. 
We have seen in the preceding lines that the Quran and the 
Tradition both have emphasized the acquisition of knowledge to a great 
deal, which consequently led to growth of a rational attitude, at least in 
respect of the understanding of the world and in defense of the faith. This 
emphasis on knowledge directed the Muslim intelligentsia to contemplate 
over the issues which confronted them in their intellectual pursuit and to 
comprehend the philosophical insight of the other communities. The 
Arabs were quite receptive and penetrative. The Prophet through the 
Quran and the Tradition did not only correct their faith but also guided 
them to use their talents, prudence and sagacity. Thus it can be safely 
asserted that the Mushms could rely on their own resources for the 
growth of knowledge instead of groping them in other houses. 
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Nevertheless, it is true that the Muslim community on account of having 
useful discourses with the scholars of other communities accepted their 
influence and, thereupon restructured their thought with significant 
transfonnation of its inherited paradigm. 
Non Islamic Sources and Influences 
In addition to the Islamic sources, Muslim philosophy owes its 
emergence to various alien sources such as Greek, Syrian, Iranian and 
Indian ones. The Syrians and the Iranians, later on, were treated as 
Islamic, for after the conquests of these countries, they embraced Islam as 
their religion and there emerged a mixed culture which transformed the 
face of Islam by admitting some of their local ancestral tradition. Before 
the Muslims conquered these countries, they practised either Christianity, 
Judaism or Manichaeanism. Besides, they also learned Greek philosophy, 
theology and its methodology. There were various important centers of. 
Greek learning such as Alexandria, Harran, Jundishapur, Edessa, 
Qinisrin, Nisibis and Rasaina. When they fell to the Muslim militia, the 
Muslim intelligentsia interacted with their scholars who created in them a 
fondness and fascination for Greek philosophy and science. They fell to 
this attraction for the reason that their religion Islam encouraged them to 
acquire knowledge from all quarters. Through this interaction, Islamic 
philosophy was also influenced. Here we will try to ascertain the sources 
and their influences, firstly, of Greek and, thereafter, of Persia and India 
Greek Sources and Influences 
According to the author of 'Kashfiizzunun' there were five masters 
in Greece who had influenced muslim intelligentsia most, namely 
Bandqlese Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. 
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The above mentioned work consideres Bandqlese to be the most 
important of these masters. It describes him to have lived in the days of 
the Prophet David. He visited Syria to learn medicine and other sciences 
from Luqman (the great hakeem). Upon his return to Greece, he wrote a 
book which apparently denied the life hereafter. Due to this confusion 
many of the believers dissociated themselves from him. Jalal-al-Din al-
Qifti, the writer of 'Akhbar-al-Hukama' describes to have seen this book 
in the library of Jerusalem but denies that it contains any such assertion 
leading to the denial of the life-hereafter. The book, however, influenced 
the Batiniyah community in the formation of its faith. A noted Batini, 
Mohd. b. Abdulah b. Maisera (269, 319 A.H.) was greatly influenced by 
the philosophy of Bandqaelse and followed it as a religion. Due to his 
beliefs in Bandqlese's philosophy he had to resort to nomadic life to find 
reftige for himself He was charged with heresy and people dissociated 
themselves from him. He retired into mystic life where he had had some 
impact, but it was wiped off after his heretic views became known. 
During his stay in Iraq he met some M'utazila dialecticians who showed 
keenness in his philosophical resolutions. It is held that Bandqlese was 
the first to believe in the Attributes and Essence being identical with each 
other. God is, according to him. Omnipotent, Omniscient and Mercifiil as 
to His Being. Abul-Hudhail al-Basari, a representative of M'utazilah 
agreed to his views . 
Pythagoras was another important Greek philosopher who had a 
notable influence on Muslim schools and scholars, as mentioned in 
'Tabaqa1-ul-0mam' and 'Akhbarul Hukama'. He learned geometry and 
medicine from Egyptian scholars. Later on, he himself propounded 
number-theory and also made a valuable contribution in the field of 
geometry. Notwithstanding his skill in music, he was a great philosopher 
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of his time. According to 'Tabaqatul Atibba' he was the first to use the 
word 'philosophy' for this kind of knowledge. This work cited above 
presents detailed accounts of his life and work based on the following two 
books: 'Tarikh-al-Falasifa' of Ferfureas (Porphery) and 'Mukhtarul 
Hikam wa Mahasinul Kalim' of Abul Wafa Mubashshir b.Falik. He 
believed in the mortality of souls and held that the virtuous souls will 
enjoy reward in the hereafter in the world of souls. Like his predecessor 
he also influenced some Muslim communities like Batiniyah and 
individual philosophers belonging to the group of Brethren of purity. 
The Muslim philosophers were also influenced by Socrates who 
also carried a great deal of influence on Muslim thinkers. He was a 
disciple of Pythagoras and more inclined to divine philosophy. Socrates 
was better known for his method of dialectics. He wrote no book, yet 
gained world-reputation. He laid emphasis on discourse involving thesis 
and anti-thesis to reach a synthesis. 'Akhbanil Hukama' and 'Tabaqatul 
Atibba' give the details of his philosophy and method. He believed in 
monotheism and lived a life of asceticism. His monotheistic views 
confronted Greek Mythology which advocated polytheism. 
Plato was one of the most important Greek philosophers, 
influenced the Muslim scholars to the greatest extent. In his youth he 
wrote poetry but it could not satisfy his quest. At the age of twenty, he 
became the disciple of Pythagoras. After Pythagoras death, he learned 
philosophy from his successor, Socrates. Thereupon, Plato resorted 
completely to philosophy and burnt all his poetic works. Plato learnt 
music from Pythagoras, the art he preferred to poetry. He was also 
influenced by the Egyptian philosophers who taught him physics and 
natural sciences. He acquired the knowledge of political philosophy from 
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Socrates and thus combined both in his works later. As Aristotle says, 
Plato started a new era in the Greek philosophy, for the Greeks had 
forgotten physics, which Plato revived without abandoning the Socratic 
tradition of political philosophy. 
The Schools of Philosophy popular in Greek tradition before Plato 
were: Eleatics, stoics, Pythagorians, Sophists and Epicureans. 
The stoics and Epicureans discussed the problems of Ethics. They 
were against the traditional philosophy. The Sophists were interested in 
political philosophy. The Eleatics showed keener interest in physics. The 
peripatetics concerned themselves with the problems of various fields. 
They favoured an inter-disciplinary approach. 
Qifti and others divide the Greek philosophers, on the basis of their 
subject-matters into three broad groups; the first are the materialists who 
held that the world is eternal and uncreated. They also believed that the 
things have opposite qualities, consequently, they can't be a creation of 
any super natural power because of their being opposite in nature, for 
God is All-Good and Good cannot create evil. Thus they argued that God 
does not exist. As these philosophers were atheists, they could not 
influence Muslim philosophers. According to the author of 'Akhbarul 
Hukama', Thales of Milatus was the founder of this school. 
The second group was of naturahsts who believed in things being 
combination of various natural capacities. They held that the world is 
created by One Who is Wise, Independent and All-powerful, Who could 
combine different elements to create one particular being. These elements 
remain integrated upto sometime and thereafter they begin to disintegrate 
and, once they are disintegrated, they cannot re-unite. They, therefore, 
rejected any possibility of life hereafter. The Muslims treated them at par 
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with the atheists and therefore were not influenced by their philosophy 
because of its being against their religion. 
The third one was the group of metaphysicians who believed in 
God and were closet to Islam. The Muslims, therefore, were most 
influenced by this set of philosophers which included Socrates, Plato and 
Aristotle. It was founded by no less a person than Socrates himself Plato 
and Aristotle, disciples in lineage, made it popular. Aristotle had useful 
discourses with the atheists and naturalists. He established the superiority 
of his tradition over the earlier ones on the basis of his forceful arguments 
using all sciences of dialectics, logic and rhetorics. His discourses were 
more effective than those of his predecessors."*^ 
Greek learning became widely popular after Alexander the great 
conquered many countries. Although he could not establish his desired 
'one man's personal rule' in the world, yet, he succeeded in popularizing 
Greek language and learning. In his time, Greek language and literature 
crossed the boundaries and became popular in other parts of the world. 
Consequently, many centres of Greek learning in the world were 
established and the people showed their keenness in studying the Greek 
masters. Out of these centres, some important ones like Alexandria, 
Harran and Jundishapur were in the Meddle East. As a result, their works 
were translated into the important languages of those days like Syriac and 
Latin. People of Alexandria, Aleppo and Harran took pride in using 
Greek language in their written and verbal discourses. The aphorisms and 
the adages inscribed on Restates speak of the importance of Greek 
language. These centres existed even before the advent of Islam but they 
had no notable impact on Arab society. The Arabs became cognizant of 
them after receiving the message of Islam. These centres were mainly 
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Christian and Jew populated and along with Greek, they had also 
accepted Roman impact. After the conquest of these lands, the Greek 
language, literature and philosophy also fascinated the Muslims. It 
opened before them new vistas of knowledge and thus the Muslim 
intellectuals also started taking keen interest in these alien sciences. 
It is obvious that the Christians were familiar with the Greek 
language and literature long before the Muslims developed fondness of 
their sciences. It was for this reason that the Christians were encouraged 
in the Muslim empires to take up the task of translation of these books. 
The work was started in the days of Omawi dynasty. Khalid b.Yazid, 
who could not succeed to the throne, was keenly interested in the books 
of chemistry (Kimiya) and got them translated into Arabic and used them 
to earn his subsistence and also of his supporters who conceded to his 
claim to the throne. Omawis' contribution to the translation of these 
books is not, however, very significant but the Abbasides made an advent 
into this field right fi-om their inception. 
The Abbasides expressed their keeimess and provided patronage to 
these scholars. Notwithstanding the puritan approach of the Orthodox 
schools, particularly of jurisprudence and some of early Kalam, like 
Muijiah and Zahirites, the Greek influences could not be resisted. Imam 
Ahmad b.Hanbal (d. 855) and his followers strongly opposed to 
questioning the apparent meaning of the Quran and the Tradition. Imam 
Malik b. Anas (d. 795), another eminent Jurist and important traditonist, 
explaining 'istiwa ah al-Arsh' is reported to have said that the sitting of 
God upon the throne is certain but its modes are not known and that we 
must believe in it without questioning its possibility, else we would 
commit heresy."*"* The example clearly shows that the revelation should be 
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followed in letter and spirit and that there is no room for the application 
of reason in interpreting it. Such puritan efforts could not withstand the 
prudent nature of man, it did appeal to the common man; but could not 
satisfy the intelligentsia. Besides, the new converts of Syria and Egypt, 
who were cognizant of Greek learning and literature, unconsciously 
brought with them their legacy of contemplation and probe. 
The early Abbaside Caliphs like al-Mansoor, Harun and al~ 
Mamun, who were noted bibliofiles, patronized the advancement of 
Greek learning. Al-Mamun, in particular, sent an emissary to get the 
books of Greek masters from Bazantium and set up a board of translators 
and a library of these monumental books, called 'Bait-al-Hikmat'. Thus 
many Greek books were translated in his time into Arabic. Some of them 
were translated into Syriac earlier through which the Muslims were 
initiated into Greek sciences. 
It is significant to know that many of the translators like Hunain, 
Ishaq, Isa b. Yahya, Yahya b. Adi Abu Bishr Mitta, Qusta b. Luqa and 
Ibn-Naima al-Himsi were Christians and thus one can't deny the 
likelihood of the colour of Christian faith in the translation of various 
books of Greek masters. It is a fact, Wolfson holds, that many of the 
problems of kalam like that of Essence and Attributes, free will and 
determination, createdness of the Quran, etc. emerged from Christian 
scholastic discourses. However, one may not agree with wolfson, for he 
traces out the origin of every Islamic philosophical discourse in 
Christianity, but it is certain that many of them do have Christian origin. 
The Abbaside caliphs provided patronage to the scholars without 
any discrimination of colour and creed. It is evident from the fact that 
ahnost all the members of the board of translators, set up in the days of 
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al-Mamun to take up the task of translation, were Christians. The team, 
however, in all phases, consisted of Christians, Sabeans, Jews, Hindus 
and Muslims. Al-Kindi was the first Muslim capable of doing and 
supervising the work of translation. 
The translation work is spread over in three phases. The first phase 
starts from al-Mansoor in which the books on morality. Logic, astrology 
and medicine were rendered into translation. 
The second phase begins from al-Mamun who directed to translate 
books of all sciences. In the third phase, the scholars showed their interest 
in translating Aristotle's books of logic and metaphysics and writing 
commentaries upon them.'' 
Among the Abbaside Caliphs, the foremost figure was al-Mamun 
who in 830 A.D. set up the famous Bait-al-Hikmah or the 'house of 
wisdom' for the purpose of translation and research."^ ^ He was so 
interested in philosophy and kalam that he himself composed "a number 
of treatises, which dealt mainly with theological questions in a Mutazilite 
spirit, such as a 'Treatise on Islam and the Confession of Unity (Tauhid) 
and another treatise on the 'Luminaries of Prophecy' as well as a series of 
aphorisms and adages, which are preserved in ancient sources and testify 
to his brilliance"^^. 
Thus, briefly speaking, the Abbaside period was quite furtile for 
the rapid growth of knowledge. The caliphs gave the scholars the best 
opportunities to show their talents in all disciplines. 
Here we will mention, in brief, a few names of important 
translators of Abbaside period along with their services in rendering 
translations of some philosophically important books of Greek masters, 
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though they have translated the books related to medicine, astrology, 
Alchemy etc. 
"The first translations of philosophical texts appear to be the work 
of Yahya (Yuhanna) b. al-Bitriq, who lived during the reigns of Harun 
and al-Mamun. 
The most important philosophical work Yahya is credited with 
translating is undoubtedly Plato's Timaeus. This work, according to al-
Fihrist, consisted of three books {maqalat). 
Equally important is Ibn-al-Britriq's translation of the paraphase of 
Aristotle's DeAnima, which together with that of Alexander of 
Aphrodisias played a decisive role in the development of Arab conception 
of Aristotle's psychology and especially his doctrine of the intellect. 
The other philosophical works this scholar is said to have 
translated are all Aristotelian: the zoological corpus (in ninteen books), 
Analytica_Priora, and the apocryphal Secret of Secrets which had a 
considerable vogue among medieval Latin authors and which Ibn-al-
Bitriq supposedly discovered during his research for the Politics_oi 
Aristolle.'"*^ 
"But by far the foremost figure in the history of translation of 
Greek philosophy and science is that of Hunain b. Ishaq (801 - 873). 
"Of the strictly philosophical works of Galen, Hunain cites his 
^Treatise on Demonstration, Hypothetical Syllogism, Ethics^ his 
paraphases of Plato's Sophists, Parmenides, Cryatylus, Euthydemus, 
Timaeus, Statesman, Republic and Law". 
"Of the Peripatetic works of Galen, Hunain claims to have 
translated his Treatise on the Immovable Mover'into Arabic and Syriac 
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and his 'Introduction to logic' into Syriac only. The Numbers of 
Syllogisms he translated into Syriac, whereas his son Ishaq subsequently 
translated it into Arabic. 
In addition, numerous Aristotelian works were translated, although 
hardly any directly into Arabic, by Hunain's associates, working no doubt 
under his supervision. Thus his son Ishaq, his nephew Hubaish, and his 
disciple Isa b.Yahya were responsible for translating almost the whole 
Aristotelian corpus, as well as a series of Platonic and Peripatetic works. 
To Ishaq is attributed the translation into Arabic of the Categories, the 
Hermeneutica, De Generation et corruptione^ the Ethica in Porphyry's 
commentary, parts of the Metaphysica, Plato''s_Sophist, parts of Timaeus 
and finally the spurious De Plantis. 
Apart from these translations, he composed a number of original 
scientific and philosophical works such as: A Greek Grammer, A 
Treatise on the Tides, A Treatise on the Salinity of Sea Water, A Treatise 
on Colors, A treatise on the Rainbow, The Truth of Religious Creeds, The 
Analects of the Philosophers, A Universal History and even a work on 
Alchemy."*^ 
"The scholar who was without doubt the equal of Hunain in the 
scope of his learning and his versatility was Qusta b. Luqa. The Hst of his 
philosophical writings includes The Sayings of the Philosophers, the 
Difference Between Soul and Spirit, A treatise on Atom, An Introduction 
to Logic, A political Treatise, An Exposition of the Doctrines of the 
Greeks, An Historical treatise Entittled al-Firdaus. 
The chief philosophical translations attributed to Qusta are the first 
four books of Aristotle's PhysicaftogQthQr possibly with Books V and 
29 
'Ilm al-Kaldm 
VI), On Generation and Corruption (Book I), and pseudo - Plutarch's 
Opinions of the Physicists, or Placita Philosophorum^ 
"Abu Bishr Matta is credited with translation of Alexander's 
coininentries on Metaphysical, De Caelo, and De Generatione et 
Corrupiione. 
"He is also credited with commentaries on Aristotle's four logical 
works: Categories, Hermeneutica, Analytica Priora, and Analytica 
Posteriora as well as a commentry or Porphyry's Isagoge, An 
Introduction to Analytica and a Teatise on Conditional Syllogisms. 
"Yahya b. Adi also earned a fine reputation in logic and was 
known as logician (mantiqi). In addition to Aristotle's Poetica, 
Sophistica, Topica,_and possibly Metaphysica, he is credited with a 
translation of Plato's Law, a commentary on Topica and parts of Physica 
VIII and Metaphysic and the whole of Generatione, and many others 
related to logic, physics, metaphysics and even to theology. 
Abu Uthman Dimashqi was another leading figure in the ninth 
century in the tradition of Aristotelian scholarship. He was responsible for 
translations of Topica, Ethica Nicomachaea^ Physica IV, De Generatione 
et Corruptione, Euclid's Elements, Porphyry's Isagoge, and Alexander's 
three treatises on Colors, Immaterial Substances, and Growth. 
"Isa b. Zurah is credited with translation from Syriac of Aristotle's 
De Generatione Animalium, Metaphysica L, Sophistica and of Nicolaus, 
Five Books on the Philosophy of Aristotle. 
"Ibn-al-Khammar translated mostly from Syriac into Arabic. His 
translations include Aristotle's Meteorologica, the four books on logic 
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(i.e. Isagoge, Categories, Hermenetica and Analytica Priora), The 
Problems of Theophrastus and a treatise on Ethics. 
"Ibn Naimah al-Himsi and a certain Astar (Eustathius) are 
responsible for the translation of the apocryphal Theology of Aristole, 
played far-reaching role in the history of Islamic Neo-Platonism and 
Metaphysica of Aristotle respectively.^^ 
Indo-Persian Sources and Influences 
Besides the Greek influence on Muslim philosophy, there are some 
Indo-Persian influences as well. So far as Indian influences are 
concerned, we can make conjectures about the import of ideas of the 
Arabs, which originated from the Indian soil in the pre-Islamic era due to 
ancient Indo-Arab trade relations, but we have no evidence of such 
transportation. In the Islamic Arabia, however, we do discover such 
evidences showing the transfer of ideas, partly due to the trade-relations 
and partly because of the craving of the caliphs, particularly Abbasides, 
for the quest of knowledge in all fields. It is believed that the Arabs, in 
the first instance, became interested in the Indian astronomy, and 
Siddhanta of Brahmagupta was translated into Arabic in the days of al-
Mansoor. The book was presented to the caliph al-Mansoor by an Indian 
scholar which, later on, was rendered into translation. Mohd. B. Ibrahim 
al-Fazari prepared an Arabic version of the book, based on its translation, 
under the title 'Sanad al-Hind-al-Kabir\ which is said to be the 
beginning of astronomy in the Muslim world. 
Another important book translated through Persian text, from 
Pahlawi, was Klilah wa Dimna of Bidpai by Abdullah b. Muqaffa, a 
hypocrite, a moralist otherwise. The author of Akhbar-al-Hukama 
mentions that al-Kindi had gone through the translated version of this 
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referred book. Apart from it, we find no notable book of any Indian 
philosophy rendered in Arabic through translation. Nevertheless, the 
imprint of the influence of Indian philosophy can be seen through the 
books of Shahrastani, particularly, the one he wrote on Indian religions. 
Apart from Shahrastani, Iranshahri and Biruni later on took keen interest 
in Indian philosophy, art and culture. Al-Biruni's account of India, in 
Kitab~al-Hind, is most valuable, for he learnt Sanskrit and other Indian 
dialects to have access to the original sources. These authors inspired the 
Arabs for a devoted study of Indian philosophy, art and culture. 
Needless to say that the socio-political controversies divided 
Muslims into different groups. The divisions became sharper after the 
conquest of adjoining and far away lands having different cultures and 
creeds. Amongst them, Persia was the most important, for it exercise a 
vital influence on the intellectual history of Islam. The Persian 
Philosophy of Mazdaism, Manichaeanism and Zoroastrianism influenced 
the Muslim mind, and later on many of the philosophers worked hard to 
present their theories rather forcibly in the framework of Islam without 
having a sagacious look at their conformity with Islam. Such theories 
gave way to the perilous insertions like the one of Hulul which may be 
identical with theory of incarnation. On account of it, we have a 
community like Nursairy in Islam who believed in the incarnation of Ali. 
This could partly be the result of Cliristian influence. 
Shiaism, which emerged, later on, as a political group after being 
transfonned into a religious community, was greatly inspired by these 
theories due to their proximity with the concept of Imamali. An Imam, 
being the spiritual descendent of the Prophet Mohammad, imbibes his 
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qualities so extensively that he appears to be the incarnation of the 
Prophet. 
Many classical Persian texts were translated into Arabic and most 
of them were on morals, for morality was the main concern of the 
Persians of those days. Such books had a positive influence on the Arab 
mind. They taught them how to live as a moral being. Under this 
influence, many treatises like that of Farabi, Miskawaih, Nasir Khusru 
and others were written on morality. Here also we find a repetition of 
Aristotelian ethics with Muslim conviction. It is evident that besides 
Greek philosophy the growth of Muslim philosophy was influenced by 
Indo-Persian scientific tradition. 
In this discussion, we have described the Islamic and non-Islamic 
sources and influences which helped in shaping the Muslim mind. This 
also shows the quick reception and deep insight of the Muslim 
community to pick up whatever is needed fi^om anywhere. Nevertheless, 
one should not be mistaken, as the orientalists, like Wolfson are that 
everything in Muslim philosophy has been borrowed either from 
Christianity, Judaism or Greek philosophy. 
The possibility of the proximity between Islam and these two 
religions is quite firm due to their being Semitic and revealed ones. The 
articles of faith, for instance, the essential features of these religions, are 
largely common having a difference of interpretation and historical 
sequence. Unity of God is one of them, which is readily acceptable to the 
followers of all these three religions, but the ingredients deteraiining the 
nature of this concept and variety of faith are different. This may lead to 
some overlapping of interpretation and comprehension. If the concept is 
properly analysed and then presented its being distinct will become an 
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evident fact leading to the realization of the proximity being accidental. It 
should, then, be clearly borne in mind that the Christian authors, engaged 
in translation, indirectly pushed through their ideas which after a critical 
perusal were wiped out. Such a process of secretion was, in the first 
place, started by Abul-Hasan al-Ash'ari himself whose contribution will 
be discussed later on in the body of this thesis. 
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Schools of Thought before al-Ash'ari 
The Muslims have a veiy proud past in the medieval world. The 
Arabs, who once were regarded in history a savage community, became 
so civilized that they reached the apex of knowledge in all possible 
realms. True it is that they erected their edifice on the available 
foundation of Greek, Persian and some Indian remains, but the body of 
knowledge that rose high was entirely different, prepared with quite 
another material, the Quran and the Tradition. It was a distinct seat 
having a different frame-work, which, in its own right, was called Muslim 
philosophy. We should never agree with the orientalists who make 
arrogant claims that all the significant contributions of Muslim 
intellectuals owe their origin to Greek philosophy, Christianity or 
Judaism. So far as Christianity and Judaism are concerned, one may agree 
to their having some similarities with Islam due to their Semitic origin 
and revealed nature, nevertheless, Islam has its own paradigms creating 
enonnous possibilities of interpretation. Greek philosophy, however, has 
helped in developing the philosophical insight and prudence to probe into 
the problems of intellectual significance. But in still does not mean that 
the Muslims were no wise community and they borrowed all wisdom 
from external sources. Their religion always taught them to seek 
knowledge and wisdom, which created in them a keen insight, a 
penetrative outlook and a sagacious, questioning spirit. It led to the 
growth of knowledge in all vital spheres, including philosophy, science 
and literature. Due to enonnous intellectual activity, many schools of 
thought were nurtured, each advocating quite convincingly for the 
doctrines that were the fruit of its own contemplation. 
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We will briefly discuss the factors responsible for the emergence 
of various sects in Muslim philosophy belonging to the two phases of 
Ilm-al-kalam; the early and the later ones. 
In the early phase, the Muslim intellectuals felt more concern for 
the discourse on the six articles of the faith (Iman) as distinguished from 
infidelity (Kufr), and the vital question regarded the position of a sinner 
about which much has been said in the Qur'an, making the sinners aware 
of the dire and dreadfiill consequences that may ensue in the life 
hereafter. It should be blasphemous to think that God has warned the 
sinners with frightful conjunctions only to frighten them and to make 
them abstain from committing sins. Such a belief would reduce the 
seriousness of God's command. Thus, the gravity of the question must be 
felt with a firm belief that God's warning is not merely to invoke fear and 
that ignoring it may result in significant consequences hereafter. The 
problem of sin and the consequences therof were discussed by the Murjia 
at length, and the latter one was seriously taken by the Wa'idiyah. 
Besides, the problem concerning the freedom of will also attracted the 
Muslim philosophers, which followed the emergence of Jabr and Qadar 
school. Sifatiyah and Mushabbihah largely took up the contentious issue 
of Essence and Attributes of God. The early phase of kalam had the 
following important schools; Jabariyah, Qadariyah, Murji'a, Wa'idiyah, 
Kharijah, Shi'ah, Sifatiyah and Mushabbihah. They became almost 
extinct in the later phase of kalam and M'utazilah and Asha'irah acquired 
the distinction of being the most representative schools of this phase. 
Many contemporary and later historians of philosophy and culture 
recorded their doctrines and commented upon their origin and nature. 
According to the available information, al-Ash'ari was the first to write 
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about the various schools and groups which emerged to from the core of 
Mushm intelUgentsia in the realm of philosophy and theology. Al-Ash'ari 
also apprised the Muslim world of the significant contribution these sects 
had made in the progress of philosophy and theology. Al-Ash'ari devoted 
a monumental book, commonly known as 'MaqalaV, to these schools, 
giving a brief historical account of their emergence and the doctrines by 
which each sect was identified as a separate religious philosophical 
group. Ash'ari's 'Maqalaf was a valuable effort which became the 
source for all other hereseographers like Baghdadi, Shahrastani and 
others. Here, al-Ash'ari reserves his comments upon the doctrines of 
various sects for his works which followed 'Maqalat'. Here he has tried 
to preserve objectivity by describing them in the order of their 
occurrence. But we are aware that such developments are not mere events 
and cannot be viewed as such. Al- Ash'ari's contribution, however, 
served as the guideline for the future generations. It is surprising to see 
that al-Ash'ari has not mentioned individual philosophers in any of his 
available works, even though they have exerted a serious influence not 
only on philosophers but also on the common man. 
The emergence of Jabr and Qadar is arguably the most important as 
for as the intellectual scene of Islam was concerned. Some orientalists 
believe that these schools existed even before the advent of Islam. One 
may not agree to their suggestion about their formal existence, but it 
cannot be denied that the traits of Jabr and Qadar could be found, at least 
implicitly, even in the days of Arabilliteracy. The oracle of fate haunted 
every generation in almost all the parts of the world. Indian and Greek 
literature and philosophy present many such evidences of contrary beliefs 
about the destiny of man. We have no reason to disagree that the Arabs 
also held these contrary beliefs which, later on, received the nomenclature 
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of Jabr and Qadar. There is little room to doubt that these views were 
prevalent in the pagan Arabs, They could be simultaneously held by the 
Jewish and Christian Arab residents, for they were religious communities 
and religion has an implicit element of paganism. 
The scholars agree that Muslims were made cognisant of this 
discourse by M'abad-Al-Juhani, Gailan-Al-Dimashqi and Jaham b . 
Safwan who held contrary beliefs regarding free will. It is believed that 
the Qadar school came into existence under the Christian influence. 
M'abad b. AbduUah-al-Juhani was the student of Sosan, who had 
converted to Islam from Christianity and had then joined a group of 
Hypocrites. His motive in embracing Islam was obvious. He wanted to 
create a cleavage among Mushms by introducing a logistic based on the 
Quran and the Sunnah'. But, apart from this, Quran and Tradition 
themselves encourage debate over the contentious issues regarding 
destiny. 
Belief in the destiny is one of the articles of faith and it attracted 
both the theologians and scholars a like to go ahead with fiaiitfiil 
discussions in its defence or otherwise, particularly in the early phase of 
the kalam. The freedom of will could thus be one of the basic questions 
which would have confronted the Muslim mind even without any foreign 
influence. The belief in destiny opens the possibilities of both Jabr and 
Qadar, thus inviting crucial discourse. The threads of the two can be 
traced to the Scriptures themselves. It is evident, then, that the Quran and 
the Hadith themselves are the source of this discussion. It is needless to 
assign any motive to any foreign mercenary. This, however, does not 
mean to deny the inimical attitude of the Christians and the Jews and their 
efforts to raise meaningless objections against Islam. This was done in the 
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past by joining with the hypocrites. Today it is done in the name of 
secular tradition. Jabr and Qadar, however, grew in the Muslim society 
and became popular in the days of Umawis and Abbasis respectively. 
Jabariyah 
Jabr school of thought was quite popular in the days of Umawi 
dynasty, the reason being that it was convenient for them to continue their 
licentious life style under the garb of predetenninism. They advocated for 
their innocent participation in the deeds by ascribing their creation and 
doing both to Allah. It was also convenient because the arguments in its 
favour could draw their strength rather substantively from the Quran and 
the Tradition. Many verses in the Quran and the Traditions may be quoted 
in support of Jabr (pre-destination). Common Muslims believe that God is 
the Maker of destiny. He writes the destiny of a child even before its birth 
in the womb of its mother or, perhaps, even earlier, in the Heaven itself 
The common man's belief is, then, sustained by numerous instances from 
the scriptures. 
Regarding livelihood, Allah says, " know they not that Allah enlarges 
the provision or restricts it for any He pleases? Verily in this are signs for 
those who believe!" At another place, about guidance and misguidance 
He says, "For such as Allah leaves to stray, there can be no guide and 
such as Allah doth guide there can be none to lead astray. Is not Allah 
exalted in Power, the Lord of Retribution?" . Still at another place, He 
declares, "If it had been thy Lord's Will, they would all have believed,-
All who are on the earth.""* Likewise there are in the Quran many verses 
that suggest thats the matters of livelihood, guidance, misguidance and 
even of faith are in the hand of Allah. The traditions supporting this 
viewpoint are as follows: 
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"It is pre-writen for all the sons of Adam as to the exact amount of 
adultery he should commit. Now, the adulteiy of eye is a (lustful) look, 
the adultery of tongue is talk; the soul wishes and desires while the sexual 
organ(only) confmns or belies" 
Muslim and Bukhari report still another tradition. According to them, 
the Prophet said "(when the embryo is four months old), God sends an 
angel with four decrees which he writes down, viz. its action, life-span, 
sustenance and whether it is blissful or damned. I swear by Him other 
than Whom there is no God, one of you continues to perform Paradise-
winning acts until, when between him and Pradise there is but a yard, fate 
overtakes him and he performs actions deserving of Fire and thus enters 
Fire (and vice versa)." 
On the basis of these evidences one may come to the conclusion that 
God is responsible for all actions and man is only a toy with whom He 
plays as He wills. The sect holding this view-point was called Jabariah 
(the Jabarites) or determinists. Jahm b. Safwan was regarded as its 
pioneer. 
The Jabariah are divided into two groups: one being the hardliners 
and the other moderates. The hard-liners deny any power to man in 
choosing the action or its performance. All such power rests with God. 
Qadrah is one of His Attributes and cannot be exercised by man. The 
moderates assign the power of choice to man, but it is not effective. This 
again virtually means denial. The distinction later became almost 
meaningless. 
There are three groups generally recognized as the Jabariya: The 
Jahmiyah, the Najjariyah and the Dirariyah. The first group consists of 
hardliners because they follow Jahm b. Safwan as their leader. Jahm is of 
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the view that the power to act given to man is created and with regard to 
this power "Jahm says that a man does not have power over anything nor 
can he be said to have capacity to act. Man is absolutely determined in his 
deeds. He has neither power, nor will, nor choice. God creates deeds in 
man just as He produces actions in all inanimate objects, and it is only in 
a metaphorical sense that deeds can be ascribed to man."^ 
The other two groups are included in the category of moderates, as 
Najjar is of the opinion that "God is the creator of all man's deeds, good 
and bad, right and wrong (but) man on his part acquires these deeds. He 
further maintains that the created power has a certain effect on these 
deeds. This he calls acquisition (kash), as Ash'ari does."'' Dirariyah holds 
that "man's deeds are in reality created by God and man in reality aquires 
them. Thus it is possible for an act to be produced by two agents."^ 
Qadariyah 
Qadar represents the other side of the argument. It grants the power 
of choice to man and firmly advocates indeterminism or libertarianism, 
considering man responsible for all the deeds that he commits, whether 
good or bad. Man is the maker of his own destiny. His reason is the best 
guide in exercising his choice between the performance of apposite 
actions. The followers of Qadar believe that man is the originator of all 
his actions. Their acquisition and completion both is in his hands. They 
conclude that in case the power is denied, the concept of the life hereafter 
and bestowing rewards or inflicting punishment by God thereof will 
become meaningless. The argument of Qadar is more forceful in the light 
of the other numerous verses of the Quran and many Traditions. For 
instance, regarding guidance to be received by man, God says, "Verily 
We have revealed the Book to thee in Truth, for (instructing) mankind. 
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He then that receives guidance benefits his own soul, but he that strays 
injures his own soul."^ In a tradition recorded by Al-Bukhari and Muslim, 
the Prophet said, "Every child is bom but then its parents make either a 
Jew or a Christian or a Magian of it". In another tradition recorded by 
Tinnidhi, Ibn Maja and Ahmad, the Prophet (P.B.U.H.) said about 
medicines and precautionary measures against illness and other calamities 
that "they are themselves a part of Divine determinism." To this effect, a 
tradition is also reported that when Umar b. Al-khattab ordered his militia 
to come back from a place stricken with plague and when someone 
objected saying "Do you flee from the Decree of God"? Umer replied, "I 
flee from the Decree of God to the Decree of God"' . 
One can easily conclude in the light of the Quran and the traditions 
cited above that taking precautionany steps against harmful things and 
even the matter of receiving guidance or rejecting it is in the hands of 
man. This is why a man deserves either praise or blame. But, at the same 
time, one should also remember that Allah is Omnipotent. Nothing is 
beyond His power. There, should, then, be harmony and balance between 
the power of man and the power of God. But Qadariyah became so 
rational in justifying libertarianism that Abdullah b.Umar, a famous 
companion of the Prophet had to warn people to avoid listening to 
M'abad b. Abdullah al-Juhani and, later on, Hasan al-Basari called 
Mabad a wayward person who leads others astray from the right path. 
Mabad al- Jahani was first to introduce this doctrine and Ghailan of 
Damascus later joined him in his movement. These two persons are 
considered the founders of this Qadariyah school. 
The problem of Jabr and Qadar is directly linked to the problem of 
good and evil. It is posed as a very relevant question as to who is 
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responsible for the creation of good and evil. It becomes still more 
important, for 'the belief in good and evil' is one of the articles of faith 
and is thus inevitable. The answer invokes three possibilities: (i) that God 
is responsible for the creation of good and evil both, as He is the creator 
of all things, (ii) that God being All-Good creates only good and evil is 
the creation of man and (iii) that God creates things and they are qualified 
as good or evil in the given situation. Such an answer would lead to 
relativism. While creating angels and jinns of different orders, God also 
created Ibhs, a jinn otherwise. He was included in the pageantry of angels 
due to his sincerity, devotion, complete obedience and excessive worship 
of God. But a given situation changed his mind and he decided to disobey 
God, which otherwise would have been impossible. Shahrastani, a noted 
hereseographer, wisely postulates seven following questions the Devil 
poses in a discourse with the angels to justify his disobedience. 
"Iblis is reported to have said: 
I admit that God is my God and the God of creation, knowing and 
powerful; that His power and will cannot be questioned, and that 
whenever he wills a thing he says to it 'Be,' and it becomes. I also admit 
that he is wise, but concerning his wisdom a number of questions can be 
raised. 
The angels asked, 'what are these questions and how many are 
they?' IbHs replied: 'Seven'. He continued: 
The first question is, that as God knew before he created me what I would 
do and how I would act, why did he create me? And what is His wisdom 
in creating me? 
Secondly, if he created me in accordance with His will and 
pleasure, why did He command me to know and obey him? Moreover, 
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since He does not derive any benefit from obedience, nor is He harmed 
by disobedience, what is the wisdom in this command? 
Thirdly, when He created and commended me to acknowledge and 
obey Him, I adhered to His command and acknowledged and obeyed 
Him. Why, then, did He command me to obey Adam and make obeisance 
to Him? What is His wisdom in this particular command, since it does not 
add to my knowledge of Him, nor increase my obeisance to Him? 
Fourthly, when He created me and not only commanded me in 
general, but gave me also this particular command, then, when I did not 
make obeisance to Adam, why did He curse me and cast me out of 
paradise? What is the wisdom in this? I committed no other evil than 
saying, 'I shall make obeisance only to you.' 
Fifthly, when He created me and gave me both a general and a 
particular command, and I did not obey Him, he cursed me and drove me 
away. Why, then, did He give me access to Adam, so that I entered 
paradise a second time and deceived him by my evil suggestion? Adam 
consequently ate of the forbidden tree, and God expelled him from 
paradise with me. What is the wisdom in this? Had he prevented me from 
entering paradise, Adam would have eluded me and would have been 
there forever. 
Sixthly, after God had created me and given me both a general and 
a particular command; after He had cursed me and given me re-entrance 
to paradise, where a dispute took place between me and Adam, why did 
He give me power over his descendants in such a way that I could see 
them but they could not see me? Why were my evil suggestions able to 
influence them, but they had no power or influence of any kind over me? 
What is the wisdom in this? If God had created them and given them their 
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nature with no one seeking to make them deviate from it, they would 
have Hved pure, attentive and submissive. This would have been more 
fitting for them and more in harmony with wisdom. 
Seventhly, I admit all this, namely, that God created me, that He 
gave me both a general and a particular command, and that when I did not 
obey him he cursed me and expelled me from paradise; also, that when I 
wanted to re-enter paradise He allowed me to do so and gave me access 
to it; that when I did the thing I did he cast me out but gave me power 
over mankind. Why, then, after that, when I asked him to give me respite, 
did he give me respite? I said to God, my Lord, respite me till the day 
they shall be raised.' He said, 'Thou art among the ones that are respited 
unto the day of a known time.' 
What is the wisdom in this? If He had desfroyed me at that time, 
Adam and the whole of mankind would have been beyond my power, and 
there would have been no evil in the world. Is not the enduring of the 
world in right order better than the world mixed with evil? 
Iblis then added: 'So this is my argument for what I maintain on 
each question." 
These questions increase the intrigue and the problem becomes still 
more important. Jabr and Qadar, as al-Ashari also agrees, try to give some 
satisfactory answers. In the case of Jabr, the answer is easier, for it 
favours pre-destinarianism which makes reward and punishment as 
redundant. In the case of Qadar, the answer has a philosophical 
foundation. The early Qadariyah believed that God is the creator of all 
good, for He is Good Himself and the creator of evil is either Satan or 
man himself This formulation poses some serious difficulties since it 
speaks of the possibility of another creator and (ii) evil is believed to 
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have been created even without the Will of God. Belief in another creator 
would amount to having an identical God, which is the creator of evil. 
This is Magian in character and the early Qadariyah, therefore, were 
called "Magians of this Ummah" in the light of the tradition recorded by 
Ahmad and Abu Daud on the authority of Ibn Abbas "Al-Qadariyah 
Majuso hazihi al-Umma. " Such a belief might owe itself to the Persian 
influence. 
The later Qadariyah reformulated their doctrine and belief, and 
held that man is the creator of his good and bad deeds. This, however, 
does not improve upon their position of another creator except that it is 
not an identical power but a subordinate one. Nevertheless, man at least 
enjoys the power of creation of deeds. The Ashairah, whom we shall 
discuss later, criticise this position and return to the cormnon man's belief 
that God alone is the creator of all things and actions too. The creation of 
evil.still remains a problem. 
Al-Khawarij 
The Kharijah was basically a reactionary group. It emerged in 
the Battle of Siffim. Having seen that the rival army raised the Holy 
Quran overhead on the point of their daggers, AH b. Abu Talib made a 
compromise with Mu'awiyah. A section of Ali's army did not agree to 
cease-fire, for they thought that Muawiyah was perpetrating thus using a 
fi-aud in the Holy Quran, and that it was only a strategy of emotional 
black mail. This section gave the proof of having a better political insight 
and acumen and it later on became evident from the historical 
developments. 
The kharijah had a popular appeal in the beginning and they 
became popular as a strong political opponent of both Ali and Muawiyah. 
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They considered both of them as the perpetrators of the grave sin (i.e. 
massacre of Mushms). As a consequence, they could get no acceptabihty 
in either group. It was certainly difficult for the Muslims in general to 
believe that Ali could be the perpetrator of a grave sin. They could, 
however, believed that Omawis, who indulged in debauchery, could be 
the perpetrators of the grave sin. The kharijah themselves assumed the 
role of a judge which was finally not accepted by the majority. 
Haraura and Naherwan were the first centers of the khawarij. That is 
whythey were first called Harauriyah. Al-Ash'ari uses five name for 
them: al-Harauriyeh, al-Shorat, al-Harariyahal-Mariqa and al-
1 'X 
Muhakkimah. Barring Mariqa, they accepted these names. They were 
named khawarij because they left the Muslim conmiunity in general, and 
Ali and Mu'awiyah in particular, and rebelled against them. We have 
already stated that the kharijah were not a group of scholars and 
philosophers. They only concerned themselves with socio-poHtical 
developments and made an attempt to reform the society as they deemed 
it fit. They were basically puritans in their approach and wanted to purify 
Islam with their calculus. They primarily deliberated on the problem of 
sin not in the Christian or Jewish tradition but as a product of socio-
political development, particularly Ali's compromise with Muawiyah. 
Their basic idea of sin was of a political nature. They, before being 
known as Kharijah, considered Muawiyah as infidel and believed that 
making compromise with an infidel was an infidelity in itself They 
regarded Ali also as infidel because he made compromise with him. For 
them this compromise was a great sin and its perpetrators were infidels. 
In their political extremism and orthodoxy they overlooked all the 
traditions of the Prophet determining the status of his house-hold (Ahl-al-
Bait). The kharijah faced heavy political coercion. It is believed that to 
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save themselves from the tyramiy of the proceeding cahphs, particularly 
the Omawis, they resorted either to seclusion or devoted themselves to 
studies. Those who withdrew themselves from the society, later on, 
became sufis. It is said that Abu-al-Hashim kufi, who is believed to be the 
first sufi, was a khariji. Those who devoted themselves to study later 
formulated themselves into the group of Mutakallimin. One can identify 
Wa 'idiyah' amongst them. They jumped into the other field due to socio-
political harshness and coercive attitude towards them. They could not 
stand it and finally became almost extinct. 
According to al-Ashari, the kharijites, in general, agreed upon 
charging Ali b.Abu Talib with infidelity due to his appointing Abu Musa 
al-Ash'ari as an arbitrator. Before his appointment as arbitrator he was a 
legitimate Imam and caliph. Abu-Musa al-Ashari, Amr b.al-Aas and 
Muawiya were also regarded infidels by them. They believed in the 
imamate of Abu-Bakr and Umar and denied the imamate of Uthman 
when, according to them, he stopped following the traditions of his 
predecessors, that is, Abu Bakr and Umar, and adopted new practices ^. 
They have their on concepts and beliefs about Tauhid, Jabr 
and Qadar, createdness of the Quran, grave sin, etc. On the basis of these 
beliefs, they are divided into the following sub-sects: 
Al-Azariqah, the followers of Nafea b. Azraq al- Hanafi. 
Al-Najadat, the followers of Najdah b. Amir al Hanafi. From this 
arose two other sects. One was called al-Atawiah, the followers of Atiya 
b. al-Aswad and the other is al-Fudaikiyah, the followers of Abu Fudaik 
but the later was rather uninfluential . From al-Atawiah arose a group 
called al-Ajarida, the followers of Abdul karim b. al-Ajrad and this was 
further divided into fifteen sub-divisions: (i) al-Mamumiyah, (ii) al-
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Khalafiyah, (iii) al-Hamaziyah, (iv) al-Shuaibiyah, (v) al-Khazamiyah, 
(vi) al-Maliuniyah, (vii) al-Majhuliyah, (viii) al-Salatiyah, (ix) al-
Thalibah, (x) al-Akhnasiyah, (xi) al-Mabadiyah, (xii) al-Shabaniyah, 
(xiii) al- Ziadiyah, (xiv) al-Roshaidiyah and (xv) al-Makarainiyah. 
Al-Safariyah, the followers of Ziyad b.al-Asfar. 
4- Al-Ibadiyah. This group was further divided into four groups. The 
first among them is al-Hafasiyah, the followers of Hafs b. Abu-al-
Miqdam. The second is al-Yazidiyah, the followers of Yazid b.Unaisah. 
The third one is al-Harithiyah, the followers of Harith al-lbadi, and the 
last one followed Abu Hazail, the Mutazilite, regarsing the obedience. 
According to them sometimes it is an obedience without seeking the 
pleasure of God. 
Ibadiyah are further divided into three groups on the basis of the 
definition and application of hypocrisy (al-nifaq). 
5- Al-Bihasiyah, the followers of Abu Bihas Hassam b.Jabir.They 
were further divided into three groups : (i) al-Ufiyah, (ii) al-Shabibiyah, 
the followers of Shabib al-Najram (also called 'people of question', 
Ashad-al-Suwal) and (iii) al-Ashab-al-Tafsir (the people of Quranic 
interpretation). 
al-Sufriah, 
al-Fadaliyah. 
al-Husainiyah. 
al-Shamrakhiyah. 
10- al-Rajeah. From this emerged a group called Shabibiyah, the 
followers of Shabib. Shabibiyah is known as Murjiatul-khwarij (the 
Murj'ites amongst the Kharij'ites). In other words, the Shabibiyah did not 
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pass any judgement against Salih. The background of this is that once 
Salih ordered to kill a man who claimed to be a Mushm. When he was 
killed, some of the followers of Salih reacted saying, "You have killed a 
Muslim", and dissociated themselves from him. They were called al-
Rajeah (the people refrained from Salih and his action). Salih was 
regarded by them a perpetrator of grave sin, because he had killed a 
Muslim. But a man amongst them, called Shabib remarked," I am not to 
pass any judgement about Salih, whether he is right or wrong." 
Consequently, he and his followers were called 'Murjiatul Khawarij.'^^ 
The common feature among the Khwarij is that they agreed upon 
the fact that every major sin is an infidelity, and that God will punish the 
perpetrators of grave sin forever, as He will do with infidels. But the 
Najadat differed from them at both points. Najadat do not believe that 
major sin amounts to infidelity and that the perpetrators of grave sin will 
go to hell for-ever like infidels. They hold that religion has two aspects , 
one is obligatory and the other is not. They believe that it is incumbent 
upon every Muslim that he should know God and His apostles. He should 
know it is prohibited to shed the blood of Muslims and to extort their 
properties. He should know that any type of compulsion in matters of 
faith as well as fleeing from the injunction of God is prohibited. This kind 
of knowledge about religion is obligatory. A partfrom, he is excused, 
therefore, fore example, if any one regards any prohibited act as to be 
pennissible on the basis of his own independent opinion (ijtihad), he is 
excused in that regard. They say, "We don't know whether God will 
punish the believers for their sins or not, and if He does He will do so 
anywhere other than hell in proportion to their sins. But they hold that 
whatever the case may be. He will not punish the believers eternally and 
they will get access to Paradise subsequently About minor sins they are of 
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the view that if any one commits minor sins Hke seeing a woman or 
telh'ng a minor He and he does so constantly and insists upon them, then 
he will be regarded as a polytheist, but if he coimnits adultery or drinks 
wine (major sins) without insisting upon them, then he will be regarded as 
a Muslim. On the othe hand, al-Makramiyah a sub-sect of al-Ajarida, 
hold that one who ignores prayer is an infidel, not due to his disregard of 
prayer but due to his being unacquainted with God. They hold the same 
view about all grave sins. They believe that "one who commits a grave 
sin is unfamiliar with God, and it is due to his unfamiliarity that he is an 
1 R 
infidel, and not because of his committing a sin." One becomes neither 
an infidel nor a sinner unless he affirms any sentence of the Shariah in a 
sense otherwise (not in the sense of Islam). If he says, for example, 
"there is no God but Allah and Muhaimnad is His Messenger" in the 
sense that Allah is here meant "an Allah having son and wife" as 
Christians believe, or "an idol assumed by him as Allah", he is an 
infidel^^ 
About Iman and Islam al-Bihasiyah hold that none can be a 
Muslim till he confesses the knowledge of God, His Prophet and the 
knowledge of what was revealed to him as a whole. It also includes 
association with His fiiends (aulia) and dissociation fi-om His enemies 
and fi-om all that has been interdicted by Him or He has threatened 
about.2° 
The opinion of the Khawarij about Oneness (Tauhid) of God is 
similar to the one held by the M'utazilites. But al-Hafasiya amongst al-
Ibadiyah believe that the belief in the Book and in the apostles is included 
m Oneness of God 
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A]-Khawarij were unanimous in the belief that Quran is created. 
About the act of man and his destiny some of them believed in free will 
and some in predestmation . 
Shia ism 
Another in the pages of Islamic history was the movement of 
shia'ism which again was the product of socio-political developments. 
Shia'ism developed into a religious movement long after its origin. It is 
believed to have started just after the death of the Prophet. The 
appointment of the Caliph was the basic issue to which some people 
reacted rather sharply. They thought it was Ali's right and they had some 
evident arguments. Equally evident arguments were, perhaps, presented 
by the other side. The matter was somehow resolved after a long hectic 
activity, but it could not convince all, and a nascent group of the friends 
of Ali (Shi'an-e-'Ah) gradually emerged on the political scene. A meek 
and feebles voice became strong when Uthman became the third Caliph. 
Just after his rising to the caliphate he started indulging himself in 
controversies. One of them was the return of Hakam b. Umayya to 
Medina who was expelled from the Madina by the Prophet himself 
Inspite of his appeal against the decision of the Prophet, the first two 
caliphs did not revoke the decision. Uthman not only averted the decision 
and called him back to Madina but also married his daughter to his son, 
Marwan. 
He exiled Abu Dharr who himself was a renowned Companion of 
the Prophet. Uthman also gave reftige to Abdullah b. sa'd. b. Abu Surh 
whose blood was declared forfeits by the Prophet and appointed him as 
governor of Egypt. All these events are important because they reflect 
Uthman's personal sense of judgement where he did not agree even with 
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the Prophet. This could be a daring step but in its response there was a 
great deal of murmur and groaning in the mushm community. 
All these controversies resulted into assassination of Uthman on 
the one hand and the emergence of socio-political conflicts on the other. 
Shia'ism, which was in a nascent form till then, became a strong political 
group and influenced the appointment of next caliph, Ali b. Abu Talib. 
There were many significant issues which led to a political upheavel. But 
perhaps most vital of them was the appointment of Imam. The lexical 
meaning of the word is 'a leader' and 'a scholar'. It has been used in both 
the senses in the early and the later phases. Moreover, the word has been 
used with different religious connotations by different sects in Islam. In 
the early phase of Islamic history, the word 'Imam' referred to the Caliph. 
A note of discord was heard even in the beginning. A larger community 
of the Muslims thought that Imam could be appointed by a committee 
\shura' either unanimously or by a majority-vote and this referred council 
was to be fonned by the Muslims. There was another group having 
almost no identity in the beginning which did not agree with any such 
criterion laid down by the people for the appointment of Imam. It 
believed that Imamate was divinely ordained. It is not left to the choice of 
the community and this group, whom we have referred to elsewhere, 
always emphasised the right of Ali to the position of Imam and tacitly 
rejected the appointment of other three as the Imams or the caliphs of the 
Muslims. Its members, mostly belonging to the family of the Prophet, 
believed in the imamate of Ali and continued it to his eleven other 
descendants. This sect was known as the Twelvers. There were other 
sects also about whom we will speak later. 
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The doctrine of imamate, being intricate in itself, involves some 
other issues which otherwise were not in comformity with Islam. One of 
the communities (gholat,) whom al-Ashari has mentioned, believed in the 
theory of incarnation which characteristically is Christian in nature. 
Another issue that followed imamate was messianism which meant the 
return of the imam to correct the follies of the world and to show it the 
path of righteousness and to establish the rule of God on the earth. Such a 
belief is found in Judaim, Christanity and in almost all the sects of the 
Muslims. It has been supported with various Traditions of the Prophet 
where he has made some predictions. 
In the Islamic history we know that this doctrine has been used to 
achieve political aims. People, at different times, have claimed 
themselves to be Mehdi and, having aroused the religious passions have 
achieved politico-rehgious importance. For the student of philosophy, 
such doctrines are significant for the pursuit of consolation to overcome 
the evil and establish the rule of law based on justice, liberty and 
fraternity. It has an ethical importance. 
Al-Ash'ari and Shahrastani have described many sects of Shia'ism 
having differences on the basis of their doctrines and emphasizing either 
one or the other, but imamate and messianism are, however, common and 
have become characteristically Shi'ite in nature. 
They include imamate in the articles of the faith which other 
communities of the muslims do not agree to. Notwithstanding the 
imamate being common, the Shi'a communities differ at the point of 
continuity. Besides, imamate had been an apple of discord and many 
people had claimed themselves to be the imams of their times. 
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Al-Ash'ari and ShahrastSnltoitfeiJi2S«e-mscussed the Shi'a sects and 
various groups along with their leaders and doctrines. Al-Ash'ari mainly 
speaks of three sub-sects, namely, (i) Gholat (extremists) (ii) Rafiza or 
Imamiyah and (Hi) Zaidiyah. Shahrastani adds 'Kaisaniyya' in the main 
divisions. Al-Ash'ari does not skip over this sect but includes it into 
Imamiyah. These sects are further divided into many groups but we are 
not concerned with these divisions, for they do not raise any significant 
doctrinal contention, but these three groups (we shall follow al-Ash'ari) 
discuss the theosophical issues along with imamate. Gholat, whom al-
Ashari recklessly side-lines, raise very contentious and interesting issues 
along with the doctrine of Imamate, a common message of Shia'ism. 
They believe in the theories of transmigration of soul and in carnation. 
We have stated it elsewhere that such theories have no room in the well-
vowen texture of Islam. Nevertheless, some groups and individuals do 
believe in the transmigration of the soul. The common Muslims and 
scholars never favoured the transmigration of the soul. Gholat believed in 
this theory but al-Asha'ri and Shahastani both did not write the case with 
then-arguments. 
So far as the theory of incarnation is concerned, we belive that in 
their conviction they must have been influenced by early Christian 
scholastic philosophy. Christianity follows it as one of its basic principles 
proclaiming Jesus Christ the son as due incarnate of God, the father. The 
Quran, however, categorically rejects this theory. Their interpretation of 
the Quranic verses has not been mentioned by any of these 
hereseographers. They, however, believe these five, Mohammad, Ali, 
Hasan, Husain and Fatima as incarnates of God . Besides, they also 
believe in the prophecy of their Imams. Some of them regard Ali as 
prophet and others consider him the form of God. As we know the 
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imamate is a common doctrine and all the schools of Shia'ism describe 
imams as sinless innocent people. The imams are included in the category 
of the Prophets whom they qualify with this apetect. Gholal also follow 
the doctrine of messianism which we have already commented on. 
Al-Ash'ari also mentions that the Gholat deny the existence of 
Heaven and Hell. It is again difficult to envisage the argument they 
present to hold their denial. But we can imagine that they denied the 
common man's positions regarding the categorical belief in the Heaven 
and Hell and upheld the metaphorical formulation that it exists in the 
world itself being experienced in the form of natural and human bliss and 
torture. 
It is something peculiar that the Gholat believe in Mohammad 
being the creator of the world. It is Allah who authorised him for 
creation, they say. No school of muslim philosophy ever proposed any 
such doctrine. Al-Ashari might have deduced some wrong conclusions 
for the arguments which have not been reproduced here. 
Imamiyah or Rafiza is the second sect of Shia'ism. Al-Alsh'ari 
speaks of some twenty four divisions of this sect. Shahrastani describes 
only seven. 
Rafida were called so because they denied the caliphate of Abu 
Bakar and Umar, but according to Shahrastani, being the pupil of Wasil 
b. Ata, Zaid bin Ah and his followers became M'utazilites. "Those who 
rejected Zaid bin Ali because he held views contrary to those of his 
ancestors on doctrinal matters, as well as on the question of association 
and the dissociation, became known as the Rafidites. They were a group 
fi-omKufa".^^ 
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The Imamiyah doctrines are largely related to the articles of faith. 
In the first place, some of the Imamiyah sects discuss the faith itself Even 
at the outset, one marks a basic distinction in the Shi'a definition of faith. 
The majority of muslims believe that faith means belief in the six articles 
of faith, but the Shi'i definition of faith includes imamate therein, which 
for other Muslims is not an element of faith. The majority of Imamiyah 
share this article with other shi'i sects. A bigger group of them defines 
faith as confession of God, his apostles and Iman. Iman also means to put 
into practice the teaching of the apostles and the other Imams. Their 
assertions must be carried out. This subsequently defines actions also 
which would mean the enactment of their teaching. Faith comprises of 
three essential ingredients, knowledge, belief and obedience^\ 
The other groups agree on the basic proposition. They only defer 
on the peripheral matters which are not important for our purpose. We 
have already mentioned that the Imamiyah discussed, at length, the 
questions arising out of the articles of the faith. The most important of the 
them is, undoubtedly, the unity of God which, besides other questions, 
involves the issue of the Essence and the Attributes. The Imamiyah are, 
generally, attributists and many of them believe in anthropomorphism. 
Some of them are even corporealists. On the basis of their interpretation 
of anthropomorphism they are divided in six groups^^. The first two are 
corporealists. 
The first is the Heshamiyah. They believe in God being a body 
having all its dimensions: length, breadth and depth. His length, breadth 
and depth are in a perfectly balanced form. This has been stated just to 
emphasize His perfection which runs short in other bodies. It is curious 
that while explaining it to Abul Hudhail, Hesham speaks of God being 
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smaller than a mountain called Abu Qubaise pointed at by Abul Hudhail. 
Hesham's anthropomorphism, however, appears to be more imaginary. 
He believes in all body characteristics like motion and rest and ascribes 
them to God. 
The second group of the Imamiyah believe in the figurative 
anthropomorphism, God being existent is a body having no form or body 
characteristics. He is not an atomic compound or having composite parts, 
yet He is established on the 'Arsh' (Throne) without being in the reach of 
our senses. It seems to be an effort to set up harmony in the 
anthropomorphic and non- anthropomorphic verses of the Qur'an. 
The third group believes God to be anthropomorphic for having the 
form of a man without body. This does not seem to be substantive. The 
forth group comprises of the followers of Hesham b. Salim al Jawaliqi. 
They believe God to be in the form of a man having no element of matter. 
God possesses all the senses and uses them as and when needed. But they 
are different from those of a man. This refers to God's infinitum. 
The fifth and the sixth groups deny God being a fonn or a body. 
He is beyond the reach of our senses. He is pure light having no fonn of a 
man or animal. But He can assume one and may become a person. 
The third and the fourth also deny God having material 
characteristics. He is a body in potentiality, not in actuality. 
These differences arise because of their definitions of an existing 
entity and a body. 
There are some other groups who categorically deny God being a 
body. 
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They deny Him being a body as He is not subject to any accident 
and a body, even the indivisible one, is characterised by accidents. Thus 
they deny God being a body, yet they believe in figurative 
anthropomorphism. 
The other groups of Imamiyah deny any kind of 
anthropomorphism to God. They believe in his attributes. But most of 
them do not ascend to their being eternal with God like the M'utazilah. 
These attributist groups mainly discuss the attributes of power, 
knowledge, and will. His Omnipotence includes His being All-hearing, 
All-seeing. The attributes of sight and audition have been emphasized to 
clarify that God being All-seeing and All-hearing does not necessarily 
mean to be of anthropomorphic nature. 
The first of these groups is Zurariyah, the followers of Zurarah b. 
Aaun al-Rafizi. Denying the eternity of the attributes, they argue that God 
was once without attributes till He created them for Himself It is not 
contended, however, that He has created these attributes for Himself all at 
one time or one by one as and when needed. They also do not take into 
account or perhaps mean it that God once without attributes was 
imperfect. The argument is not sustainable either ontologically or from 
the point of view of Islam. 
Like their predecessors the second and the third group also speak 
of His imperfection and deny the eternity of the attributes. In the case of 
the second it is interesting to note that this group understands the 
attributes in relation to the objects. They believe that the attributes can be 
conceived only after the creation of the objects. Their denial of God's 
possessing these attributes, perhaps, refers to their meaninglessness. They 
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argue that the objects before their creation are nothing and God can not be 
beheved to have power over and knowledge of nothing. 
It is wrong to believe that the world before being created was 
nothing. Those who advocate for the eternity of the world believe it to be 
present in God in the potential form. 
The third group makes God more materiahstic by considering Him 
inorganic in the first place and organic thereafter. Life is a characteristic 
of matter not of spirit. 
The fourth group, the followers of Shatanuttaq and the fifth one, 
the followers of Hesham, lay emphasis on His knowledge. Both of them 
agree that His knowledge is not eternal. It becomes meaningful only in 
relation to the objects known. They affinn God being omniscient but his 
wisdom and knowledge are actualised in the objectified form of 
something known. He knows them after He detennines them and wills, 
for objects are nothing till they are determined or willed. Will and 
determination are taken here as synonyms. 
Hesham is positive about the knowledge being His attribute like 
His Omnipotence and Omnipresence. But he denies God's knowledge of 
the objects before their being existent and argues that if the knowledge of 
the object is eternal, the objects known should also be eternal. He further 
argues that a priori knowledge of the objects would make the theory of 
reward and punishment meaningless. Because if God had a priori 
knowledge of the actions, man's being wicked or virtuous would be 
known to Him and the reward and punishment would become 
meaningless. Knowledge, however, is an attribute of God which is neither 
He nor other than He. 
60 
Schools of Thought 
Ash'ari, later on, might have derived aspiration from Hesham. Like 
Ash'ari, the sixth group also believes that God is not All-knowing as to 
His essence. It argues that God knew the objects when He affected them 
and that He existed before. Like knowledge, action means to take effect 
and affect is volution. The knowledge of the objects follows the volution 
of God and as soon as He wills, the things are set in motion. It remains a 
question if it is a motion within Himself or outside. The outside is nothing 
and there is no menaing of motion in nothingness. It is, then, a motion 
with in Himself and if so explained, things would become eternal with 
Him and it is not acceptable to them. 
The seventh group is constituted of the people belonging to both 
sections affirming God's being All-knowing as to His essence and 
holding the contrary one. Those denying God being All-knowing as to 
His essence repeat the same argument of His existence before His action. 
Those holding otherwise deny the eternity of acts despite His knowledge 
being essential. The last of these groups rejects both and 
anthropomorphism of God also. These attributists in the Imamiyah sect 
can be classified either as anthropomorphists of both types, Mushabbiha 
and Mujassimah, and attibutists upholding M'utazilah position or 
•3-2 
presuming Ash'arism . 
Another discussion that follows the attributes in the perspective of 
the unity of God is the doctrine of change {bada'). In our opinion it has 
reference to revealed books which have been abrogated and rejected. 
Suyuti and many other scholars of the Qur'an describe, in detail, the 
problem of rejection and abrogation in the Qur'an itself The change in 
the revealed books raised questions in the minds of the believers also. The 
shi'i sect of the muslims, particularly Imamiyah, took it more seriously, 
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for some of them taught that the part of the Quran related to the House of 
the Prophet has been dehberately left out or abrogated. God, however, 
claiming to preserve it in the Qur'an itself, becomes ultimately 
responsible for this omission. 
The doctrine of bada' (change) is related to the question of 
volution concerning its meanings and importance. There is bound to be a 
difference of opinion. Some believe that the volition is one of the 
attributes of God and being an attribute it is neither separate from nor 
identical with His Essence. They define will as motion. They are the 
followers of Hesham b. Hakam and Hesham al-Juwaliqi. The companion 
of Abu Malik al-Hadrami and Ali b.Metham agree with their predecessors 
on the definition of will as motion. They also affirm it to be an attribute 
but believe it to be other than God. Ashari does not mention their 
argument of defence. 
Another group following M'utazilah denies will to be movement. 
It agrees that will is an attribute. God wills as to his being. Interestingly 
enough, these scholars differentiate between will and the things willed. 
On the basis of their being created God wills to create things. Here will 
and something created are different from each other. Another set of 
people denies such difference and also avoids to include sin in the objects 
of His will. 
There are some other opinions but not of much importance. 
In the doctrine of 'bada' there is an indispensable question: if God 
wills before He makes a change. The answer would be in affirmation or 
negation as well. There are three important groups who have deliberated 
on this issue. 
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The first of them beheve that change necessitates in God. It occurs 
after being necessitated in Him. It means that change is a compulsion, 
which occurs even in God by way of necessity. God is cognisant of it and 
acts accordingly. It is for this reason that He changes His Shari'ah and 
other things but always on the principle of good. This view also holds that 
God cannot make change in his communications to his servants. It is 
difficult to ascertain the reference to "His communications," for if it is the 
revelations, they have been ordained many times until the revelation of 
the Qur'an and if it is the Qur'an, God has promised not to change it. It 
means the change may necessitate God but He is not bound to effect it. 
The second group does not deny the possibility of change even in 
His communications and message to man. 
The third group rejects the idea of change in God . 
The Rafizah differ on the status of the Qur'an. Earlier, there have 
been two prominent views: one of common Muslims and the other of 
Mutazilah. The common Muslims believe that the Qur'an is uncreated 
and will remain preserved after the Doomsday. This common people's 
view poses some serious questions regarding the status of the Qur'an. The 
Mutazilah, after profound contemplation, put forward another view that 
the Qur'an is created, for in their opinion it resolves all questions. It was 
their conjecture and they could not anticipate the criticism which lashed 
at their contention and revived the common man's view. 
One of the groups of Rafizah as the 'unacknowledged precursor' of 
Asharism led by Hesham b. Hakam took a mid-way position by denying 
all the three possible positions that it is neither creating nor created nor 
uncreated. Ashari while describing this sect never gives its argument. 
Hesham, however, argues that the Quran being the speech of God is one 
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of the attributes of God. The quahfication of an attribute cannot be 
ascribed to the other. 
Arguing his position Hesham speaks of two levels of the Qur'an 
and classifies it accordingly by calling it as the audible and the essential 
Qur'an. The audible Qur'an means the one recited in asundered voice and 
as the sound is created, the audible Quran is also created. The essential 
Quran being the attribute of God is uncreated. This form of Qur'an is 
neither He nor other than He. This argument is almost the same, which al-
Ashari, later on, presented in a changed shape. 
The other group follows Mutazilah and Khawarij and agrees that 
the Qur'an is created. It had a beginning and may have an end . 
Like other schools of Muslim philosophy, the Imamiyah also 
discuss the freedom of will. Naturally, the variety of opinion is the same. 
The followers of Hesham b. Hakam favour semi-determinism, holding 
that the creation of the action is in the hand of God. Man has the power of 
choice in so far as the will and acquisition is concerned. 
The action is determined by the cause that occurs before its 
creation and becomes responsible for the same. Man has no power in the 
act of creation. Once the action is caused he has the choice of willing and 
acquisition. He may will either to perform or to reject. At another level he 
has the choice of translating his will into action. Thus will and acquisition 
is in the hand of man. 
The other group agrees with no compulsion and champions the 
cause of full liberty. 
The third group follows Mutazilah and denies the actions to be the 
creation of God^ *". 
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The Iraamiyah also speaks of the capacity that is at work before 
the existence of the actions, but Al-Ashari provides no explanation. The 
concept, however, is interesting. Capacity assumes five conditions: cause, 
instrument, fitness, duration and emptiness of actions. 
The Muslim scholars generally believe that no action is uncaused 
and the cause is one of the stimuli created before the eventual occurrence 
of the action. In the Imamiyah scholars, some believe that the stimulus is 
prior to the actions. On this account, they are divided into four sections. 
Hesham b. Hakam leads the first section. It holds that some of the 
stimuli are prior to the action and others come into being just before its 
occurrence. One of them is cause. No action can originate without a 
cause. Hesham believes that the action being the effect necessarily 
follows the cause. The other stimuli, though present a priori, may not 
follow the action. What Hesham means us that the cause is vital for action 
and that God creates the cause. It, he thinks, answers the questions ad 
infinitum. 
The second section believes that the fitness of all kinds related to 
all things is the most important stimulus for the occurrence of the action. 
Although no explaination has been given, as the book follows in the usual 
style, it would, perhaps, mean that the person or the thing upon which the 
action occurrs must be in the fitness of ail kind to bear the occurrence. 
The third group describes the stimuli to come into existence just 
before the occurrence of the action. They add another dimension to the 
problem by calling the stimuli as not being universal but individual. 
The fourth one is not so important. It emphasises the fourth 
stimulus; instrument along with effects. All these groups of Imamiyah 
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scholars agree on the basic preposition that the stimuh are prior to the 
action. The difference hes onJy in the explanation . 
In the passage of action and its occurrence there is yet another 
interesting discourse on the contention as to who is responsible for the 
subsequent action. In the opinion of one set of scholars, man is not 
responsible for the subsequent action. As a doer, he should be responsible 
for the action that he does, not for the one that follows in the aftermath, 
for example, pain following beating, taste following eating. 
The other set of scholars believes man to be responsible for what 
he does and what follows in the aftermath. They argue that the subsequent 
action does not occur unless so caused. Thus the doer is responsible for 
the two. The Mutazilah also agree this view . 
The Imamiyah, in general, are semi-detenninist: a midway position 
which al-Ashari held later on. 
Regarding the Day of Judgement and the return of thedead, the 
Imamiyah are again divided into two groups. 
The first believes in the Day of Judgement and supports the 
Messianic view of the Jews which states that some of the dead will return 
to the world for the removal of the evil and to establish the rule of God on 
the earth. We have described it elsewhere, as well as the fact that the 
return of Mahdi is a Mesianic concept, commonly prevalent in all Muslim 
communities. 
The other group, interestingly enough, denies the Day of 
Judgement and supports Ghulat's (extremist's) view on the 
transmigration of souls. It believes that the evil souls return in the ugly 
and loathsome bodies where they are tortured and penalised. The virtuous 
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souls return in good bodies and enjoy the bliss and happiness of virtue. 
For them, this is the meaning of reward and punishment. Otherwise there 
is no Day of Judgement to account for the deeds and decide upon Hell 
and Heaven. They also believe that the world is etemal^^. It is, of course, 
a minority view and is quite alien to Islam. Besides the other articles of 
faith, the Imamiyah, very emphatically, advocate for the doctrine of 
Imamah which speaks of the divine personage of Imam, convincing the 
community that there is always a need of a spiritual guide to keep up right 
on the track of Islam. Such a logic contends for the presence of Imam 
either in the Messianic form or divinely embodied material shape of man. 
The Imamiyah amongst themselves agree on the divine stature of Imam 
but differ on his status. Some exaggerate it and consider it as higher to the 
angels and the prophets. Majority of them are, however, reasonable and 
place them after the angels and the prophets'*^. Most of the section of the 
Imamiyah agree that the Imam is innocent and commits no sin. It does not 
appear to be logical and cannot be claimed even of the prophets. 
Regarding the warning to the sinners, one section of the Imamiyah 
believes that their opponents will be danrned to hell and that they will be 
redeemed of sins after some questions. The belief is Christian in 
character. It is not in concurrence with Islam. Those belonging to the 
other section reasonable and hold that the perpetrator of grave sin will be 
damned to hell, despite the fact that he belongs to this or that 
community . 
Regarding the creation of things they are again divided into two 
groups: one, the followers of Hesham b. al-Hakam, is of the view that 
God creates the attributes that become things like mortality fi-om mortal. 
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existence from existent. The attribute is neither the same nor other than 
the same. 
The other group beheves that the things are created and separate 
from their attributes'*^. 
Along with other doctrines, Al-Ashari also discusses their 
Epistemology. Apart from the testimony being the valid source of 
knowledge, the Imamiyah also discuss perception and inference. Most of 
the Imamiyah sects favour reason. They believe that the knowledge about 
the Shariah is innate. It is instinctive. God, however, has the power either 
to impart or deny a portion of knowledge He wills. It means that man can 
have only as much knowledge as God desires, but whatever portion of 
knowledge He wills is a priori and is actualised as and when required. 
Some scholars are of the view that knowledge can either be innate or 
acquired but its acquisition is on the will of God. On the contention of the 
application of reason they are again divided. Some advocate that the use 
of reason is possible after the arrival of the prophets. Others hold that 
reason was always a valid source before and after the arrival of the 
prophets'*^. 
Zaidiyah is the last important shi'ite sect. It has been named after 
its founder Zaid b. AH b. al-Husain b. Ali b Abu Talib. Being the Shi'ite 
sect the Zaidiyah community, in general, agrees with their other 
compatriots barring some minor differences which are of the least 
significance for our purpose. Zaid, being a Mutazilah, follows their 
doctrines. Besides, he discusses the question related to faith and 
infidelity, position of a grave sinner, unity of God (ensuing a discussion 
on Essence and attributes) and freedom of will (covering the discussion 
on createdness of action and the forces detennining the creation of action) 
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Regarding faith and infidelity most of them believe that faith 
means knowledge of God, affirmation of all that God has commanded 
and abstention from what God has forbidden. On the contrary, belief in 
the forbidden or its persuasion is infidelity but it cannot be designated as 
polytheism and disbelief The smaller group holds that faith is all 
obedience and all the forbidden is not infidelity. It is, certainly, not to be 
pursued as it is forbidden and God has warned against it again and again. 
Regarding the position of the grave sinner, the Zaidiyyah agree 
with the Khawarij having no confusion that the grave sinner will be 
damned to Hell forever and will have no chance of redemption. It is in 
concurrence with the larger shi'a sect. They advocate for such a severe 
view to argue that the first three caliphs being the perpetrators of grave 
sin, will be in such a position. The majority of Muslims disagree with this 
belief and reject the idea that the difference with Ali could be a major or 
even minor sin. 
Zaidiyah, like their predecessors, believe in the unity of God. God 
is one, pure and simple. His attributes are neither identical with nor 
separate form His essence. They are neither the same nor other than the 
same. Hisham b. al-Hakam, a great Imamiyah scholar, had earlier 
advocated that theory. His echoes are being heard in the writings of his 
successors. Sulaiman b.Jarir al-Zaidi believes that God is Omniscient on 
account of his knowledge and wisdom. He is Omnipotent on account of 
His power. His Omniscience and Omnipotence, though objectified, are 
not objects of form and mater. God is always willing. He rejects all apart 
from his will. His will is His pleasure and His rejection is His wrath. 
There is, however, a smaller group which does not agree with Sulaiman. 
They believe in His attributes but hold that God is Omniscient and 
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Omnipotent without knowledge and power. They also deny God as 
(eternally) willing and reject the concept of pleasure and wrath. 
The Zaidiyah do not directly discuss the freedom of will, they deal 
with action. Those who believe actions being created by God are 
deteniiinists. And those who hold the actions being the creation of man 
are indetenninists (or libertarians). In the fonner it is difficult to justify 
the concept of reward and punishment. It is overcome with the assertion 
that God is the creator of actions but their completion and acquisition are 
in the hands of man. This pre-envisages Ashari's position of semi-
detenninism and circumvents the Mutazilah position of categorical 
indeterminism. The other contemporary sect of Imamiyah led by Hesham 
b. al-Hakam also holds almost similar views. The Zaidiyah, holding the 
action being the creation of man, reiterate Mutazilah point of views"^ .^ 
Murji'ah 
We have already stated that the early Mutakallimin prudenty 
emphacised the distinction between Iman and Islam. It was, perhaps, the 
basic problem discussed in early Kalam for the explicit reason that it 
fonns the core of Islam as a religion. It was also essential because new 
convertants required explanation. Besides, the social scenario of Muslim 
society in accordance with the direction of its development, raised some 
questions and doubts about the integrity of quite notable persons like 
Uthman and Ali. Some politico-rehgious groups like Khariah and Shi'ah 
came into being in the aftennath of these questions and doubts. The 
Murji'ah is also one of them which often takes a neutral position m 
answering these questions. For them the basic and contentious issues are 
the definition of faith and the status of a Muslim sinner. 
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The queries cited above provided room for the emergence of at 
least three pohtical religious groups, that is, Kharijah, Shi'ah and 
Murji'ah. The Shi'ah and the Kharijah took extreme positions in 
answering the querries stated before. The Murji'ah advocated a midway 
position and did not regard anyone as a disbeliever unless socially 
declared aberrant. The word Murji'ah is derived from irja' which means 
'to defer' of 'to giver hope'. The Murji'ah defer judgement about any 
believer unto God. He is the best judge and will do what He deems fit. 
They are always optimistic of God's Forgiveness and argue that 
disobedience with faith is not harmfiil just as obedience with disbelief is 
not beneficial and, thus, they look upon deels as secondary to intention 
and resolve"* .^ 
The hereseographers disagree as to who is the founder of this sect. 
Al-Ash'ari, whom other historians followed, named Jahm, b. Safwan as 
its founder'**'. Shahrastani, another important historian and 
hereseographer, considered Ghailan of Damascus to be the founder of this 
sect'*''. It may be noted that Jahm b. Sufwah and Ghailan Damishqi are 
also believed to be the proponents of Jabriyah and Qadariyah schools, 
respectively. Their names as the founders of this Murji'ah sect may not be 
acceptable. Baring these two, the other hereseographers like ibn Sa'ad, 
plead for the name of al-Hasan b. Muhammad b. Hanafiyah to be its 
founder. He is also believed to have written an open letter, which was 
first read in the circle of scholars and, later on, in public, under the little 
'Kitab-al-Irja'' in which he argued that the matter related to the sinners 
must be left to the judgement of God, which He would decide on the day 
of judgement. We can make no judgement about their status. Other early 
sources name Qais b. Abu Muslim al Masir or Darr b. Abdullah, both 
Kufans, as the first propagator of 'irJa'. This, however, does not deny 
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Hansan's role in the propagation of the doctrine of 'irja,' but it does 
strengthen the argument that Kufa was the early seat of this sect from 
where it spread in other parts of the Muslim world . 
In its early phase, the Murji'ah were a political group. They, unlike 
Shi'ah, did not believe in the innocence of Ali and Uthman. They also 
disagreed that both Ali and Uthman were grave sinners as Kharijah held 
and were, thus, to be condemned. The Murji'ah thought it to be politically 
and reUgiously wise to leave the judgement unto God about their position 
in Paradise. In declaring them sinfiil, the Kharijah, however, forgot that 
they were among the ten Companions for whom Paradise was promised 
even in their lives. The Murji'ah, by sustaining such claims, ventured no 
declaration. It is also believed that the Umaiyyah patronized the Murji'ah, 
for they made no comments on the licentious and debauched lives of the 
Umayyad Caliphs. This might be evident from their approach, but the fact 
is otherwise. Many important Murji'ah thinkers were persecuted by the 
Umaiyyads when they raised sword against their injustice to Muslim 
Ummah. Many Murji'ah like Qais b. Masir and Darr b. Abdullah joined 
the rebellion of Ibn-al-Ashath and fought in the Battle of Dayr al-Jamajim 
and the governor al-Hajjaj tyranically crushed them. They also organised 
themselves under Yazid b. al-Muhallab and fought against Yazid II. 
They, however, supported Omer II who himself was a pious man and is 
allegedly included in 'al-Khulafai Rashideen'. It is obvious then that the 
Murji'ah were neither politically quietists nor were patronized by 
Umaiyyads for granting them licence to go ahead with their unjust and 
psychophancy oriented policies. 
Besides their political task, the Murji'ah also looked after their 
religious responsibilities. In their religious discourse they discussed the 
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problem of faith and infidelity (Iman and Kufr) at length. Here, again, 
they disagree with the two extremists, that is, Shi'ah and Kharijah, who 
are quite definitive about both faith and infidelity. The Murji'ah, in 
general forbid raising sword against any Muslim except in self-defence. 
They rather loosely define faith, and hold that mere knowledge of the 
articles may be regarded as faith. For them detailed knowledge is not a 
pre-requisite. Omer b. Uthman al-Shamzi is reported to have asked Abu-
Hanifa that (I) if a person is unablse to distinguish the forbidden meat of 
the pig fi^om the mutton and does eat none of them due to his doubt, an 
that (ii) if a person does not know as to where Ka'aba is situated and that 
(iii) if a person has no knowledge about the pedigry and geneology of the 
Prophet of Islam, can such a person be regarded a Nuslim. Abu Hanifa's 
answer to all these questions was affirmative, mere knowledge of the pig 
being interdicted, Ka'aba being the Holy pilgrimage and Muhammad 
being the Prophet of Islam will make him mumin. Abu Hanifa and his 
followers advocate that the knowledge and conviction of the unity of God 
and other beliefs comprise Iman (faith) and it neither increases nor 
decreases and that no one is superior or inferior on his basis. The Hanifi 
definition of faith imposes some serious difficulties. The Hypocrites 
(Munafiqun) may be declared mumin merely on account of their 
aquiscence with Islam and the verses of the Quran stating the superiority 
of a person on the basis of 'Taqwa' (piety) would require different 
interpretation^*^. 
Abul-Hasan al-Ashari, in his Maqalat, speaks of twelve groups of 
al- Murji'ah, most of whom are named after their propagators. They are 
(i) Al-Jahmiyah, (ii) Al-Satihiya, (iii) Al-Shimiyah, (iv) Al-Unusiyah, 
(v) Al-Janbaniyah, (vi) Al-Najjariyah, (vii) Al-Ghailaniyah, {Vui) Al-
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Shabibiyah, (ix) Al-Hanafiyah, (x) Al-Tulmaniyah, (xi) Al-Manisiyah, 
and (xii) Al-Karramiyah.^' 
All the sects, as we have already mentioned, have largely pondered 
over the problem of faith. Although it seems quite explicit, for the Quran 
has already defined it by mentioning six articles of faith, yet, it invited the 
attention of early theologians, probably due to the destructive role of the 
hypocrites or because of the non-Arab convertents who were not familiar 
with the temperament and variety of Arabic language and who actually 
needed interpretations to explain to them the real spirit of the contents of 
the holy Quran. Most of these groups agree that Iman (faith) is the belief 
in God, His apostles and what comes from Him. This may be interpreted 
as what has been said in the Book. Some of them, like Karramiya, hold 
that faith means pronouncement of the articles with the tongue. Others do 
not agree with such a loose definition which would include even the 
hypocrites in the category of Muslims. It would not be acceptable to 
many of the scholars and common Muslims as well. 
The other Murji'ah groups rightly believe that the pronouncement 
with tongue and affirmation by heart, both are indispensable. Belief in 
God, His apostles and what He was ordained must be acknowledged by 
the tongue and affirmed by the heart. 
Most of the groups define faith as the knowledge of God, but differ 
on account of its being primary knowledge or secondary knowledge. 
Some of them comprehend it to be the primary knowledge but the 
opponents (like: Ghailaniyah) hold otherwise. There could be yet another 
question whether faith is acquired knowledge or whether it is innate. 
Those who believe it to be the secondary knowledge advocate for its 
being acquired. And the upholders of its being primary knowledge 
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consider it as innate. It may be concluded that for some, faith is an 
empirical proposition, and for others it is empirical in the sense of its 
being acquired, not necessarily experimental, for faith is something 
beyond an experience of empirical nature. 
Most of the groups are of the view that faith neither increases nor 
decreases. It can perhaps be interpreted that faith cannot be measured in 
quantum. It is qualitative in nature, and there is no meaning of its being 
less or more qualitative. Other groups, like Na^ariyah hold that faith can 
increase or decrease. Their definition of faith implies of its being 
quantitative in nature having a different way of its measurement. Unlike 
their other counterparts, they also believe in someone being superior or 
inferior on account of his faith. This doctrine seems to be in confonnity 
with the verses of the Quran holding the superiority and the inferiority on 
account of Taqwa. 
Thus, the Murji'ah, in general, discussed faith, its nature and 
prerequisites and advocate that even the sinful is not debarred from the 
coimnunity. His occasional disobedience does not deprive him of his 
faith. They are ready to extend this concession even to Iblis. But his 
constant disobedience and pride against the divine order puts him in the 
rank of rejecters. 
The Murji'ah have also discussed infidelity, the opposite of I man. 
They are liberal in its definition too. Unlike kharijah they abstain from 
passing judgement. Most of them define infidelity as rejection and denial 
of God, His apostles and what He has said in the Book. The rejection or 
the denial of the articles of faith may either be pronounced with the 
tongue or by heart. 
75 
Schools of Thought 
The Murji'ah are divided into seven groups on this issue, but only 
three of them are important.^ "^ They agree on the definition of infidelity 
which says that it is unbehef and rejection of either of the articles of faith 
or anyone of them. Abu Shimr, for intance, considers a person an infidel 
who rejects the idea of unity of God and destiny. Abu Shimr is an 
orthodox Mu'ta^ili, who support their doctrines to the point of being 
irrational, so much so that he even denies the religious status of the 
opponents. The Murji'ah also disagree on the point of the occurrence of 
infidelity and as to whether it means the rejection by tongue or by heart or 
by both. The Karramiyah, the followers of Mohd. b. Karram, understand 
it to be ominous even if it is rejected merely by tongue. The Jahmiyah 
believe that infidelity means rejection by heart. The other groups take 
infidelity to mean rejection by the tongue and the heart simultaneously. 
The Murji'ah, besides these two vital issues, also discussed the 
other doctrines attributed to Mu'tazilah and Asha'irah, but their basic 
contention lies in the doctrine of 'irjah' and for this reason they are spread 
across various Muslim sects. Keeping this in view, Shahrastani and other 
Scholars broadly classify them into four groups, Kharijite Murji'ah (like 
al-Najadat), Qadrite Murji'ah, Jabarite Murji'ah and pure Murji'ah.^^ 
M'utazilJsm 
So far we have been dealing with the early phase of Ilm-al-Kalam 
(Scholasticism). With the origin of M'utazOah school we enter into the 
realm of later Ihn-al-kalam where we come across a different set of 
problems while the former ones continue. The emergence of M'utazilah 
school is a landmark in the history of Muslim philosophy for the reason 
that it popularized rational thinking, scientific outlook and philosophical 
investigation amongst Muslims. Mutazilah is a thoroughly rationalistic 
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school. Its chief exponents, hke WS&rf-*r-2m; Amr b. Obaid, Hudhail, 
Nazzam and others, do discuss problems arising out of theological 
diffferences, but their approach is categorically rational in their 
interpretation. In their contents, they include discourses on Essence and 
Attributes, vision of God, createdness of the Quran and so on with a 
slightly newer interpretation. M'utazilah's rational approach was not 
hannful for the cause of Islam, for many people belonging to Magians, 
Christians and Jews embraced Islam after being convinced by their 
forceftil presentation of the argument. The great M'utazilah often 
participated in the organized discourses (munazirah) and prevailed over 
the opponents who after, being defeated, accepted Islam and propagated it 
thereafter. Nevertheless, the attitude of the M'utazilah became ultra-
rational, which later on began to prove rather, hannful for the cause of 
religion. The common Muslims started getting deviated so much so that 
the need for of its reform was intensely felt. 
Before the emergence of M'utazilah, particularly since the time of 
Siffin, the question regarding the fate of grave sinners, particularly those 
belonging to the Muslim community gained serious importance and was 
discussed in all the elite groups. This question became the cause of the 
origin of the M'utazilah. As it is stated. Imam Hasan al-Basari was 
teaching in a mosque when a man entered the mosque and asked Imam 
Hasan al-Basari the popular question regarding the fate of the grave 
sinners belonging to the Muslim community. A long-necked pupil named 
Abu Hudhaifa Wasil b. Ata, answered the seeker. This discourtesy 
irritated the teacher who in response to his pupil's unnecessary 
enthusiasm expelled him fi-om his school. Wasil b. Ata, with scant show 
of modesty, readily accepted his rejection and seceded to another comer 
of the mosque and founded another school in the name of M'utazilah. The 
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name was derived out of what the teacher said at the time of his secession 
from him. Amr b. Ubaid also joined this group. Wasil b. Ata and Amr. b. 
Ubaid both popularized Mutazilism to the extent that it created great 
scholars like Hudhail, Nazzam and Jahiz who, in their days, touched the 
acme of renown and eminence both "*. M'utazilism became so popular 
that all other schools of early Kalam got overshadowed. It was the creed 
of scholars belonging to different sects of Muslim community like 
Qadariya, Kharija and Shi'a. Wasil b. Ata, propounded some doctrines at 
the very outset which became the foundation on which the whole edifice 
of Mutazilism was erected. 
Wasil b. Ata designated the followers of M'utazilah school as 'The 
people of Unity and Justice' {Ahl-al-Tauhid wa-al-AdI). It certainly 
means that he emphasized the basic principles, which formed the 
theoretical paradigm of M'utazilism. He included five doctrines in its 
basic structure: the Unity of God (Tauhid), Justice of God (Adl), 
intermediary position {Manzilah-bain-al-Manzilatain), promising and 
warning {Waad wa Waid) and enjoying good and prohibiting evil {Amr 
bi al-Manifwa al- Nahya an-al-Munkar). 
The one regarding the intermediary position is dear to Wasil b. Ata 
alone. Others found little interest in the matter and showed a varying 
degrees of agreement or disagreement. The other doctrines have been 
discussed at length by other scholars who have added new dimensions. 
Monotheism {Tauhid) is the core of Islam. It is, of course, the 
constituent of other religions, particularly of Semitic ones like Judaism 
and Christianity. God is one according to these religions but the nature of 
their monotheism is different. The Christians believe in God being an 
assembly of three constituents: Father, son and the holy Ghost. Jews, 
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however, do not agree to God having any triplets. They beheve in an 
indivisible God but some of their sects advocate for incarnation. Despite 
this, the Jewish concept of monotheism is relatively closer to Islam. The 
Pentateuch describes God manifesting Himself in the form of calf, though 
the Quran says it was the creation of a famous magician Samiri. 
Moreover, the Jews also believe Uzair to be the son of God as stated in 
the Quran itself^ .^ Islam totally rejects that God could be ascribed with 
the attributes of procreation and fatherliness. "He neither begets nor is 
begotten"^*". When the Jews and Christians describe God as Father, they 
do not use the concept in a metaphorical sense but imagine the physical 
possibility. Islam shows its contempt to such a concept and denies even 
the flicker of such a possibility. 
Islamic monotheism can better be comprehended by the terai 
'Unity' which means God is One, Pure and Simple (There is none like 
unto him) The Unity, however, poses several questions, like, whether it is 
unity of Essence, or of both Essence and attributes. In the case of the 
inclusion of the attributes in its premises, there is the danger of its being 
interpreted as pluralistic. Islam ventures to refuse all pluralistic 
possibility, and even at the outset of its acceptance negates the pluralistic 
tone with the assertion that there is no god but God, thereby ensuring a 
more important clause. It denies every possibility of any polytheistic 
interpretation. The Quran takes utmost care in the description of God and 
asserts with emphasis that God is one and there is none to share His 
attributes . The Quran, explaining the concept of Unity, generally uses 
two basic tenns, ie. ahad and wahda that categorically reject any 
possibility of diversity and composition. It is also persistently uses the 
clause, 'there is none to share Him' {La Sharika Lahu), with the word 
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wahdah. It has been so emphasized to refrain people from any 
polytheistic interpretation of even its ambiguous verses. 
The problem of the Unity of God, however, posed serious threats 
to Islam when the Jews and the Christians started criticizing Islam for its 
being the shade of Christianity or Judaism. The scholars particularly the 
Mutakallimin, felt the fiiture warning and decided to save Islam from 
such acrimony. Their different groups, including the M'utazilah, 
discussed the problem and explained the meaning of attributes being an 
integral part of His unity. 
The scholars who contend the problem of Essence and Attributes 
can be diwid^d into two groups, one affinning the Attributes as being 
entities and the other denying them as entities but taking their cognizance 
as identical with the Essence. Wolfsan and other orientalists trace the 
beginning of the discourse on the problem of the Essence and the 
Attributes in Islam to Christianity. They hold it to be the consequence of 
the discussion on the three Apostles being the constituents of God as the 
manifest of His Attributes. The Christian scholastists, like John, Plotinus 
and Alexander of Aphrodicias, the teacher of Plotinus himself, make an 
effort to justify the perception that Trinity is apparent. They substantiate 
with seemingly convincing argument that Christianity is a monotheistic 
religion and that Trinity is the manifestation of His Attributes which 
subsist in Him as essential properties, which could, in other words, be 
called as emanating modes. It gives way to the discussion of 
transcendence and emanence. It, however, does not prove that the 
contention of Essence and Attributes arose in Islam due to Christian 
scholastic philosophy. In our opinion, the root of this problem lay in the 
Quran and the Tradition where God despite being an object of Unity is 
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described to possess as many as ninety nine attributes, which are 
remembered as His names . Again we know that these Attributes are not 
beheved to be His properties which would mean that they are essential for 
His existence and would reduce Him to be mere substance. The Quran 
defines God as Light {Noor)oi the heavens and earth, and Light is not 
substance. 
The M'utazilah, in general, denied the Attributes. Thus, they 
disagreed with the common man. Since the denial was not in confonnity 
with the holy Quran, they had to take recourse to its pages and interpret 
the verses which speak of His Attributes as being identical with His 
Essence to give the common man an impression that they do not reject 
their belief and are no heretics, but the fact is otherwise. Wasib b. Ata, the 
founder of the M'utazilah school, denied the Attributes on the contention 
of eternity. The Attributes, if taken to be entities, will become co-eternal 
with God while the Quran says that there is one eternal being, that is, 
God.^ ^ 
Thus the Attributes, the M'utazilah argue, cannot be affirmed as 
being separate. It is, again, blesphamous to comprehend God having 
acquired them later, for such a proposition would endanger His perfection 
which He possesses infinitum. Both these arguments strongly deny the 
Attributes being separate entities. It was, in fact, an instance of deviation 
fi"om the common man's belief M'utazilah, however, were philosophers 
and not the advocates of common Muslims. 
The other important M'utazilah sect, led by eminent scholars like 
Hudhail and Nazzam, also denied Attributes and followed their founders 
but their arguments are different. They have categorized the Attributes as 
essential and non-essential. Knowledge, power and hfe have been 
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classified as essential ones and the non-essential, though eternal, ones 
include will, hearing, seeing and so on. Al-Ashari, whom we shall discuss 
later, has described the views of different M'utazilah leaders and their 
arguments in support of their views. To avoid repetition we shall abstain 
from describing them in detail. Some M'utazilah groups also support 
anthropomorphism in one or the other form, but others reject it in all its 
shades rather emphatically. All of them, however, are consistent in their 
denial. Some believe them to be identical with Essence while others hold 
them it to be a shade of dualism and thus, reject their being identical with 
the Essence. They conceive them to be no different from the Essence. 
Their emphasis is on their negation. Al-Ashari explains their concept of 
Unity (Tawhid) in the following way: 
The M'utazilites agreed that Allah is alone, none is like unto Him, 
He is All-Hearing and All-Seeing, he is neither a body nor a ghost nor a 
coipse, nor a form, nor a person, nor flesh, nor blood, nor substance nor 
accident, having no colour, no taste no smell no sound, neither having any 
heat nor moisture nor coldness nor dryness, neither having any length, 
any breath and any depth, nor meeting nor separation. He neither moves 
nor does He rest, nor is He divided. He has no part and no limb. He has 
no side and direction either right, left, front, back, up and down. No space 
comprehends Him, no time is applicable to Him. Any kind of touching 
and isolation is not applicable to Him. He does not stay in any place. He 
is not qualified with any of temporal qualities nor with such implying His 
being finite nor is He qualified with distance, not with going any 
direction. He is neither limited, nor is He Father nor a child. Quantities 
can't comprehend Him. Veils can't hide Him. Senses can't perceive Him. 
He can't be compared with people. He does not resemble any creature. 
Epidemics are not to be applied to Him, No defect overcomes Him. 
82 
Schools of Thought 
Everything occurring to mind or fonned in imagination does have no 
likening to Him. He is eternally the first, the last, the antecedent of all 
products and the existent before all creatures. He is eternally all-knowing, 
all-powering and all-living. No eye sees Him. No sight perceives Him. 
No imagination comprehends Him, No ear hears Him, he is something 
unlike things knowing, powerful and living but unhke those having 
knowledge, powers all life. He is the Eternal alone. There is no Vizier 
(minister) in His rule, no assistant in the origination of what He has 
originated, nor in the creation of what He has created. He did not create 
this universe on the basis of any previous example. The creation of one 
thing is not easier for Him than that of any thing other as it is not more 
difficult than that of the other. He does not gain any profit nor does He 
lose. He does not get delight nor pleasure nor does He suffer fi^om any 
hurt and pain, nor does He have finitude. Mortality is not applicable to 
Him or any impotency applicable to Him. He is far over and above being 
in contact with women and adopting any wife and sons .^ 
The other important doctrine related to the unity of God is the one 
concerning with the createdness of the holy Quran. The common Muslims 
believe that the Quran is a revealed book and eternal with God. The 
philosophers agree with the common Muslims on its being a revelation as 
auxiliary to Islam but are divided on the question of its eternity with God. 
It has been a matter of controversy even in the early kalam. Some groups 
advocated for its being uncreated and consequently eternal with God like 
his Attributes and others denied its eternity with God on the argument 
they use to reject the attributes being separate fi^om His Essence. They 
believe that nothing could be co-eternal with God for there is one eternal 
being and that is He. It is blasphemous to call it otherwise. M'utazilah, in 
general, believe the Quran as being created on account of its being the 
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product of one of His attributes viz. Kalam. The holy Qur'an is the Kalam 
which, of course, is a product even if it is beheved to have been preserved 
on the Tablet for all times to come. It must have a beginning when God 
decided to write it on the Tablet and must also have an end which the 
Quran itself proclaims as the Day of Judgement. The M'utazilah, thus, on 
their rational principle believe in the Quran as created*^ .^ 
The M'utazilah also deny another common behef and give their 
own interpretation to the verses which promise the vision of God as 
reward to the virtuous people . They believe that the vision of something 
is possible only in the space and God being beyond space cannot be 
seen . Al-Ashari is true in his criticism of M'utazilah that they commit a 
fallacy by applying the criterion of space on something beyond space. 
There must be different criteria for the vision of something beyond. On 
the basis of distance, direction and position, the requisites for the right of 
something in space, the vision of God, which is beyond space, cannot be 
denied. The M'utazilah, however, were not rationally convinced of the 
vision of God. Their explanation, though founded on fallacious 
arguments, had an appeal to the common man and he being affected by it, 
got deviated. He, perhaps, felt discontented with the promises of God 
having little possibility of fulfillment. Their metaphorical value could be 
no solace for him to keep upright. The rejection of the vision of God also 
entailed the denial of such miraculous acts like ascension. It had a serious 
consequence which posed a threat to the basic paradigms of religion. The 
danger was, however, felt and cured. 
The Wasiliyah amongst the M'utazilah showed a keen concern in 
one of the early controversies which, in fact, arose between the Kharjah 
and the Murjiah after the Battle of Siffin regarding the fate of the 
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perpetrator of grave sin. It, in fact, became the cause of the origin of 
M'utazilah school. The Wasilyah, the earhest shape of the M'utazilah, 
took a mid-way position between Murjiah and Kharijah and introduced 
the doctrine of 'manzilah Bain-a-Manzilatain' (a destination between the 
two)*^ .^ The other groups of M'utazilah are not very about this discourse. 
They, however, support their founder. The most important of these 
doctrines is the belief in free-will. The M'utazilah inherit the legacy of 
their predecessors i.e. the Qadariyah. Wasil b. Ata, the founder, also 
belonged to this school. He was an eminent scholar and had not only the 
courage to face the wrath of his teacher but also the will to survive. He 
worked so hard that his school gained ground and became the cause of the 
impoverishment of the preceding school. In his inheritance Wasil brought 
with him the rejection of determinism. He favoured the belief that God 
has granted man the power of discernment through reason by which he 
could choose between the right and the wrong and be rewarded or 
punished accordingly in the life hereafter . Due to their sharp opposition 
to the idea of Jabr, the M'utazilah also faced the charge of being 'Majusul 
Ummah'. Besides drawing force of their argument from the Quran in 
favour of free-will, they also provided it a rational basis to make their 
argument even stronger and with better appeal. The M'utazilah regarded 
man to be the nucleus of all actions. They also held him as the author of 
his action which means that he is both the creator as well as the doer of 
his acts. God has nothing to do with his choice of the right and the wrong. 
He is free in this and, thus, is the maker of his own destiny. He creates 
action by way of both 'mubasharah' and 'taulid' (direct intention and 
consequence or Immediate and mediate actions). It is compared with the 
fable of Zaid's moving finger, which follows the movement of ring that 
he wore. He had no intention of moving it. In the same way, guidance or 
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otherwise is intentional and immediate and the success or failure therein 
is its consequence or mediate action. The former is the direct action and 
the later is indirect one. There is no doubt, if it is believed, that man is the 
author of these actions. He has to reap what he sows^^. 
The M'utazilah, like their predecessors, are criticized for following 
the theory of dualism of the Magians regarding man and God both as 
creators^^. For the M'utazilah, it was against the principle of justice that 
God should create a helpless man and make him responsible thereafter for 
something in which he has no choice. Moreover, that reward and 
punishment should be decided upon the merit and demerit of the action 
which is determined by God is, they hold again, unjust^^. The critics also 
contend that in the face of God being Omnipotent, there should be no 
other potent. In case of being creator, man becomes potent and allowing 
/TO 
potency to man means dualism . In our opinion, the argument is 
pessimistically reductionist in nature and besides, it also overlooks the 
distinction of man and God having limited and infinite power, 
respectively. The M'utazilah seem to be convincing in their argument. If 
not so believed, justice is to be interpreted otherwise. The M'utazilah, 
however, give man the choice of either being obedient or disobedient. 
We have aheady stated that free will has always been a matter of 
popular discourse in almost every nook and comer of the world. The 
scholars have either denied or affurned it. Those who deny freewill to 
man favour the authority of God and those who affirm it believe in the 
justice and benevolence of God and assert that justice is greater than 
authority. Moreover, it is wrong to believe that appeal to His justice 
means to reduce His power. It only means a prudent use of power, justice 
and authority. In fact, both are methods of application of power. In the 
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fonner, there is a flexibility of mending something in man's favour, and 
in the latter there is a rigidity which gives no room to fret and favour. It, 
however, does not mean defying His Omnipotence. 
Such discourse was popular in Arab society even before the advent 
of Islam. The two schools the Libertarians who were later known as 
Qadariyah and the predestinarians popularly known as Jabariyah, existed 
in the lifetime of the Prophet. It is evident from the traditions of the 
Prophet who has shown his strong dislike for libertarians, are the 
Qadariyah by calling them Magians. It was enough to reject the 
M'utazilah but even they dominated the academic scene for quite a long 
period due to the favour of the eminent elite and socio-political 
luminaries as well as the caliphs. 
God as the M'utazilah hold, is Omniscient besides being 
Omnipotent. His justice and wisdom demand that He should be All-Good. 
It means that good and evil are in the nature of things. They exist as 
inherent qualities. This explanation of the origin of evil is also not very 
satisfactory and it does not resolve but enhances the confroversy. God 
being the knower of all things, has the knowledge of evil inherent in 
things. Notwithstanding the denial of God being the creator of evil, he 
becomes its creator. In the controversy regarding the priority of reason 
and revelation, the M'utazilah are rather clear that reason alone is the 
criterion to judge good and evil or right and wrong. They evolved a 
rational criterion laying down that good and evil are synonymous with (i) 
merit and defect {ii) profit and loss and {Hi) reward and punishment^^. 
Apparently it seems to be very simple, but it invites several serious 
questions like if good and evil are individualistic. In such a case it will be 
difficult to have a universal criterion to recognize something as good and 
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evil. It is true that the Quran has emphasized the apphcation of reason and 
has made occasional appeals to human prudence, but it does not mean 
that reason could serve as guide. The Revelation has to be taken into 
account as the primary source of guidance because it is based on divine 
knowledge. The M'utazilah make it subservient to reason instead and 
believe it to be only a seal on what reason judges as right and wrong. The 
common Muslims in general and the later scholars in particular agreed 
with the M'utazilah on the third possibility, that is, good and evil are 
synonymous with reward and punishment. In the case of the other two 
synonyms, revelation would be the true guide. The M'utazilah could not 
agree to this criticism, saying that if one is true, the other must equally be 
true. This, in our opinion, could not be accepted, for it undermines the 
importance of revelation. Justice if God also demands that God must not 
violate His promises He has made in the Quran. He has to carry out all 
His warnings He has given to man for being wicked and sinfijl. Justice 
demands that law be upheld and reward and punishment be confirmed 
accordingly. Some more of the controversial views of the M'utazilah can 
be summarized as under: 
1. Denial of reward and punishment to the dead in the grave and the 
questioning by the angels, Munkar and Nakir. 
2. Denial of the indications of the Day of Judgement, of Gog and 
Magog and of the appearance of the anti-Christ (dajjaf). 
3. Some M'utazilites believe that the view that full justice will be 
done on the Day of Judgement has only metaphorical meaning 
because deeds can hardly be weighed. 
4. The M'utazilah also deny the existence of Recording Angels 
{Kiraman Katibin). 
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5. They also deny the physical existance of Tank (Hauz) and the 
Bridge (al-Sirat). They hold that Heaven and Hell are not in 
existance at the moment. Rather, they hold that they will come 
into existence on the Day of Judgement. 
6. They deny covenant (al-Mifhaq). They believe that God neither 
spoke to any prophet, angel, or supporter of the Divine throne, nor 
would He cast a glance towards them. 
7. They hold that deeds are included in Iman and a grave sinner will 
always stay in Hell. 
8. They believe in evidentiary miracles of the prophets but deny any 
miraculous act from any saint lest it may cause confusion. The 
same was the behef of Jahamites too. 
9. They deny the ascension (al-M'eraj) of the Prophet but affirni his 
journey to Jerusalem. 
10. They believe that the doer deserves to reap the reward of his 
action; none can get benefit from the deeds of another, for 
example, one who prays is alone entitled to reap the reward of the 
prayer. 
11. As the divine decree cannot be altered, prayers serve no purpose at 
all. One gains nothing by them, because if the object, for which 
prayers are offered is in conformity with destiny, it is needless to 
ask for it, and if the object conflicts with destiny, it is impossible to 
secure it. 
12. They believe that Message bearing angles are superior to prophets 
in rank. 
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13. They hold that reason demands that an Imam should necessarily be 
appointed over the Ummah. 
14. For them, a Mujtahid can never be wrong in his views, as against 
the opinion of the Asharites. According to the Ash'artes, he 
sometimes errs sometimes hits the mark. 
In the light of the summary it is evident that the Mutaziah are 
thoroughgoing rationalists. In their emphasis on reason they became 
oblivious of its limits. They also could not realize that reason is 
individualistic. It does not have any cosmic character and cannot, 
therefore, help in the evolution of a universal principle. Reason of one is 
different from the other. What can be true in one case may be otherwise 
in the other. Besides, the M'utazilah defied the authority of revelation. 
They, in fact, subordinated it to reason. It is certainly against the common 
outlook. Briefly, they differed from the sunni community on the 
following principles: 
(i) The Problem of Essence and Attributes, 
{{{) The Problem of createdness of the Quran, 
(iii) The Problem of free-will and determinism, 
(iv) The Problem of Beatific vision and, 
(v) The Problem of promise and threat . 
It is obvious that M'utazilism declined because it could, impress 
only the elite. The common man could never relate to it. It was for this 
reason that when al-Ashari revolted against it, he was very widely 
welcomed, for his opposition to M'utaziHsm based on revelation as the 
primary source appealed to the common man's prudence. 
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CHAPTER - 3 
Contribution of al-Ash'ari to Islamic Thought 
We have mentioned elsewhere that the purpose of 'Ilm-al kalam is 
to justify the basic tenets of kalam on the basis of reason, and to assert 
whether it is possible to know God, His Essence and Attributes, 
specifically are generally with the help of such factors as the meaning of 
creation, motion and rest, body and accidents. The most disputed area of 
discussion is God's Essence and Attributes. The Mutazilite think it 
contrary to Oneness if it is maintained that God has knowledge, power, 
i.e. eternal entities. Those who maintain them are called Sifatiyah 
(Attributists) and those who deny are called Muattila (Strippers). 
Shahrastani says, "Concerning the revealed attributes, there were 
two schools of thought among the early leaders. One school interpreted 
them in a way that could be suggested by the words themselves. The 
other group abstained from interpretation. They said: we know from 
reason that there is nothing like God: therefore, God does not resemble 
any created thing, nor does any created thing resemble Him. This we are 
sure of We do not know, however, the meaning of the words applied to 
Him in such statements as "The beneficent sat on the throne', T created 
with my hand' 'God came', and the like. We need not know the 
explanation of these verses, nor how to interpret them; but we are obliged 
to believe that God has no partner and that there is nothing like him: that 
we have shown beyond doubt". 
He fiirther says, "Among those early leaders who did not follow 
the principle of interpretation or adopt anthropomorphism was Malik b. 
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Anas, Ahmad b. Hanball, Sufyan al- Thauri and Dawud b. Ali al-
Asfahani, and their followers held the same view."^ 
These are the "orthodox groups, particularly the Zahirites, the 
Mujassimites (Anthropomorphists), the Muhaddithun (Traditionalists) 
and the Jurists, all of whom were wholly opposed to the use of reason or 
kalam in defending or explaining religious dogmas and condemned any 
discussion about them as innovation." 
Al- Ashari, at the first stage, had to confront them. He tried his best 
to justify kalam. For this purpose he wrote a 'Resalah' entitled, Reslah fi 
Istihsan- al- Khawdfi- Ilm- al- kalam (A Vindication of the Science of 
kalam). At the second. He countered those whom he believed to hold 
views contrary to Islam especially in his books, al-Luma and al-Ihana. 
He criticized kharijah for their strict belief in w'aid, those 
anthropomorphists believing in God having human form or body and 
specially the M'utazilites for their denial of Attributes, belief in 
createdness of the Quran, belief in Qadar, denial of beatific vision, etc. 
We at first mention his justification of Kalam. 
It is a peculiarity of al-Ashari that before answering it he positively 
puts the question of the opponent. The opponents of kalam, says al-
Ashari, "calumniate him who scrutinizes the basic dogmas of religion and 
accuse him of deviation. It is innovation and deviation they claim, to 
engage in kalam about motion and rest, body and accident, accidental 
modes and states, the atom and the leaf, and the Attributes of the 
Creator.' 
He further says, "They assert that if it were a matter of guidance 
and rectitude, the Prophet and his Companions would have discussed it, 
for, they say, the Prophet did not die until he had discussed and amply 
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explained all needful religious matters. He left nothing to be said by 
anyone about the affairs of their religion needfiil to Muslims, and what 
brings them near to God and removes them far from His anger." 
Illustrating their view point, he fiirther says, "Since no kalam on any of 
the subjects, which we have mentioned, has been related from the 
Prophet, we know that such kalam is an innovation and such inquiry a 
deviation. For if it were good, the Prophet and his Companions would not 
have failed to discuss it. For the absence of such kalam on the part of the 
Prophet and his Companions can be explained in only two ways: either 
they knew and were silent about it; or they did not know it, nay were 
ignorant of it. Now if they knew it and did not discuss it, then we also 
may be silent about it, as they were, and we may abstain from plunging 
into it, as they abstained. For if it were a part of religion, they could not 
have been silent about it. On the other hand, if they did not know it, then 
we may have the same ignorance of it. For if it were a part of religion, 
they would not have been ignorant of it. So according to both 
explanations such kalam is an innovation and plunging into it is a 
deviation." 
This is the summary of their argument for abstaining from 
reasoning about the basic dogmas of religion. Al-Ashari rejected their 
argument for three reasons. Firstly, he reverses their argument against 
them saying," It is true that the Prophet never said: "If anyone should 
inquire into that and discuss it, regard him as a deviating innovator." 
since you have discussed something which the Prophet did not discuss, 
and you have accused him of deviation whom the Prophet did not so 
accuse. 
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Secondly, al-Ashari admits that the Prophet was not ignorant of 
any item of the kalam though neither he nor his companions ever discuss 
them. At the same time, he also admits that the basic principles of the 
kalam regarding body and accident, motion and rest, etc. have been 
mentioned in the Quran in general terms. About motion and rest he says, 
"Their basic principle is present in the Quran, where they prove the 
affinnation of God's oneness and so for union and separateness. In 
relating what His friend Abraham said in the story of setting of the star 
and the sun and the moon and their being moved from place to place, God 
said what proves that his (Abraham's) Lord cannot be subject to any of 
that and that one who is subject to setting and translation from place to 
place is not the divinity".'^  
About the oneness of God he quotes verses from the Quran. Similar is the 
case with His justice also. Thereafter he raises the question regarding the 
possibility or impossibility of resurrection of the body and argues its 
possibility by quoting some verses from the Quran. In his support he also 
uses rational argument. Because some people, according to him, "denied 
both the first creation and the second and maintained the eternity of the 
world, a doubt entered their minds simply because they said: It is our 
experience that life is wet and hot and death is cold and dry, akin to the 
nature of earth. How, then, can there be any amalgamation of life and 
earth-and decayed bones, resulting in a sound creation, since two 
contraries do not combine? For this reason, then, they denied the 
resurrection." 
Al-Ash'ari answers "It is certainly true that two contraries do not 
combine in one substrate or in one direction or in what exists already in 
the substrate. But they can exist in two subsfrates by way of propinquity. 
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So God argued against them by saying: "He who makes fire for you from 
the green tree-for lo! You kindle fire from it (36.80) In saying that, God 
referred them to their own knowledge and experience of the emergence of 
fire from green tree notwithstanding the heat and dryness of the former 
and the coldness of the latter. Again, God made the possibility of the first 
production a proof of the possibility of the last production, because it is a 
proof of the possibility of the propinquity of life to earth and decayed 
bones and of making it a sound creation, for He said, "Just as We created 
man a first time, so We shall restore him" (21.104)".^ 
About cause and its effect and the relation between them and the 
first member of the things existing, al-Ashari says, "We find the basis of 
that in the Sunna of God's Apostle. On a certain occasion he said, "There 
is no contagious disease and no bad omen." And a Bedouin said: then 
what is the matter with camels, flawless as gazelles which mingle with 
scabby camels and become scabby? And the Prophet said, "And who 
inflected the first? And the bedouin was silenf. And the belief that the 
body has a limit and the atom cannot be divided (ad infinitum), he says 
that the basis of this lies in the Quran: " And everything has been 
numbered by us in a clear archetype (36.12). He rationally proves it by 
saying, "Now one cannot number what has no limit and the single thing 
cannot be divided (ad infinitum). For this would necessitate that they 
(endlessly) are two things and God has declared that numbering applies to 
themboth".^ 
Thirdly, al-Ash'ari admits that all these questions and items were 
known to the Prophet and his companions but it was custom of the 
Prophet that he answered any question when it was raised. He himself did 
not pose any problem and the problems were solved as and when they 
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arose. Since this kind of kalam was not introduced at the time of the 
Prophet, therefore he did not discuss it, but the companions and the 
followers of the companions and their followers including Ahmad b. 
Hanbal, a renouned jurist, engaged in it. Ahmad b. Hambal held the view 
about the Quran that it is uncreated and the one advocating its createdness 
is a non-believer. He also referred to other three Imams saying that they 
wrote books while the Prophet did not write. By referring to them all He 
wanted to justify the science of Kalam and that this kind of Kalam is 
necessary for the justification of Islamic tenets and its behefs. 
Now we come to his second job, that is, his refutation of the ideas 
and the beliefs contradicting Islamic ones. His main opponents are the 
M'utazilites. At some places of his work 'al-Ibana' he also condemned 
the Qadarites and the Jahamites as deviators. Al-Ash'ari, at the outset, 
gives a general description of his opponents and their ideas. He says that 
there are some deviators from the right path, namely, the Mutazilites and 
the Qadarites whose wishes urged them to follow their heads and 
forefathers, so they interpreted the Quran on the basis of their opinions as 
God did not reveal any authority in their support, nor did they report 
anything from the Prophet nor from any holy predecessors (al-Salaf). 
Moreover, they contradicted and disagreed with the Companions of the 
Prophet in their opinion regarding the vision of God with eyes while there 
are many traditions to support it. They denied the intercession of the 
Prophet for the sinners and the Tradition in this regard. They also denied 
that the unbelievers are punished in their graves, whereas the Companions 
and their followers unanimously agreed to punishment in the grave. They 
also believed in the createdness of the Quran as their brothers associating 
partners with God said, "It is not but a speech of a man". Moreover, they 
hold that man creates evil, as the Magians believed in two creators; one 
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creating good and the other ewil. These are the Qadarites. After criticizing 
them, Ashari confronts the M'utazilah, denying any kind of 
anthropomorphism. He says that they also deny that God has a face, 
whereas He said, "All that is on earth will perish but will abide (forever) 
the Face of thy Lord, frill of Majesty, Bounty and Honour"^. Al-Ash'ari 
frirther says that they also deny 'two hands,' 'two eyes' ,knowledge and 
power to God while there are verses to ascribe them to Him. 
After attacking in this section, al-Ash'ari the Jahamites, Kharijites, 
Qadarites and the M'utazilites in berief, he, in the other, briefly discuss 
the ideas and the path of(Ahn-al- haqq wa al- Sunna). He says, "we 
affirm that our religion is to hold fast the Book of our Lord, the Sunnah of 
the Prophet and what was related by the Companions of the Prophet, their 
followers (Tabe'in) and by the Traditionists. We hold them all and what 
was said by Abu Abdullah Ahmad b. Mohammad b. Hanbal, may God 
bless him, elevate his status and make his reward plentiful." (It seems 
that he recognizes Ahmad b. Hanbal as his Imam, though he did not 
strictly follow him). He fizrther says "All that we say is that we affirm and 
believe in Allah, His angels. His Book, His Messengers, what they 
brought from Allah and all that is related with authority. We do not reject 
any of them and that Allah is One. There is no Allah but He. He did not 
adopt any wife nor any child and that Mohammad is His slave and His 
Messenger whom He sent with guidance and with right religion and that 
Heaven and Hell are realities. The day of judgement will undoubtedly 
come and that God will resurrect those who are in the graves. Afterwards, 
al-Ashari affirms Allah as firmly established on His throne, having a face, 
two hands, two eyes and substantiats all these with Quranic verses. He 
affinns all His Attributes and Names, especially Knowledge, Power and 
Will, by quoting holy verses of the Quran in his support. He believes in 
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human destiny being either good or bad and goodness or badness being 
determined by His decree and judgement. Beatific vision with sight is a 
reward for behevers at the Day of judgement while the unbelievers will 
be deprived of this bhss. About the perpetrators of the grave sins he says 
that he should not charge anyone of infidelity even if he commits a grave 
sin like adultery, fornication, thefl;, etc. He says that he believes in Islam 
being wider and more extensive than Iman, and that Iman may increase 
and decrease. He also believes that the heart of man is between His two 
fingers and that He has kept heaven on one finger and earth on the other 
as reported by the Prophet. After this, he discusses the concept of 
intercession by the Prophet on behalf of the sinners amongst the believers 
at the Day of Judgement, and agrees to this concept and also believes in 
punishment in the grave. He also believes in Basin, Balance, Bridge and 
resurrection after death. Having mentioned them, he discusses the 
problems related to the Caliphate, Munkar and Nakir, and creation of 
Heaven and hell.^ 
The issues discussed and justified by al-Ash'ari are those denied 
either by the M'uitazilah or Jahmiyah or Qadaria. Some of them have 
been explained convincingly. We will discuss them one by one. They are 
as follows: 
(i) Essence and Attributes. 
{ii) The Quran being created or uncreated. 
(iii) Beatific vision with physical eyes. 
(iv) Problem of Jabr and Qadar. 
(v) Promise of reward and threat of punishment. 
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Before we elaborate upon these, one thing must borne in mind, 
that is, al- Ashari always sought to find a mid-way position. In the case of 
the Attributes of God, for example, he tried to seek reconcilation 
between the two extreme views held by Anthropomorphists and 
M'utaziltes. The former maintained that God possesses all the attributes 
mentioned in the Quran and that all these attributes such as two hands, 
two eyes, a face, etc must be taken in the literal sense. In other words, 
God has bodily existence. The M'utazilites, on the other hand, considered 
themselves to be the 'Champions of Unity and Justice' maintaining that 
God is One, eternal, unique, absolute Being having no touch of dualism in 
Him, His Essence is self-subsistent and He does not have any attribute 
apart from His Essence. Therefore His knowledge is He Himself or His 
Essence and His power is He Himself or His Essence. Similar is the case 
with all His attributes like Seeing, Hearing, etc. These Attributes, if they 
exist, have no meaning other than His Essence or other than He. 
In the same manner al-Ash'ari maintained a mid-way position 
regarding the case of free-will and determinism. 
God's Essence and Attributes 
According to al-Ash'ari, for God there is an Essence along with 
some Ninety-nine attributes mentioned either in the Quran or in the 
Tradition. If we carefiilly study his 'al-Luma,' we find that he explained 
His Oneness along with His attributes like Knowledge, Power, Will, 
Hearing, Seeing, etc. and maintained all of them as neither separate nor 
identical with His Essence. Therefore God is knowing by knowledge, 
powerful by power and seeing by sight, or in other words. He has 
Knowledge Power, Hearing, Sight, etc. 
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About the Unity of God he held that God is One, pure and simple. 
There is no God but He "He is Allah, the One, the Eternal, the Absolute, 
He beggetteth not, nor is He begotten and there is none like unto Him"^^ 
and "He is the Lord of the worlds"". He is the Creator of this universe. 
There is no Creator but He. He is the Governor and maker. Justifying His 
oneness al-Ash'ari says, "The Government of two will be neither 
harmonious nor consistently effective, but impotence will inevitably 
attach to one or to both of them. For if one of the two wills a man's life 
and the other wills his death, one of three things must ensue: the will of 
both together will be accomplished or the will of neither will be 
accomplished, or the will of only one will be accomplished. Now it is 
impossible that the will of both together be accomplished, for the body 
cannot be simultaneously living and dead. Similarly if the will of both 
together be not accomplished one must conclude to the impotence of both 
and the impotent can be neither God nor eternal. And if the will of only 
one were accomplished impotence necessarily attaches to the one whose 
will is not accomplished and the impotent can be neither God nor eternal. 
Thus what we have said proves that the Maker of things is One. And God 
Most High has said, "Were there gods other than God in them, the 
heavens and the earth would be in disorder" (21 -22) This is the meaning 
of the argument which we have just presented". 
Ash'ari divides attributes into two categories: Essential and 
Operative. In his book al-Luma, al-Ash'ari has discussed seven essential 
Attributes of God, that is. Knowledge, Power, Life, Hearing, Seeing, 
Speech and Will. Speech and Will have been discussed in greater detail. 
Al-Ashari's concern is to prove that these Attributes are inherent in Him 
and that these are neither different nor identical with Him. Let us take the 
case of Knowledge. 
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Ash'ari mentions the question of his opponent who asked, "Why 
do you say that God is knowing?" and then he replies, "Well-made works 
can be wisely ordered only by one who is knowing. That is clear from the 
fact that a man who lacks skill and knowledge cannot weave patterned 
brocade or execute fine points of craftmanship. So when we behold in 
man an embodiment of wise organization, such as the life arranged in him 
by God, and his hearing and sight and the ways in which food and drink 
are distributed in him, and his perfection and completeness, and when we 
behold the firmament with its sun, its moon, its stars, and their courses, 
we see in that proof that the Maker of what we have mentioned could not 
have made it without knowing its mode and nature. Besides, if works of 
wisdom could be produced by one who is not knowing, but we could not 
know but that perhaps all the detemiinations, dispositions and works 
which proceed from living beings proceed from them while they are 
unknowing. (And this is impossible). The impossibility of that proves that 
well-made works can be produced only by one who is knowing". 
With the same argument al-Ash'ari fiirther proves that God is 
living and powerfiil. He says, "It is likewise true that works can be 
produced only by one who is powerfiil and living. For if they could be 
produced by one who is not powerfiil and not living, we should not know 
that perhaps all the things which proceed from men proceed from them 
while they are powerless and dead. (And this is impossible). Since that is 
impossible, the works prove that God is living and powerfiil." And in 
order to justify His being Hearing and Seeing, al-Ash'ari says, "One who 
is living, if he be not qualified by some defect which prevents his 
perceiving audible and visible things when these exist, must be hearing 
and seeing. Therefore, since God is living, and since He cannot be subject 
to such ailments as deafiiess, blindness and so forth, for ailments prove 
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the temporal production of him who is subject to them, it is certain that 
God is hearing and seeing." 
These are five of God's essential attributes. Al-Ash'ari has so far 
proved His being living, powerful, knowing, hearing and seeing. But the 
question arises whether He is always (or eternally) living, powerful etc.? 
Al-Ash'ari maintains His being eternally living, knowing, powerful, 
hearing and seeing. Al-Ash'ari says that if we maintain that He is not 
eternally so and so, it means that he, at any time, was qualified by 
something contrary. We take the example of knowledge. He says, "One 
who is living, if he be not knowing, is qualified by some contrary of 
knowledge such as ignorance, doubt or other defects. So if the Creator 
had been ever living but unknowing. He would have been qualified by 
some contrary of knowledge such as ignorance, doubt or other defects. 
But if He had been ever qualified by some contrary of knowledge, it 
would have been impossible for Him ever to know. For if the contrary of 
knowledge had been eternal, it would have been impossible for it to cease 
to be; and if it had been impossible for it to cease to be it would have 
been impossible for Him to have made works of wisdom." 
Al-Ash'ari fiirther maintains, God's being eternally powerful 
seeing and hearing. He says, "Similarly, had God been ever living, but 
not powerful. He would necessarily have been ever impotent, ever 
qualified by some contrary of power. And had His impotence been 
eternal, it would have been impossible for Him ever to be powerful and 
for acts to proceed fi*om Him. Likewise, had God been ever living, but 
not hearing and seeing, He would have been qualified by some contrary 
of hearing such as deafiiess and other ailments, and by some contrary of 
sight such as blindness and other ailments. But it is impossible for the 
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Creator to be subject to ailments because they are among the 
characteristics of temporal production. So what we have said proves that 
God has always been knowing, powerful seeing and hearing".'^ 
Al-Ash'ari has so far proved, that God is eternally living, knowing, 
powerful, etc., but he still has to prove that He is knowing by knowledge, 
powerfiil by power and so on. This is necessary for the reason that his 
opponents believed His being knowing, powerful, etc. but they held that 
He was knowing by His essence. The Jahamites denied altogether His 
knowledge, power etc., and the M'utazilites held, if they believed, His 
knowledge, power, etc to be identical with His Essence. Al-Ashari's 
contention is to prove all His attributes as being neither identical with nor 
distinct from Him and His Essence and that He is knowing with 
knowledge, powerfiil with power and so on. 
Al-Ashari first advances his argument that "One's being knowing 
means that he has knowledge". ^ ^ In the case of God he also believes that 
He has knowledge. He quotes these two verses: "He has sent it down 
with His knowledge" and "No female conceives or bears save with His 
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knowledge." To justify His power he quotes another verse of the Quran. 
In order to prove that these Attributes are not identical with His Essence, 
as the M'utazilites believed, he says, "Among the proofs that God is 
knowing by a knowledge is the fact that He must be knowing either by 
Himself or by a knowledge which cannot be Himself Now if He were 
knowing by Himself, He Himself would have to be knowledge. For if one 
said that God is knowing by a quality distinct from Him, he would have 
to say that this quality is knowledge. But knowledge can not be knowing, 
nor can the knower be knowledge, nor can God be identical with His 
attributes. Do you not see that the ways in which one knows that 
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knowledge is that by it the knower knows? For the power of man, by 
which he does not know, cannot be knowledge. Hence the Creator cannot 
be knowledge, He cannot be knowing by Himself (or by His Essence). 
And if that be impossible, it is certain that He is knowing by a knowledge 
which cannot be Himself"'^ In relation to God's knowledge (similar is 
the case with His other essential attributes) al-Ash'ari has proved that it is 
not identical with God or with His Essence, while the second phrase of 
his conviction, i.e. 'these are not separate and distinct from Him', requires 
explanation. Al-Ash'ari, in this regard, says, "Granted that the work of 
wisdom that a man has knowledge, it does not therefore prove that the 
knowledge is distinct from him, just as, though it proves that the man is 
knowing, it does not prove that he is in any way distinct. Moreover, 
'otherness' means that one of two things can be somehow separate from 
the other. Hence, there is solid proof of the eternity both of the Creator 
and of His knowledge, it is impossible for them to be two distinct 
things."^^ 
One can think that this inference was made because if His 
knowledge or any other attribute be maintained to be distinct from Him, it 
would destroy the divine unity. That is why the Jahamites denied His 
attributes altogether and the Mutazilites believed them to be identical 
with His Essence. But Al-Ashari is of the opinion that these are not 
identical with Him because, one can think that this will nullify them, nor 
are they distinct and separate from Him because this will destroy His 
unicity. This argument prove that all His attributes, specially essential 
ones, such as life, power, hearing, sight, etc are neither separate nor 
identical with Him. 
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Essential attributes are those that are active at all times. If we deny 
them, their contraries will necessarily follow. In other words, if we say 
that God is not knowing, we must believe that He is All-ignorant. If we 
say that He is not willing we must say that He is not-willing and likewise 
if we say that He is not speaking, we must say that He is qualified with 
the contrary of speech such as silence or other ailment and if the 
contraries of will, speech, power, etc had been eternal, it would have been 
impossible for them to cease to exist just as it is impossible for them to 
begin to exist. Seven attributes are regarded as essential. They are life, 
power, knowledge, hearing, seeing, will and speech. Apart from them, 
there are other operative or active attributes. They are also eternal, but 
their contraries will not necessarily follow if we deny them. In the case of 
action and creation, if we say 'He is not acting, or not creating', it does 
not mean that He is qualified by their contraries. Because action, creation 
and even justice have no contraries. In relation to justice al-Ash'ari says, 
"the denial of justice does not necessitate the affirmation of a contrary, 
which is impotence. Nor does it necessitate the affirmation of injustice, 
because a man may not be just, when there proceeds from him no justice 
acquired or effected by him, and yet not be unjust" . Mc Carthy says, 
"Ash'ari seems to have held that God's active (not essential) attributes 
(those concerned with His operations like creation, sustenance, etc) were 
entitively temporal, but denominatively eternal. Thus God is eternally 
'creator' but not eternally 'creating', just as a weaver is a weaver even 
when he is not actually weaving"^"^ 
Anthropomorphism is yet another problem related to the 
Attributes. There are many verses in the Quran ascribing face, hands, 
eyes to God. The problem is whether they should be treated as literal or 
metaphorical. The Muta2ilites treated then as metaphorical i.e. face for 
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His Majesty, hand for His Power etc. But al-Ash'ari treats them as literal, 
whereupon question arises as to whether these words have bodily 
existence in their connotation, or in other words, whether God is a body 
or not. If He is a body, or has bodily existence, then there is no difference 
between Him and His creatures having bodily existence and that is absurd 
because He Himself has declared, "There is nothing similar to Him". On 
this very basis the Mutazilites denied Him having face, hands etc and 
interpreted them otherwise. But the Asharites affirmed them saying that 
since these words have been used by God Himself, and are ascribed to 
Him and they have no meanings other than face, hand etc. in Arabic, and 
Quran was revealed in Arabic so the Arab might understand it well. 
Therefore, we are left with no choice but to accept them in their literal 
meaning and there is no reason to interpret them otherwise. But since He 
is not like anything therefore we should say that He has face unlike faces, 
hands unlike hands etc. In his book 'al-Ibana' Al-Ash'ari has quoted the 
verses describing these words to God and answered the M'utazilites 
interpreting them otherwise. For example. He says in the case of two 
hands, that when Satan denied to prostrate before Adam, He said to him, 
"Why did you deny to prostrate one whom we have created with my 
hands"? There God wanted to show that Adam was someone special for 
Him. He had created him with His own hand and this was the pride of 
Adam denied to other creatures including Satan himself If we interpret 
'hands' in the meaning of Power, then everything is created by His 
power, and in this case, there is no privilege with Adam and there is no 
difference between Adam and Satan because Satan also was created by 
His power. Quoting another tradition al-Ash'ari says that both His hands 
are right Thus Ash'ari believes that God has face unlike faces, hands 
unlike hands, etc and that He is sitting on His Throne as suggested by 
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many verses of the Quran. Throne, according to him, is the highest 
heaven. He comes every night to the nearest sky to forgive His servants if 
they seek His pardon, as reported in a tradition, and then goes back. Thus 
he beHeves in His coming and going. The verses of the Quran also 
support this.^ "* Here Ash'ari followed a midway between the two 
extremes: one of the downright anthropomorphism, like Hesham b. 
Hakam whom we have discussed in Shia'ism, and the other of the 
Mutazilites who stressed on anti-anthropomorphism (Tanzih) and, thus, 
denied to ascribe to God even face, hands etc. that were used by God for 
Himself in the Quran. 
The Quran being either created or uncreated 
The M'utazilites believed that the Quran is created and al-Ash'ari 
held that it is uncreated. In order to justify his claim al-Ash'ari argued 
that Speech is one of God's essential Attributes and that "God has ever 
been speaking. Had God ever been not-speaking (and He is one for whom 
speech is not impossible) He would have been qualified by one of the 
contraries of speech, such as silence or some ailment." And this silence 
being an attribute of God would have been eternal and subsequently it 
would have been impossible for it to cease to be as well as to begin to be. 
Therefore we should believe that God has eternally been speaking and 
speech is one of his essential Attributes and the Quran, being an eternal 
Attribute of God, must be uncreated. 
Everything created, in order to take place, needs divine command, 
because it is God who is the Creator of all things, and in order to create 
anything He commands it to be. In case we maintain the Quran being 
created, it should also have needed divine command. Because God says, 
"For to anything which We have willed, We but say 'Be' and it is." 
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Ash'ari holds that God has been ever speaking and that the speech of God 
(the Quran) is uncreated. In order to justify this behef he says, "We hold 
that because God has said, 'When We will a thing Our only utterance is 
that We say to it, 'Be'! and it is' (16.40/42). So if the Quran had been 
created, God would have said to it 'Be'! But the Quran is His speech and 
it is impossible that His speech be spoken to. For this would necessitate a 
second speech, and we should have to say of this second speech and its 
relation to a third speech what we say of the first speech and its relation to 
a second speech. But this would necessitate speeches without end which 
is false. And if this be false, it is false that the Quran is created. 
Moreover, if God could speak to His own speech. He could also will His 
own willing a thing which both we and they hold to be false. And if this 
be false, it cannot be that the Quran is created." 
It seems that al-Ash'ari has founded this argument on the basis that 
there should be an end to every thing and "the antecedently limitless 
cannot begin to be" and cannot be counted as well because God has said 
"And everything has been numbered by Us in a clear archetype." 
Ash'ari says, "now one cannot number what has no limit." 
Another argument advanced by al-Ash'ari is that God is the Lord 
of the worlds. He is the Creator of this universe. There are two things 
existing in this universe: one is God's command and the other is His 
creation. When God says, "To Him belong both creation and 
Command" . He Himself differentiates between them. It means 
Command is not included in creation. If it were included, it would not 
have been used separately. It means that Command is something 
uncreated. This is the Command the heavens and the earth are sustained 
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thereby. God says,". 
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This is the command (amr) of God that eternally exists because He 
says, "For Allah there is Command (even) before (the creation) and after 
(this).""^ It means Command is something eternal and therefore 
uncreated. Since the Quran, being the speech of God, is His command, 
therefore, it is not created 
Ash'ari criticizes those who prove that the Quran is created saying 
that they should, at first, prove that God is not All-speaking. If He is All-
speaking, there must be His speech and His speech must be eternal like 
Him. Because, He is All-speaking. This is why there is no end of His 
speeches while there is an end of oceans if they are to write His speeches. 
God says, "Say: "If the ocean were ink (wherewith to write out) the 
words of my Lord, sooner would the ocean be exhausted than would the 
words of my Lord, even if we added another ocean like it, for its aid."^ 
Ash'ari says Tn case we admit that the Quran is created this will 
not be the speech of an eternal. Rather, this will be considered to be the 
speech of a created entity either of a tree as the Jahamites hold that God 
had spoken Moses through a tree. His speech was inherent in that tree or 
of a man as the polytheist regarded this Quran as to be the speech of a 
man.^ ^ 
Therefore, those who maintain, Ash'ari says, that the Quran is 
created are sa)^ng what was said by the polytheists and therefore they are 
like them.^ ^ 
Ash'ari in this connection, refers to Ahmad b. Hanbal who said 
that a man believing in createdness of the Quran is kafir (infidel), and he 
himself holds this view. When Ahmad was asked whether the Quran is 
created or not, he repHed with reference to the Quran that God has said, 
"The Most Gracious! It is He Who has taught the Quran He has created 
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man"^^ (Allama-al-Quran, khalaqa-al-insan). Here Ahamad b. Hanbal 
repeated again and again allama and khalaqa (taught and created). Thus 
he wanted to say that God himself has differentiated between the Quran 
and the man. In case of the Quran He says, 'He taught it", while in the 
case of man He says, 'He has created him'. If the Quran were something 
created He would have said, "It is He Who has created the Quran and He 
has created man". But He did not say so. 
Another argument is that the Quran is Divine knowledge that He 
imparted to man and divine knowledge cannot be created, especially 
when it consists of divine Names and every Muslim believes these Names 
to be etemal.^^ 
But the question arises, what does the Quran mean? Quran is 
composed of parts, words and sounds. Whether all these are uncreated 
and eternal or only its meaning is eternal and therefore uncreated. Here 
again al-Ash'ari adopts an intermediary position between the extreme 
views of the Zahirites and the Mutazilites. The Zahirites, including the 
Hanbalites "hold that the speech of God, that is, the Quran, is composed 
of letters, words and sounds which inhere in the essence of God and is 
therefore eternal. Some of the Hanbalites went to the extreme and 
asserted that even the cover and the binding of the Quran are etemaF''^ ^ 
The M'utazilites went to the other extreme and asserted that it is created 
and, therefore, not eternal. But the Ash'arites, adopting a mid-way 
position, "maintained that the Quran is composed of words and sounds 
but these do not inhere in the essence of God. They made a distinction 
between the outward and concrete expression of the Quran in Language, 
and the real, self-subsistent meaning of it, and held that the Quran, as 
expressed in words and sounds, is no doubt, temporal (Hadith), but the 
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Quran in its meaning is uncreated and eternal. They further maintained 
that this meaning is an attribute other than knowledge and will, and as 
such, inheres eternally in the essence of God and is, therefore, etemal."'^^ 
Vision of God 
The question of the Vision of God has three possibilities; one, 
whether God may be seen or not, two, if His vision is possible, whether it 
is possible in both the worlds, here and hereafter or in the Hereafter alone, 
and third, whether this vision is related to eyes or to the heart. Some of 
the M'utazilites believed that God would be seen by hearts, that is, the 
believers would have His vision not by sight but by their hearts and that it 
is a kind of knowledge. This controversy took place because of a verse in 
the Quran where God says, "Eyes do not attain (perceive) to Him, but He 
attains to eyes." The verbs used in this verse are derived from the 'IdralC 
that means perception. The problem is what does this verse mean? Some 
are of the view that \i denotes perception by eyes, which is evident from 
the verse and they, therefore, deny His vision but affirm His perception 
by the hearts, which is a kind of knowledge, and that is possible even in 
this world as it is possible in the Hereafter. On the contrary, "The extreme 
orthodox Muslims and the Zahirites, in particular, held that it is possible 
to see God and the righteous persons would actually have His vision as 
the chief reward for their good actions. They fiirther held that God is 
settled firmly on His throne, He exists in different directions and is 
capable of being pointed out"."*^  
This controversy is related to His vision with eyes. The Mutazilites 
denied His vision because it entails, firstly. His being a bodily existence 
and then, being located in space and time and even in a particular 
direction and God is above all these limitations. On the contrary, Ashari 
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is of the view that it is possible to see God and the righteous persons will 
see Him in the world hereafter, as the moon is seen in night, and that the 
unbelievers will not have this bliss. He quotes the Quran, "Some faces 
that day, will beam (in brightness and beauty) looking towards their 
Lord.""' 
In this connection, there are two verses in the Quran and both of 
them seem to be contradicting each other. One suggests, eyes don't attain 
to Him and the other affirms the possibility of His vision with eyes. 
Ash'ari tried his best to have reconciliation between them. He restricted 
the verse, apparently denying this possibility to this world alone so that it 
be in agreement with the other verse and with the Tradition also in which 
the Prophet said addressing his Companions that they would see in the 
world hereafter their Lord as they saw the moon, and shall receive no 
harm in seeing Him. 
• The second argument advanced by al-Ash'ari is related to the 
language and its grammar. The verse affirming the possibility of vision 
contains the word 'nazirah' that is derived fi'om its root word 'nazr,' and 
nazr can be used in three senses: (i) to consider or to learn a lesson {nazr-
al-'itibarf^, (ii) to wait and watch {nazr-al-intizarf^ and {iii) vision with 
eyes {nazr-al-ruyah). Ashari has shown why and how the word 'nazirah' 
is restricted to express the last meaning. Ash'ari says that these two 
verses mention righteous people and their reward in the Heaven, and 
Heaven is not a place of consideration and a place of learning a lesson, 
but it is a place of reward for the righteous . Therefore, this 'nazr' (Look) 
is not a nazr-al-itibar (Look of consideration). Likewise, Heaven is not a 
place of waiting but it is a place of receiving. The righteous will get what 
they like. Therefore it is not a 'nazr-al-intizar' (look of expectation). 
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Now, the last option remains and this is true that it is nazr-al-ruyah (Look 
with eyes). 
The other argument, related to Arabic grammar and advanced by 
Ashari, is that when 'nazr' is used with preposition '//a' meaning 'at', it 
does mean to see. In order to substantiate his contention he quotes a verse 
from the poetry of hiir-al-Qaise where nazr is used but is not followed by 
any preposition like 'ila'. Therefore it means waiting. Likewise, he quotes 
two more verses containing this verb, that is, 'yanzonin', which also 
means waiting, while in the verse concerned, 'ila' is used before the 
object of 'nazirah,'' therefore it means 'looking at'. 
The other objection related to it is whether this look (nazr) is the 
look of the eye or of the hearts. Unlike the Mutazilites, Ash'ari is of the 
opinion, that this is the look of the eye, not of heart. Ash'ari refutes their 
contention with the same argument, that is,, 'look of consideration as well 
as look of expectation. That both are related to the heart has already been 
refuted. Therefore, it is not the look of the heart. Rather, it is the look of 
the eye, especially when reference is made to the faces also, which may 
be seen in the holy verse.'^ 
There is an objection. If the vision of God with eyes was possible, 
the desire of the Prophet Moses could be ftilfilled. Moses desired to have 
the vision of God but he could not accomplish it Ash'ari replies that it is 
true that Moses did not attain His vision in this world, but it does not 
probe the fallacy of his contention. Rather, it supports it. There are two 
possibilities, he says, one is that Moses did not know that His vision is 
impossible, but this is not true because he was a prophet and knew 
everything about his Lord. The other possibility is that he knew that His 
vision is not possible but under his strong urge to see Him, he demanded 
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it in the temporal world, whereas His vision is possible only in the world 
hereafter. As God did not like to make himself visible to Moses in this 
world, therefore He postulated a condition that is fixity of the mountain. 
In other words, if the mountain was fixed, Moses could see Him but 
"When his Lord manifested Himself to the mount, He made it as dust and 
Moses fell down in a swoon". Ash'ari says that if God liked to show 
Himself to Moses, He would have made the mount fixed in its place and 
Moses would see Him, but His vision is not possible in this world 
because this is a bliss and reward for the righteous in the hereafter. 
Therefore, He made it as dust. Since the antecedent, in its nature, is 
possible for God, therefore the consequent must also be possible for 
Him.'^ ^ 
The objection that seeing a thing requires space, time and 
direction, that is, a thing, in order to be seen, must be located in a space 
and in a particular direction, is countered in the following way. 
Ash'ari says, "What is visible is not seen because it is limited or 
because it inheres in something limited or because it is an accident. Since 
that is not so, one must not apply that judgement to the invisible. We, 
likewise, have no experience of an agent who is not a body or a thing, 
which is neither a substance nor accident or of one knowing, powerful 
and Living how is not such by reason of temporally produced knowledge 
and life and power. Yet we must not apply that judgement to the 
Invisible. For the agent is not an agent because he is a body, nor is the 
thing a thing because it is a substance or an accident."^^ 
The basic argument is that God should not be treated as we treat 
His creatures because "There is nothing like Him"^° and that "There is no 
one equal to Him".^ ^ 
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In order to differentiate God from His creatures, Ash'ari denies His 
being a body or resembling anything. He says, "If God resembled 
anything He would have to resemble it either in all of its respects or in 
one of its respects. Now if He resembled it in all of its respects, He would 
of necessity be produced in all of His respects. And if He resembled it in 
one of its respects. He would of necessity be produced, like it, in that 
respect in which he resembled it. For every two like things are judged the 
same regarding that in which they are alike But it is impossible for the 
produced to be eternal and for the eternal to be produced". 
When God is not like other things such as body, substance or 
accident. He should not be treated like them. Ash'ari wants to argue that 
it is our habit that we see a thing located in a limited space and time. We, 
therefore, apply that judgment to everything. But the Invisible is not like 
visible. We, therefore, should not apply this judgement to the Invisible 
because He is above all these limitations and that "There is nothing like 
unto Him." 
Theory of Acquisition 
This theory is related to freewill determinism discourse. It has been 
established that the controversy of freewill and determinism existed even 
in the days of Ignorance amongst the pagan Arabs. After the advent of 
Islam, Muslims were also influenced by it. The early Qadarites 
concentrated on the Quran and the Sunnah. They traced some verses in 
the Quran holding man responsible for his deeds while there are some 
that emphasize that God is the ultimate cause of everything There is a 
verse saying that if there is good in our destiny it is from God, but if 
there is an evil it is from man. The Qadarities, we may suppose, held it 
fast and believed that good is from God and evil is from man or Satan. 
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The Mutazilites modified this doctrine and held that man is the doer as 
well as creator of his good and bad deeds and thus they became the 
champions of qadar. Qadar is from qudra (power), and this qudra 
(power)was attributed completely to man by the Multazilites, while the 
Asharites are of the opinion that all powers belong to God. It is He Who 
creates and determines all things and deeds. One can thus think that this 
freewill detenninism discourse deals with action, whether it is done or 
created or, as Ash'ari holds, acquired. 
The main problem is that if a man is not the doer or creator of his 
deeds, why he should be held responsible and why he should deserve 
reward or punishment. The Mutazilites and the Asharites both hold man 
responsible for his deeds and thereby deserving of reward and 
punishment. In order to make a man responsible the M'utazilites regard 
him as doer and creator as well. But the Asharites consider him to be 
acquirer because for them there is no creator save God. Therefore, God is 
also the creator of man's deeds. The main problem is 'who determines 
human acts, God or man'? If God detennines them He is the creator, and 
if man detennines then the question arises whether he should be 
considered its creator or not. Ash'ari denies man's being a creator of his 
deeds, because, he says, God has said, "And Allah has created you and 
what you do" ' From this Ash'ari wants to show that man and his 
handiworks both are created by God. At another place, Ash'ari refers to 
another verse where he wants to suggest that even the sperm is created by 
Allah, "Do ye then see ? The (human seed) that ye emit, is it ye who 
created it or are We the Creators ?"^ '* 
The sole force in this regard is the will of God.^ ^ Therefore, in 
order to explain the above cited verse of the Quran, Ash'ari says, " They 
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could not affirni with proof that they created what they ejected. 
Despite their desire to have a child he would not come, and despite their 
unwillingness to have him, he would come." Thus the Maker and 
en 
Creator of all is One Who is "Doer (without let) of all that He intends". 
Therefore His will embraces all temporally produced things either good 
or bad. Ash'ari says, "All temporally produced things are created by God. 
Hence, if the Creator cannot do what He does not will, there cannot 
produce from another what He does not will—since all the things 
(including acts) which proceed from others are acts of God. Moreover, if 
there were in the world something unwilled by God (as the Qadarites hold 
that God does not will evil therefore He is not its creator), it would be 
something to the existence of which He would be averse. And if there 
were something to the existence of which He was averse, it would be 
something the existence of which He would refuse. This would 
necessitate the conclusion that sins exist, God willing or God refusing. 
But this is the description of one who is week and dominated and our 
Lord is very far above that."^ *^ It means if there are sins in the world they 
exist by divine will, because if He were to refuse, nothing would exist. In 
other words, if He does not will nothing can exist. From another point of 
view at another place, Ash'ari attacks the same group (the Qadarites) 
saying, "The champions of the qadar should be asked: Do not God's 
words "The Knower of everything" (2.29/27) prove that there is nothing 
knowable which God does not know? If they agree, they should then be 
asked: why, then, do you deny that Gods words "Over everything 
powerful" (2.20/19) prove that there is nothing which can be done over 
which God has not power? And that His words "The Creator of 
everything" (13.16/17) prove that there is nothing produced or made of 
which God is not producer. Maker and Creator?" 
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The question arises, when God is the Creator of all things, even of 
human acts, God, then, should be responsible for both good and evil. 
Why should a man be responsible and deserving of reward and 
punishment? 
Man is responsible, for al-Ash'ari, because he acquires them, 
while, for the Mutalizites, he creates his act, and there is no difference 
between doing and creation, but the Asharites "made a distinction 
between creation (khalq) and acquisition (kasb) of an action. Actions of 
human beings are created by God and acquired by them, because the 
creatures are not capable of creating any action" '^^ . The creative power 
belongs to God alone. There are two types of power: one is original or 
eternal (qadimah)and the other is derived or temporal (halithah). "The 
original power alone is effective. Derived power can create nothing."^' In 
the case of human action, God is Creator and man is acquisiter. Creatioii 
is His prerogative that takes place by the original and eternal power while 
acquisition proceeds from man under his derived and temporal power 
Ashari says, "The true meaning of acquisition is that the things proceeds 
from its acquirer in virtue of a created power." Thus a man can; just, 
acquire a thing or make a choice between two alternatives, between the 
right and the wrong, though this free choice is not effective in the sense 
that he can produce the action. Actions are in their nature right or wrong, 
good or bad. Goodness or badness is their essential property. A man can 
neither create them nor can he change them. He is bound to choose one of 
the alternatives. In other words, there is compulsion on one hand and on 
the other, there is choice also, though so minute. This is why the 
Ash'arites are regarded here also to have adopted a midway position 
between pure fatalistic views of the Jabarites and the libertarian view of 
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the M'ulazilites. The best position is the moderate one and the moderate 
one is something lying between the two extremes. 
Another problem related to the Jabar and Qadar discussion is the 
problem related to justice and injustice of God. The M'utazilites 
contention is that if God creates good and evil both and if a man does 
nothing except acquiring one of them, so his punishment is injustice on 
the part of God. Ash'ari replies that there is a difference between injustice 
for oneself and injustice for another. If a man makes injustice, it is for 
himself but if God makes or creates injustice, He makes it "as another's 
injustice not as His. Hence, since one who is unjust is not unjust because 
he makes injustice as another's injustice. God is not necessarily unjust 
because He creates injustice as another's injustice, not as His." This 
argument is based on the analogy that if God creates motion, desire and 
volition for others, He, by creating them, does not become willing, 
moving and desiring. Likewise, if He creates injustice for another. He 
should not be unjust. The thing moving is responsible for its motion. The 
agent willing or desiring is responsible for his volition and desire. 
Therefore the man doing injustice is responsible for his injustice, not God 
Who creates it. 
In the same context, at another place, commenting the verses: 
"God wills no injustice for creatures" (40.31) and "God wills no injustice 
for the worlds" (3.108), Ash'ari says, "They mean that God Himself has 
not willed to wrong them, although He has willed that they should wrong 
one another" 
Ash'ari wants to tell, one can think, that justice and injustice both 
are created by God and a man is responsible when he acquires one of 
them, not when he creates one or both of them. It is God who creates both 
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of them and He is not unjust by creating injustice because He is free to do 
what He hkes. Ash'ari says, "He is the Supreme Monarch, subject to no 
one, with no superior over Him who can permit, or command, chide or 
forbid or prescribe what He shall do and fix bounds for Him. This being 
so, nothing can be evil on the part of God. For a thing is evil on our part 
only because we transgress the limit and bound set for us and do what we 
have no right to do. But since the Creator is subject to no one and bound 
by no command, nothing can be evil on His part." . 
Related to this issue, that is, Jabr and qadar, is the problem of 
istita'ah (capacity) also. Istita'ah is the power by which a man either 
acquires an action, as the Ashrites believe, or creates it, as the Mutazilites 
hold. Both the schools believe in istita 'ah (capacity). But there are many 
problems related to it, for example, whether it is perpetual or momentary, 
whether there is capacity with the act taking place or before it or after it 
or before and after it and how this capacity exists what are its conditions, 
etc, etc. It is generally held, as we have discussed earlier, that the 
conditions in which capacity takes place consist of a motive, fitness of the 
organ, instrument and emptiness of the action. 
Let us examine them one by one. What does it mean that the 
capacity is perpetual? Surely, it does not mean that it is eternal. Rather, it 
means that it is as durable as the person concerned is. This is why the 
M'utazilah believed it to be inherent in man. According to this thesis, a 
man can do anything at any time. But there is its antithesis advanced by 
Ash'ari, that is, a man cannot do everything at all times because this 
capacity is not as durable as man is and, therefore, it is not something 
inherent in him. Ash'ari says that a man "is sometimes capable .and 
sometimes impotent. Just as he knows at one time and does not know at 
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another, and now moves and again does not move. Therefore, he must be 
capable in virtue of something distinct from him, and as he must be 
moving in virtue of something distinct from him, and as he must be 
moving in virtue of something distinct from him, for if he were capable of 
himself or in virtue of something inseparable from him, he would not 
exist save as capable. But since he is sometimes capable and sometimes 
incapable, it is true and certain that his capacity is something distinct 
from him."^^ 
The thesis that a man is sometimes capable and sometimes 
incapable is also an argument against the durability of capacity. Because 
if it is durable he should always be capable. But Ash'an formulates 
another argument against its durability. He says, "If it were to endure, it 
would endure either of itself or because of a duration subsisting in it." 
And these two possibilities were refijted by Ash'ari on the ground that if 
it is enduring by itself, it should have been enduring also at the time when 
it existed and that is absurd. And if it is enduring because of a duration 
subsisting in it then this is also absurd because in this case, a quality 
subsists in a quality or an accident subsists in an accident and that is false. 
The other problem related to capacity is whether capacity exists 
before the act, which Ash'ari denied, or after it, his was denied generally, 
or with the act as Ash'ari held and many others followed him. The 
problem is that if it is perpetual, it exists before and after the act takes 
place and even simultaneously, but if it is momentary, as Ash'ari 
beheved, there is no question of its being before and after it. Since 
according to Ash'ari, a man has no free choice in the matter of 
undertaking and action are otherwise, because the capacity is, according 
to him, something created by God and unless and until it is created by 
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God a man can not acquire anything. Therefore, this is the power linked 
with the act, and its existence postulates the existence of the object 
concerned. Thus capacity is with the act and for the act and acquisition of 
the act exists only because the capacity exists. And if this capacity takes 
place with the act or, in other words, if its existence postulates the 
existence of the object concerned then that object should be only one, not 
more than one as some M'utazilites believed. Therefore, Ash'ari denies 
that there may be one capacity over two volition, or two motions, or over 
two similar things. Because in this case, two volition, or two motions or 
like things will take place at one place at the same time and that is, 
according to him, impossible. Likewise, this capacity is not enough for 
two contraries as well. For example, if a man wants to under take an act, 
he is capable either to do or to omit it His capacity is not enough for 
commission and omission both. Furthermore, the capacity does not exist 
perpetually. Likewise, in the case of obedience or disobedience to God, 
one will either obey or disobey Him. If the capacity of obedience is 
created by God, one will surely obey Him, and if there is no capacity, one 
will disobey Him. Respite being preached by the prophet, the people did 
not believe in God and accept His Message. God has said about them, 
"They were not capable to hear the Truth and to accept it."^^. It means 
that the capacity was not created in them for the acceptance of the Truth. 
Therefore, they did believe in it. Ash' ari's contention is that man is not 
a free hand, and it is Allah who creates capacity in man by which man 
acquires this or that, therefore a man is not absolutely capable either to 
reject or accept anything and thus capacity is not something inherent in 
him but it is something distinct from him. 
The other point of Ash'ari's philosophy is that there is one 
capacity for one act. Those who believe have capacity to believe and 
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those who reject have capacity to reject (or we can say that they have no 
capacity to beHeve). In both cases, capacity is something distinct from the 
man. One capacity is not enough for two motions, or for two vohtions, or 
for two contraries or even for two similar things. The third print is that it 
co-exists with act. The fourth one is that it is not perpetual but 
momentary, and fifth one is that it is distinct from man. The last, but not 
the least; God can coimnand his creatures beyond their power. 
Shahrastani says, "According to Ash'ari it is possible for God to 
command what is beyond the power of man to perform because for 
Ash'ari capacity is an accident, and an accident does not endure for two 
moments. At the time of command the one commanded does not have 
power to execute the command, because the one commanded is one who 
will have the power to do what he has been coirunanded. However, to 
command one who has no power at all to do what is commanded is 
impossible, even if it were found clearly written in the Book". 
From this, one can easily understand the role of capacity and its 
close association with the theory of acquisition. Human acts are acquired 
and an acquired act is one possible through or under the created power. 
But this created power has no effect at all. In other words, since it is not 
an absolute power therefore it cannot produce absolutely anything. 
Shahrastani says, "According to Ash'ari's principle, however, the created 
power has no effect on the bringing into being of an act, because from 
the point of view of coming into being there is no difference between 
substance and accident. If this created power had an influence on coming 
into being colours, tastes, smells and even to produce substances and 
bodies. This would lead to the possibility of heaven falling on earth 
through the created power. God, indeed, has established a custom of 
creating the resultant act, either immediately subsequent to the created 
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power, or under its mantle, or with it; when man has willed it and wholly 
directed himself to it. This is called acquisition. Accordingly the act will 
be the creation of God; that is, it is originated and brought into being by 
Him. It will also be man's acquisition, having taken place 'under' his 
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power . 
Promise of Reward and Threat of Punishment 
There are verses in the Quran promising the believers and pious 
men of reward and Paradise and at places there are verses also threatening 
the unbelievers and sinners of their being punished. The question is 
whether these verses are universal or their implication is particular, or, 
more precisely, whether the sinners amongst Mushm will be condemned 
to Hell for ever if they commit sins like murder or any other grave sins. 
Ash'ari says no, they will not necessarily go to Hell forever because the 
application of the verses threatening punishment should not necessarily 
be universal. According to Arabic Language, "who does that unjustly" 
Ash'ari says, "may be interpreted as applying to all who do that or as 
applying to 'some'. Therefore one cannot affinn positively, from their 
form alone, whether they mean 'all' or 'some'. 
Ash'ari further wants to say that there are verses suggesting that 
the believers will be in the Paradise and this is clear from the words of 
God; "those who will come with good work will have something better 
and on that day they will be safe from any fear", and "God indeed 
forgives sins of all of them".^^ From these verses and like that Ash'ari 
concludes that every sin, either minor or major, can be forgiven but the 
sin that can never be forgiven is the sin of polytheism because God has 
warned that He can forgive every sin except the sin of associating any 
partner with Him. 
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Thus Ash'ari denied the thesis of the M'utazilites that God will 
necessarily do what He has warned or what He has promised. On the 
contrary, Ash'ari is of the view that though He has warned and threatened 
but He can forgive the sinners, if He pleases provided that they do not 
associate partners with Him. Likewise He is not bound to fulfil His 
promises though He will do so because He is not unjust and one breaking 
His promises. 
This belief of Ash'ari is related to his conception of faith (iman). 
Because according to him, faith consists of six articles that have been 
mentioned earlier, and that action is secondary to intention. Actually 
intention and affirmation by the heart is faith and the submission by 
tongue and limbs is not as important as the former is. Through the later, a 
mumin either increases or decreases in his iman. Shahrastani says, 
"Ash'ari holds that iman is inner belief; as for its verbal expression and 
external practice, these are branches of behef One can conclude that 
Ash'ari, here, adopts the Murjite position. In the same way, we see, in the 
case of major sins, he condemns the Khawarij for their denouncement of 
he perpetrator of a grave sin as an infidel. He also criticises Wasil b. Ata 
particularly, and the Mutazilites generally, for their belief in intermediary 
position. Ash'ari says, "Before the advent of Wasil b. Ata, the chief of the 
M'utazilah, men followed tow opinions. The Khawarij among them 
regarded grave sinners as unbelievers, whereas the 'People of Rectitude' 
maintained that the grave sinner was a believer by reason of his faith and 
a sinner by reason of his grave sin. But no one said that he was neither 
believer nor unbeliever before the advent of Wasil b. Ata. The latter 
withdrew fi-om the community and departed fi-om its view, and because of 
his divergence fi-om the consensus, he was called a "withdraweror" 
'M'utazili'". Ash'ari, as against the Khawarij, believes that the grave 
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sinner amongst the Muslim community is a believer. He is, says Ash'ari, 
"a believer by reason of his faith, a sinner by reason of his sin and grave 
fault." He argues thus: "Those who speak the language are agreed that he 
who strikes is a striker, and he who kills is a killer, and he who 
disbelieves is a disbeliever and he who sins is a sinner" Therefore he 
who believes must be a believer and because he sins also, therefore, he 
must be regarded as sinner too. In other words, a grave sinner among the 
Muslims is both, a believer as well as a sinner as well. And the sin of the 
sinner may or may not be forgiven. It depends upon God's mercy even 
though he may repent. Therefore he is not in a position between the two; 
belief and disbelief ( manzilah bain aj-manzilatain) as the Mutazilites 
hold. 
In the light of this contention of al-Ash'ari, one can reach the 
conclusion that the verses related to threatening of the profligates or the 
unjust, are not universal in the sense that they will not necessarily go to 
hell because God has threatened them unlike what M'utazilites hold, or 
although they are no more believers as the khawarij believe. Rather these 
verses are particular and therefore should be restricted to the unbelievers 
only. Likewise, the verses related to promise may not be treated as 
universal apprehending both; believers and unbelievers. In other words, 
the divine promise : "God indeed forgives sins, all of them", or other 
similar promises are true only for the believers and not for unbelievers 
because such verses are particular meaning 'some' not 'all'. 
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CHAPTER - 4 
Al-Ash'ari's Influence on the Later 'Ilm-al-kalam. 
The objective of al-Ash'ari' in general, and of orthodox section of 
the Muslim Community in particular, was to purge Islam of all non-
Islamic elements. Some of them, like Anas b. Malik and Ahmad b. 
Hanbal, opposed to any interpretation of religious dogmas. In the case of 
Istiwa, for example, Anas b. Malik is reported to have said that 'al-Is1iwa 
is known, its howness is unknown, belief in it is obligatory but the 
question about it is a heresy or innovation'. In other words, they strictly 
adhered to the Tradition and literal interpretation of the Quran and the 
Sunnah and refused to admit any innovation in the Shari'ah. But as the 
time passed, this attitude had to be abandoned. Even Ahmad b. Hanbal 
had to come in the field and he vehemently refused to admit the thesis of 
the createdness of the Quran. Consequently, he had to pass through 
mehnah. But he adhered strictly to his thesis that those believing in the 
createdness of the Quran are infidels. This is the one case where the 
orthodox section of the people had to purge Islam of non-Islamic belief 
Before the advent of Ash'arism', M'utazilism was on its height and its 
beliefs were imposed on the Muslim community by the Abbaside caliphs, 
particularly al-Mamun. M'utazilite approach was totally rationalistic. 
"They made reason the sole basis of truth and reality and thus identified 
the sphere of philosophy with that of rehgion. They tried to interpret the 
faith in terms of pure thought"'. We can identify their approach in the 
cases of the createdness of the Quran, denial of beatific vision or even in 
the case of denial of Divine attributes. In all these cases their approach is 
purely rational, while the case is different. The basic principles of Islam 
must be accepted on the authority of revelation. Otherwise there is no 
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need of any Messenger to be sent by God to mankind for their guidance, 
if reason is enough. 
The task to maintain the superiority of revelation over reason and 
to estabhsh the supremacy of rehgious dogmas over rationahst 
hypotheses was taken by the orthodox MusHms, Hke, "in Mesopstamia by 
Abul-Hasan al-Ash'ari' (d. 324/935), in Egypt by al-Tahawi (d. 331/942) 
and in Samarqand by Abu Mansoor al-Maturidi (d. 333/944). But of 
these three, al-Ash'ari became the most popular hero, before whom the 
Mutazilite system (the rationalist kalam) went down, and he came to be 
known as the founder of the orthodox philosophical theology, and the 
school founded by him was named after him as Ash'arism' 
Ash'ari tried his best to prove religious dogmas on the basis of 
reason maintaining the supremacy of revelation. His main opponents are 
M'utazilites, but this does not mean that the M'utazilites are enemies of 
Islam. Rather, it does mean that some of their beliefs are contradictory to 
it and al Ash'ari felt to purge it of them. Ash'ari's main objective, 
however, was to save Islam from all non-Islamic influences. We can 
easily reach to this conclusion if we only see the titles of the books 
attributed to him. Ash'ari himself mentions one book in his Maqalat 
entitled 'Kitdb al-Mulhidin' (Book on Materialists)'*. It suggest that 
Ash'ari's aim was not only to encounter the M'utazililes but to refiite the 
philosophers also. Following his footsteps his followers also refuted those 
having beliefs contradictory to Islam. Some of them strengthened to his 
thought, like Baqillani and Jawaini and some added new things like 
Ghazali. The list of his followers is quite comprehensive. Ibn Asakir 
mentions 81 eminent scholars. He gives a list in which he makes five 
categories. The first consists of al-Ash'ari's contemporaries. The second 
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category consists of those who were the companions of his companions. 
In this category he mentions Qazi Abu Bakr al-Baqillani al-Basari (d. 
403/1013). The third class consists of those who met the companions of 
al-Ash 'ari's companions and acquired knowledge from them. In this 
category he includes the father of Imam-al-Haramain, the Iman Abu 
Mohammad al-Juwaini (d. 438/1046) and Imam-al-Haramain himself is 
included in the fourth category where he mentions those who sought light 
in al-Ash'ari's penetrating exposition through imitating and following his 
views'. His full name is 'the Imam Abul Ma'ali Abdul Malik b. Abdullah 
b. Yusuf al-Juwaim al-Nishapuri (419/1028-478/1085-6). The fifth class 
includes the most eminent scholar and most appropriate personage for our 
purpose, the Imam Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, al-Tusi (d. 505/1 111), without 
whom the description of Asharism is incomplete. This chapter, I mean, 
'Ash'ari's influence on the later 'Ilm al-kalam will be confined to 
mention these three personalities; firstly, al-Baqillani, secondly, Imam al-
ffaramarin and thirdly, al-Ghazali. 
AI-Baqillani 
As Ash'ari's interest was purely theological and he did not build 
any metaphysical basis for his theology, therefore, the elaboration of his 
theology was left chiefly to his successors. In order that their discipline 
should have a basis they payed their attention on two fundamental 
questions: "(i) the nature and limits of rational knowledge in relation to 
religious truth, and (ii) the metaphysical framework in which the concept 
of God's Sovereignty and omnipotence should be expressed"*". 
As the achievement of their objective of defending the faith and 
harmonizing reason with revelation is impossible unless the ultimate 
nature of reality is known and Ash'ari's theological system, without it, 
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would be considered to be incomplete. Therefore, the system was fully 
developed by the later Ash'arites, particularly by Qazi Abu Bakr 
Mohammad bin Tayyib al-Baqillani who was one of the greatest among 
them. He was a Basarite, but he made Baghdad his permanent residence 
and died there in 403/10137 He is the author of several books, like 
'Aejdz al-Our'an, al-lnsaf, al-Bayan 'an al-Farq bain al-Mujezah wa al-
Karamat, Manaqib al-Aiimnah, etc. But it is his al-Tamhid that contains 
the core of his philosophical ideas. This book, in the beginning, discusses 
the nature of knowledge, its types, sources and limits. Baqillani defines 
'ilm (knowledge) as the cognition of the known (m 'alume) as it is in itself 
or as it really is'^. He divides beings (maujudat) into two kinds; eternal 
(qadim) and created or temporal (muhdath). Eternal is that exists from 
eternity and nothing precedes it in existence. Muhadath is something 
created from non-being (adam). 
Baqillani says, in case we maintain that knowledge is the cognition 
of the thing concerned as the Mu'tazilites hold, it will be incumbent upon 
us to exclude non-beings from the data known to us. And it is self-evident 
that our data include things and that which is not a thing, consequently 
non-beings. Thus, a non-being is also known which is neither a thing nor 
even existent.'^ He classifies the data known (m'alumat) into existent and 
non-existent in the sense that both these types are included in our 
knowledge. 
Another objection, one can think, that may be raised against the 
M'utazitiles in affinning knowledge as to be the cognition of a thing is 
that God will be excluded from the data known to us. In other words, we 
cannot have the knowledge of God because he is not a thing and one can 
have the cognition of a thing only; a composite of substance and 
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accidents, and God is not a composed being. His existence is not 
contingent but Necessary. Therefore, the definition given by al-Baqillani 
is proved to be certain. 
As the existence is of two types: necessary and contingent, in the 
same way, knowledge is also of two types: eternal and temporal or 
created. This temporal knowledge was classified by al-Baqillani into (i) 
necessary and (ii) theoretical. This theoretical knowledge or acquired 
(Kasbi), another name given by al-Baqillani himself, may be doubtful, 
because it is the result of prolonged reflection while necessary knowledge 
is that which cannot be doubtfiil because it is, somewhat, innate (badihi) 
or intuitive. Such necessary knowledge may be called empirical because 
it is acquired through one or the other of five senses. However, there is a 
type of necessary knowledge which does not rest on senses and that is 
the result of immediate apprehension of the mind, for example, man's 
knowledge of his own existence, feeling and instincts. This may be 
called intuitive knowledge. The third type of necessary knowledge 
consists of the knowledge of historical or geographical accounts, like 
historical personages, existence of other countries, etc. In this type of 
knowledge eternal knowledge interferes, because it is God who infuses 
directly into the souls or through. His Apostles His knowledge about 
ancient kingdoms or prophets, etc. This may be called authoritative 
knowledge, as named by Majid Fakhry. This kind of knowledge is 
different fi^om rational one. To this authoritative knowledge belongs the 
domain of faith. All these types of knowledge are included by al-
Baqillani in the necessary knowledge.'"* Among these types of necessary 
knowledge, one can easily conclude, the authoritative knowledge is more 
sure and certain because it is eternal and based on Divine knowledge, 
while others are created and temporal that belong to His creatures 
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indudings men, angels, jinns, etc. This authoritative knowledge contains 
the knowledge of the past, the present and the future. It is certain that 
historical events of the past cannot be know rationally, because their 
certainty depends upon informations of others; historians or 
hereseographars etc. It is also certain that these types of knowledge are 
not as certain as the authoritative knowledge is. Therefore, Baqillani 
supposedly seems to estabhsh that the knowledge of God, His apostles, 
resurrection, Day after death. Heaven and Hell and all other infomiations 
of the Shariah are certain because they depend on the authority of 
revelation and eternal knowledge. Baqillani, however, does not ignore the 
importance of reason, though he does not give it priority over revelation. 
On the other hand, the M'utazilite's position is that they believe in reason 
in the sense that it can give us enough knowledge about God and His 
unity, and His knowledge may be obtained independently of revelation. 
The Ash'arites believe in revelation. At the same time, they also hold that 
the existence of God can be known rationally from the consideration of 
the createdness of the world that is composed of atoms and accidents. 
Because these atoms and accidents need a Creator for their existence, that 
Creator is God the Omnipotent. ^ ^ From here starts a metaphysical 
discussion in Ash'arism. What is the reality of this world? What is the 
basic stiff the world is composed of? If the world consists of things, then 
what are the compositions of a thing? These are the metaphysical 
questions Baqillani deals with. We have mentioned earlier that Baqillani 
classifies beings into necessary and contingent. He fiirther classifies 
contingent beings mto three types: Composite body (Jism muallj), 
individual substance (Jauhar mmfarid) and accident that exists by 
substances. Substance is something mind reflects upon and the accidents 
exist thereby. These substances are atoms that subsist by themselves and 
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are not dependent upon accidents. ^ ^ Since the bodies are composed of 
substance and accidents, therefore there are only two types of existence, 
instead of three. They, when composed, are either a thing or a body. In 
order to substantiate his claim about accident that it is transitory and does 
not exist for another moment Baqillani qoutes a holy verse in which the 
word 'ard' is used; God says; "Ye Look for the goods (ard) of this world; 
but Allah Looketh to the Hereafter". ^ ^ 
The existence of these accidents is yet to be proved rationally. 
Baqillani says that the argument for their existence is the movement of a 
body after it rests and its rest after it moves and the body moves or rests 
either by itself or by a cause (illah). In case we maintain that a body 
moves by itself then that body should not cease to move at anytime, while 
we see that the body sometimes rests and sometimes moves, therefore we 
should believe that it moves and rests by a cause that is movement or rest 
respectively. It means that there is something like accidents that exist and 
that are transitory. 
The existence of substance is self-evident because the accidents, in 
order to take place, need a substance. This is so because they cannot exist 
by them selves. Therefore, substances exist and they exist by 
themselves. Substance, according to Baqillani, is that which assumes 
and accepts only one accident and if there are more than one accident, it 
does not remains as a substance. Thus substance is an individual 
(munfarid) or an atom (juz). Atom and substance are synonyms as 
qualities and accidents are. 
These substances are also subjective like accidents, but unlike 
accidents, they subsist by themselves. They come into existence fi-om 
vacuity and drop out of existence again. It means that these substances, 
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though exist by themselves, are not eternal. In other words, a substance is 
not God and God is not a substance, as some Christians hold, because it 
is self subsisting (qaim bi-nefsihi). Rather it is created. It is God who 
creates and annihilates it. Further, these substances or atoms are located 
in space and time (mutahaiyjiz and shaghil). 
Elaborating this metaphysical theory, M.M. Sharif says that the 
world is composed of things that consist of substances and qualities. 
Substance lies in the thing-in-itself and qualities in the mind of the 
perceiver. These qualities are accidents that are transitory and subjective, 
having only momentary existence. They can exist only in a substance. In 
other words, a quality cannot exist in another quality or an accident 
cannot exist in another accident. Quality and accident are synonymous for 
the Ash'arites. They do not believe in other qualities like place, time, etc. 
They believe in only two categories i.e. substance and quality. Further, no 
substance could exist apart from a quality. Thus substance and quality (or 
qualities) are integral constituents of a things. Since the substance is 
inseparable from its qualities or accidents, therefore, it should also be 
transitory, having a momentary existence like accidents. Thus everything 
that exists is composed of transitory units, that is, substance and 
accidents. 
He further says that if the Ash'arite atomism is compared with 
that of other philosophers we find it most comprehensive and most 
appropriate of others. For example, the atoms of Democritus and 
Lucretius are permanent and self subsisting but the atoms of Baqillani are 
not permanent. They come into being and go out of existence by the 
Supreme Being, God. The atoms of Democritus and Lucretius are 
materia] while Baqillani believes them to be non-material and ideal in 
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character. And if these atoms are compared with the monads of Leibniz 
we find, at least, one resemblance between them. The monad of Leibniz 
has some qualities as the substance of Baqillani assumes accident. All 
changes in the thing and subsequently in the world take place due to their 
coming into being and going out it. But there is difference between the 
two theses. Atoms of Baqillani are extended in space and time, while 
Leibniz believes that they have extension neither in space nor in time. 
Space and time are subjective. The other big difference is that it is God, 
for al-Baqillam", Who creates and annihilates the atoms and makes 
changes in them for a harmonious connection among them, but Leibniz 
holds that there is a Monad of monads or God by which there is a 
harmony and connection among them and this harmony is pre-
estabhshed. Thus he founds a 'Theory of Pre-established Harmony'.^^ 
As it has been said earlier that the objective of al-Baqillani, like his 
leader, is to defend religious dogmas, therefore, he builds metaphysical 
and epistemological bases for his school of thought. Baqillani has proved 
that there are only two types of existence; necessary and contingent or 
created (muhdath). Contingent beings are either substances, accidents or 
bodies the world is composed of And there must be a Producer (muhdith) 
of them as well.^ "* Likewise, from the viewpoint of his epistemology he 
wants to prove that the most reliable type of knowledge among the 
necessary ones is authoritative knowledge where eternal knowledge 
intervenes and that is the revelation. It is revelation that tells us that God 
is the Creator of the world and that He has certain qualities or attributes. 
From here he starts criticizing the Mu'tazilites and Jahamites for their 
denial of attributes and argues for their being eternal with God. He 
affmns God's being only One. He says that it is impossible that there be 
more than one God because they will differ from each other in their 
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decisions, and impotence will necessarily attach to anyone of them. This 
is the same argument advanced by al-Ah'ari. Likewise, Baqillani proves 
His being Alive (haiy), Knowing (aalim), Hearing (sami), Seeing (basir), 
Talking (mutakallim). Willing (murid) and Powerful (qadir). He also 
believes that Attributes are eternal with Him. Regarding these beliefs, 
his argument are same as propounded by al-Ash'ari, but new things are 
also added. He says, for example, that it is not true for God that animal 
desires (shahwah) are attributed to Him. It is also not true that non-
existence (adam) is applied to Him because He is eternal. 
One thing related to His will and creation is that, he says, God has 
created this world without any cause (illah). He argues that the cause is 
meant to provide benefits and to avoid evils. Therefore, the causes are not 
to be applied to Him. Further, if we believe that there is a cause behind 
the creation of the world then there are two possibilities, either it is 
created or eternal with God. If this cause is eternal then the world is also 
eternal and in this case we will have to believe that there is a duration of 
invention between the eternal cause and its effect (world), and in case one 
thing is earlier and the other is delayed, we apply time to them and any 
thing taking place in time cannot be eternal. Because eternal is something 
beyond time (and space), and if we maintain that this cause is not eternal 
but it is temporal, the question arises, whether its creator has created it 
with or without any cause. If it is produced with a cause, the present 
cause should also have been produced by another and that should also 
have been produced still another and so on. This will lead us to ad 
infinitum and that is inconceivable because in this case the world will 
never come into existence. The world will come into existence when its 
antecedent is true and here antecedents are inconceivable and therefore 
impossible. 
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He further says that in order to scope from the difficulty of 
hmitless causes, if we believe that there is no more cause behind the 
cause of the creation, then it means, we affirm that a cause may take place 
without any cause. In this case if it is possible that a cause which is also 
created can take place without any cause then the whole world can also 
come into existence without any cause and if a Creator cannot be charged 
with insanity in creating a cause without any cause, He will also remain 
as wise and just in creating the whole world without any cause. He further 
says that cause means objective and God's objective of creation may 
however be different from ours. We judge according to our perception 
and He judges on the basis of His knowledge. Therefore, the thesis that 
the world is created with a cause is not true. The Eternal did not create it 
with a cause. 
One can think that al-Baqillani wants to affirm God's arbitration 
in the matters of creation and that He is not bound anywhere, neither by 
anyone nor by any cause whatsoever. Everywhere His monopoly prevails 
and He is the Supreme Monarch. He can do without let what the pleaseth. 
Creation and doing both belong to Him because a created being cannot do 
any work and that the Creator cannot be created (muhdath)}'^ In the 
system of cause and effect the existence of the one depends on the other 
and the chain of dependence is extended to ad infinitum Baqillani, 
therefore, rejects the idea that a created being may be the cause for the 
existence of another created. God alone is the Cause and the Creator of all 
things, independent of all exigencies. 
Here one can imagine that the acts of human beings, because of 
their being created, cannot be the work of human beings, or in other 
words, man is not the creator or doer of his deeds because he himself is 
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created and a created cannot be a doer, as a doer of created acts can not be 
created. Therefore, the creator and producer is one, that is, God. But the 
problem is that if human acts are created by God and it is God Who 
creates, as Ash'ari beheves, power or capacity in man by which he 
acquires them, whether this created power or capacity (istila 'ah) has any 
effect on the act or does not have any? There are two interpretations of 
Baqillani's position,. According to the one; 'The created can have no 
effect on the created'. This has been argued. But there is another 
interpretation and in accordance with it, created power may have some 
effects. While dealing with knowledge and its types he says that a 
knowledgeable person has created power by which he can acquire further. 
More precisely, theoretical knowledge depends upon human efforts. 
Thus he affirms that created power has, upto some extent, its effect. This 
is what reported by al-Shahrastani of him in relation to human actions. 
Shahastani says, (One should remember, here that Ash'ari believes that 
created power has no effect on the bringing into being of an act), "Qazi 
Abu Bakr Baqillani has taken the matter a little further. According to him 
it has been proved that the created power is not capable of bestowing 
existence. However, an act in its attributes and aspects is not limited to 
coming into being alone, but it has other aspects also, such as, for 
example, in the case of a substance, its being a substance, occupying a 
place and receiving an accident. Similarly an accident has the aspect of 
being an accident, being black and so on. Baqillani holds that the aspect 
of an act's coming in to being with or 'under' the created power is a 
special relationship between the two, and this is called acquisition. It is 
this acquisition which is an effect of the created power".^^ It means that 
Baqillani believes that the created power may be have effect on the act to 
bring it into being, but this thesis of his fundamentally contradictory to 
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his principle that a produced is incapable to produce anything or 'a doer 
of the produced (muhdath) cannot be himself produced'. Therefore, one 
should believe that created power is incapable to produce anything or to 
do anything. In this case one have to believe in pure determinism, 
because theory of acquisition is not free from logical and ethical 
difficulties. This is why "some of the later Ash'arites, particularly Imam 
Fakhruddin al-Razi, discarded the veil of acquisition in order to scape the 
charge of fatalism, and advocated naked determinism". 
The other points discussed by al-Baqillani are related to the 
prophecy and miraculous nature of the Quran. He justifies the need of 
prophecy on the ground that reason is not enough to lay down the 
principles of morality, pennissibility, obligations, good and evil, because 
every philosopher in these matters has different views that rest on either 
perception, or reason, or institution, and these faculties of knowledge are 
not as sure and certain as the Divine knowledge is. 
About the Quran, in order to justify it as the Divine book and 
Divine revelation, he points to its miraculous nature. He says that it 
contains its own style, eloquence and language along with the order 
among its parts and that it also contains the truth about the past and the 
fiiture and about seen and unseen. All these suggest that the Quaran is a 
Divine book and knowledge and that it is a miracle in itself For this very 
purpose he also wrote a separate book entitled 'Kitabfi A 'ejaz a!-Quran'. 
Al-Juwaini 
Abdul Malik b. Abdullah b. Yusuf b. Mohammad al-Jawaini is 
another important Ash'arite theologian. He is called Juwaini because he 
was bom in Juwain, a town near Nishapur, in 419/1028 and died in 
478/1085 at Nishapur. 
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Due to their acceptance of reason as a genuine source of 
knowledge along with revelation, the Ash'arites were strongly opposed 
by the Hanbalites at every nook and comer. Revelation is, however, 
considered by them as the primary one. The Hanbalites regard revelation 
to be the sole criterion of truth. They are, somewhat, Zahirites in their 
approach to Islam. They stress more on the literal meanings of the 
Scriptures. Ash'ari's opinions, therefore, did not get much recognition 
outside the Shafi'ite group to which he belonged. The Hanafites preferred 
the doctrines of his contemporary al-Maturidi. At that time, the emperor, 
Tughril Beg, was a Hanbalite, therefore he persecuted the Ash'arites. But 
his successor Sultan Alp Arsalan and his famous vizir, Nizamal Mulk 
defended and patronized Ash'arism. For this pupose Nizamiyah Academy 
was founded in the name of his vizir, Nizam al-Mulk, at Baghdad in 
495/1066. Nizam al-Mulk patronized this academy and appointed Abul 
Ma'ali Abdul Malik al- Juwainiu as its head. There he got the chance of 
preaching the Ash'arite doctrines. Al- Juwaini was a great scholar. He got 
the titles of Dia al-Din (the hight of rehgion), Shaik al-Islam (the chief 
leader of Islam) and Imam-al-Haramain (the leader of two places, i.e. 
Makkah and Madinah). These titles were conferred upon him due to his 
vast learning and erudite scholarship. He wrote books on various subjects, 
hke al-Shamil that deals with the principles of religion, al-Burhan that 
discusses the principles of jurisprudence. Al-Aqidah al-Nizamiyah and al-
Irshad deal with theology. Besides, he wrote Nihayatul Matlab fi 
DerayatuI Mazhab' and 'Mughith al-Khalq \ but these two booked are in 
manuscripts fonn.^ 
As he was recognized as the Shaikh al-Isham and Imam al-
Haramain therefore he was respected everywhere. His judgements about 
the religious matters were followed frequently, especially in the holy 
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places of Makkah and Madinah. He preached there for a long time. After 
his return from these holy places he was appointed the chief and the head 
of the Nizamiyah academy. Thus Ash'airaih became popular is the East. 
Juwaini added nothing new to the doctrines of Ash'arism except 
some insignificant differences from his predecessors as Shahrastani 
points out. In the case of acquisition, Ash'ari is of the opimon that created 
power does not have any effect in bring about acts, while al-Baqillani 
holds that created power does have that effect. Imam al-Haramain 
supports the view of al-Baqillani with some added elaboration. 
Shahrastani says, "According to him (al-Juwaini) to deny the created 
power and capacity (we should remember that it is created power and 
capacity by which acquisition takes place) is contrary to reason and 
experience, on the one hand, to maintain the power which has no effect 
at all is equivalent to denying the power altogether. Similarly, to maintain 
the effect of power on a mode, no on an act, is equivalent to denial of 
effect particularly as modes, on the M'utazilite principle, cannot be 
predicated as exiting or non-exiting. A man's act must, therefore, be 
ascribed in a true sense to his own power, though not in the sense of 
bringing it into being and creating it. The reason for this is that creation 
expresses the idea of self-sufficiency in bringing a thing into being out of 
nothing, whereas man, although feeling in himself power and capacity 
also, feels in himself a lack of this self-sufficiency."^^ 
Al this point, it should be clear that Juwaini, like his predecessors, 
believes that the Creator is one, that is, God. He is the Creator of our 
power and their effects also. Juwaini in his al-Irshad, says, 'All created 
things are created by the power of God, without any distinction between 
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those with which human power is connected and those over which Lord is 
alone in his power." 
It is certain because when we analyze and go into details we reach 
to the conclusion that the created powers have no effects because the 
powers and the capacities given to man are completely dependent upon 
will of God Who, if wants to produce anything, gives him capacity to 
perform, otherwise he is helpless and can do nothing. This is evident from 
the principles adopted by al-Juwaini. These are those propounded by al-
Ash'ari on which his theory of acquisition rests. Ash'ari has postulated 
four principles for the power of acquisition. These are as follows: 
(i) The created power or capacity does not endure. 
(ii) It is simultaneous with the act. 
(iii) It is attached to only one object and 
(iv) It is applicable only to that which is within its limits. ^ ^ 
These principles are adopted by Juwaini and it is evident that if premises 
are same the conclusion will also be same. Therefore, we see that Juwaini 
himself, finally, reaches to the conclusion that man is helpless in 
producing anything and it is God upon whom everything is dependent in 
order to take place. It is God Who is absolutely independent, lacking in 
nothing whatever. In the case of human acts, they may depend upon some 
approximate causes and obviously these causes have their effect but they 
are evidently dependent upon the First Cause.^ 
Besides, he elaborated the doctrines and defended the concepts and 
methods to which the school as a whole was committed. This celebration 
includes epistemological and theological explanations of Ash'arism. For 
this purpose he wrote al-Shamil, of which an abridgement, al-Irshdd was 
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made by the author himself. It is al-Irshad m which he proves the 
createdness of the world and adopts 'somehow' a syllogistic method. He 
says, 
"What does not precede originated things is originated. 
Substances do not precede accidents (wliich are originated). 
Therefore the world (the totality of substances and accidents) is 
originated." 
This is an example of his knowledge of logic. He introduced it into 
theology. On this very basis (the createdness of the world) he proves that 
God is not a body and that He exists. According to him, as in the case 
with al-Bagillani, body is a composite of substances and accidents and 
these are originated, therefore, God is not a body. 
In order to prove the existence of God he says, "An originated 
thing may exist or not exist, therefore, it requires a detenninant to 
determine whether it is to exist or not to exist at a particular time. The 
detenninant may be either a cause (illah), or a nature (tabi'ah) or a 
conscious agent, various arguments show that it is not a cause or a nature, 
therefore is must be a conscious agent' (and that conscious agent is 
God, obviously). 
Ai-Ghazali 
Al-Ghazali is the most important person in the history of Islam, 
who, being a student of al-Juwaini, is an Ash'arite in his beliefs, but he 
followed al-Imam al-Shafe'i in rituals. His name was Mohammad. His 
father and grandfather both were Mohammad by their names. He had the 
tittle of Abu Ham id and was bom at-Tus. Therefore, he was also called as 
al-Tusi. But he is generally called al-Ghazah because of his belonging, 
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most probably, to a village in the region of al-Tus where he was bom in 
450/1058. 
He belonged to a poor but intellectual family. After the death of his 
father he and his brother Ahmad were entrusted to a sufi friend of their 
father for education according to their father's instruction. After 
sometimes they were admitted to a Madarsa where they were provided 
free food and lodge as well as instruction. It is the age of nineteenth in 
1077A.D. when he went to Nishapur, the then capital of Persia, for higher 
education. At that time Imam al-Haramain al-Juwaini was the chief of 
that academy. Al-Ghazali received education from him and became well-
versed in theology. He remained there till al-Juwaini's death in 1085, 
A.D.. Afterwards he went to Nizam al-Mulk, the founder of Nizamiyah 
academy, who received him with honour and respect, while a-Ghazali 
was only twenty seven. After some years, at the age of thirty three, m 
1091, A.D., he was appointed at another, but more important, Nizamiyah 
college in Baghdad. 
Since he was devoted seeker after truth and was completely dissatisfied 
with the methods of theologians and that he had already studied 
philosophy and logic, and logical methods seemed to him comparatively 
stronger, therefore, doubts and skepticism became to strike at him 
regarding the theological subjects that he taught. He realized that the 
dialectical methods of the scholastics had no basis and that the rehgion 
should have been based on more sound foundations. For this purpose he 
began to examine theological beliefs and wanted to erect then on rational 
proofs. Simultaneously, he realized that reason is not enough, for it had 
its own limitations and "it could not go very far. The Ultimate, the 
Supreme Truth could not be reached through it."^^ 
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When he studied philosophy and knew its hmitations he turned to 
the people of balin (esoterics), or the Batinites. This was a group of the 
Shi'ite sect, who sometimes were also called the talimites, the party of 
authoritative instruction, the Batinites stressed more on the esotesic 
meaning of the Shariah, that might be imparted only by an Imam knowing 
its secrets, and ignored more or less its outward and literal meanings. 
Hasan Ibn al-Sabbah was the exponent of this school. This concept was 
derived from the teachings of the Isma'ilites amongst the Shi'ites.'*^ 
After studying carefiilly the doctrines of the Batinites and their 
ways he reached the conclusion that there is some thing wrong with them. 
No body can be as innocent as the Prophets are. In the matters of the 
Shariah, it is the Prophet Mohammad (P.B.U.H.) who is an infallible 
Imam who has the knowledge of its esoteric as well as exoteric aspects. It 
is he who can guide us to the right path, and he has done this job 
successfiilly. Therefore, no body has the quality of a charismatic leader 
except the Prophet Mohammad. 
Lastly he paid his attention towards Sufism. He thought that Sufis 
were knowledgeable as well as practical, therefore, he could acquire 
knowledge of certitude from them. But when could not get satisfactory 
response, he once again turned to theology and when he was offered 
professorship he, after some hesitation, accepted the chair at Mamuniyah 
Nizamiyah college at Nishapur in 499/1106. However, he did not stay 
there for long and retired once more. Then he established a Madarsa in 
Tus where he devoted his life to study and teaching his disciples till his 
last breath in 505/1111.^^ 
Ghazali has written many books and treatises. Some major books 
are as follows: 
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i. Ihya Ulum al-Din, 
a. IIjam al- 'Awam 'an 'Urn aJ-Kalam', 
///. Raudat al-Talibin wa 'Umdat al-Salikin. 
iv. Al-Muslasfa min 'Ulum al-UsuI 
V. Minhaj al- 'Aabedin, 
vi. Minhaj al 'Aarefin, 
vii. Mizan al'Amal, 
via. Al-Wajiz, 
IX. Mehakk al-Nazrfi al-Mantiq, 
X. Tahafat al-Falasifah, 
xi. Me 'yar al- 'Ilmfi Fann al-Mantiq, 
xii. Kimiya al-Sa 'adah and 
xiii. Al-Munqidh min al-Dalai 
These books are related to theology, philosophy, logic, Sufism and 
Batinism. He criticized every descipline except theology. This is evident 
from his 'al-Munqidh' (Deliverance from Error). Al-Munqidh is the book 
in which he mentions different phases of his educational life. To him, 
there are four groups of men who claim themselves to be the seekers of 
Truth. Ghazali says that he himself has practiced their ways but found 
them in vein. He, finally, reached where he had started from, that is, 
theology. All these ways have their own limitations, but the religion, 
Islam, leads to the Truth in the right sense. It is the religion that is based 
on Divine knowledge. But '\\ faces strong criticism from the philosophers. 
Philosophers are said to have reasonable bases and their philosophies are, 
according to them, founded on reasonable principles. Al-Ghazali, thus, 
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found strong opposition from them. He, therefore, decided to refiite their 
philosophies and, consequently, made his first appearance against them 
when he wrote 'Maqasid al-FaIasifah\ In this book he mentions their 
philosophies. The remarkable book in which he not only mentions their 
philosophies but strongly attacks and refutes them also, is his 'Tahafut al-
Falasifah\ In this book he refutes their suppositions and principles 
related to either metaphysics, like staircase of emanationists, or causation, 
like their hypothesis that only one can proceed from one. All goal that he 
wants to achieve is to establish and justify basic tenets of Islam on 
reasonable foundations. 
All that is important to say is that Ghazali studied very carefully 
and with open mind. He had no prejudice where he was studying the 
books of different groups. He was sincere in his investigation and quest 
after Truth. Even about religious matters and dogmas he was, at one. 
phase of his life, sceptic, therefore, he studied theology also with critical 
point of views. He attacked theologians saying that their methods to 
prove and justify the dogmas were not satisfactory and that they needed 
modifications. The dogmas should be founded on certitude and there 
should be no room for doubt, nor any possibility of error. 
In the search for Truth, where there should be no doubt, he firstly 
relies on sense perception but when he equates this sense-perception with 
dream where it seems that man perceives something or the other while he 
is asleep, he finds that there is no difference between awakening and 
dream, because in both conditions he perceives. If he, in dream, perceives 
something and does not differentiate it as dream except when he awakes, 
likewise, one can say that what we see in awakening conditions is a 
dream and this will be clear when we will be resurrected after death. 
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Therefore, there is doubt in sense perception. Thus he recognizes that the 
hfe in this world is a dream by comparison with the world to come. He 
also refers to a Tradition in this regard."^^ 
When his confidence in sense-perception has been skaken he turns 
to investigate what he calls the necessary principles, that is, factual bases 
or mathematical principles. For examples he thinks Ts ten more than 
three? Can it be necessary and impossible at the same time ? Thus one 
can think that his doubt regarding sense-perception made him reluctant 
even to accept rational and mathematical data. He thinks that if reason 
tells us about the falsity of sense-perception when we see that a coin 
covers the sun or the moon while they are thousand times bigger than the 
coin, there should be some other judge besides reason that can tell us 
about the falsity of reason. Of course, it is revelation. However, he does 
not reject the role of reason; neither in worldly matters nor in Shariah. It 
is reason on the basis of which he refutes philosophers and justifies the 
tenets of Islam. Philosophers are the most troublesome in the seekers of 
Truth. They engaged his attention more than others. The philosophy, as 
stated elsewhere, is based on reason, particularly the philosophies of Plato 
and Aristotle Ghazali confi-onted with. The Arabs were familiar with their 
ideas just before the time of al-Ghazali. Farabi (d.950) and Ibn Sina 
(d. 1037) were regarded genuine exponents of Aristotelianism. Ghazali 
had studied their philosophies that is evident fi^om his autobiographical 
treatise, 'al-Munqidh\ where he admits that he had gone through them 
and reached the conclusion that their philosophy, though aimed at Truth, 
did not succeed in it. They are, however, the seekers of Truth. 
It is a peculiarity with al-Ghazali that he never criticized anything 
without its complete knowledge. He followed it in the case of the 
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Batinites and Sufis. Similar is the case with the philosophers. This is 
evident from his 'al-Munqidh'.^^ When he became acquainted and had a 
complete grasp of their philosophies, he, first, wrote 'Maqasid al-
Falasifah' (The Intentions of the Philosophers) and then ^Tahafat al-
Falasifah'' (The Incoherence of the Philosophers). In Tahafaf he 
vehemently attacked their methods, theory and thought. 
Al-Ghazali broadly divides the philosophers into three categories: 
the materialists (dahriyiw), the naturalists {tabi'iyun) and the theists 
(i/ahiyun). The materialists do not believe in God and hold that the 
universe exists eternally without a creator and that matter, space and time 
are eternal. The naturalists admit the existence of a wise creator or Deity 
but reject the spirituality and immortality of the soul. It is explained by 
them to be an epiphenomenon of the body and that it will also die with 
the body. They do not believe in heaven, hell, resurrection, etc. The 
theists received his attention more, because this group held a 
comparatively more strong position. Al-Ghazali regards Socrates, Plato 
and Aristotle as theists but he rightly holds Aristotle more significant due 
to his tremendous influence on the predecessor Muslim philosophers; al-
Farabi and Ibn Sina, etc.. They are the most faithful commentators of 
Aristotilian corpus. They regarded Aristotle as their master. "Thus al-
Ghazali came finally to concentrate on that philosophical thought of his 
day which had emerged from the writings of these two theist 
philosophers (particularly Ibn Sina) and applied himself to its 
examination in a systematic manner. "^° He refiites only that ideas which 
are based on sheer metaphysical speculations; having no sound proofs. 
He, however, readily accepts the mathematical and natural sciences based 
on factual evidences. The philosophical ideas refiited by him are 
generally those which contradicted the principles of religion. He refutes 
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and attacks the philosophers because he thinks that their arguments are 
logically false and lack coherence. In his refutation al-Ghazali justifies his 
claim and proves their falsity, for example, their assumption that every 
event has a cause or everything is causally determined neglecting the 
occurrence of miracles. 
Being a true theologian, Ghazali's principle is different irom that 
of the philosophers. He does not accept any philosophical assumption 
unless and until it has logical consistency. On the other hand, he does not 
reject any of religious dogmas unless and until it is self-contradictory. 
One can say that it is a double-faced criterion to judge the trutli but, it is 
certain that a Muslim always believes in revelation to be true because it is 
Divine knowledge, while philosophy is based on human knowledge. And 
it is a big difference that al-Ghazali maintains and follows as method. 
Ghazali divides philosophic sciences into six sections: 
(1) Mathematics; (2) Logic; (3) Physics; (4) Metaphysics; (5) Politics; 
and (6) Moral philosophy. 
He accepts all except metaphysical speculations of the 
philosophers. About logic he is of the opinion that "this science contains 
notliing for or against religion. Its object is the study of different kinds of 
proofs and syllogisms, the conditions which should hold between the 
premises of a proposition, the way t combine them, the rules of good 
condition and the art of formulating it".^ One can conclude from this 
remark of his that he admires this kind of knowledge, that they, for him, 
use a particular set of tecliiiical fonnula that lead them to irreligious 
conclusions. All the ideas of the philosophers that were condemned by 
liim are tlie examples of such speculations. Ghazali reduce them to twenty 
problems: 
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i. eternity of the world, 
ii. everlasting natuie of the world, 
iii. their assertion that matter is ultimate reality, 
iv. their assertion that God is the creator of this world and (at the same 
tune) that the world is His product, 
V. their inability to prove the impossibility of two gods by rational 
arguments, 
vi. their denial of Divine attributes, 
vii. their theory that the Divine Being is not divisible, 
viii. their theory that the First (Principle) is a simple miqualified being, 
ix. their inability to show that the First Principle is not body, 
X. the thesis that they are bound to affirm the eternity of the world 
and to deny the creator, 
xi. their inability to mamtain that the First (Principle) knows anyone 
other than Himself, 
yli. their mability to maintain that He knows Himself, 
xiii. their doctrine that the First (Principle) does not know the 
particulars, 
xiv. their doctrijie tliat tlie Heaven is a hving being whose movements 
are voluntary, 
XV. their theory of the purpose of Heaven's movement, 
xvi. their doctrines that the souls of the heavens know all the 
particulars, 
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xvii. their belief in the impossibility of a departure from the natural 
course of events, 
xviii. their theory that the soul of man is a substance wliich exists in 
itself and which is neither body nor an accident, 
xix. their belief in the impossibility of the annihilation of the human 
souls and 
XX. their denial of the resurrection of bodies. "^^  
These are twenty points of tlie pliilosophers. Al-Gha2iali eitlier 
refuted their beliefs or showed them unable to prove their hypotheses. 
Ghazali charges the upholders of these beliefs with heresy or 
iiTeligiousity. In his 'al-Mwiqidh\ he says, "Their errors can be reduced 
to twenty propositions: three of them are irreligious and the other 
seventeen heretical". ^^  The three propositions about which he charges 
with infidelity or irreligiousity are related to (i) their belief about the 
eternity of the world, {ii) theii- denial of God's knowledge about 
particulars and {iii) their denial of bodily resurrertion.^^ Due to the 
seriousness of these tliree views of the pliilosophers we choose them to 
comment upon along with some other important ones. 
Eternity of the World 
Tliis is the most serous and challenging problem between religion 
and piiilosophy. A religious person camiot believe in the eternity of the 
world, for there is nothing eternal save God. The philosophers' claim of 
the eternity of the world, thus, could not be acceptable for a theologian 
like al-Ghazali. Seeing its seriousness, therefore, he allotted a great space 
of his book, al-Tahafut, to refrite the thesis of its eternity. The thesis is in 
confonnity with the Aiistotelian pliilosop[hy. Tliis was why that Farabi 
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and Ibn Sina, being true paripatetics, believed in this theoiy. At the same 
time they also believed God to be an eternal Creator of the Universe. But 
to make aiiytliing co-etenial with God is to violate the basic principle of 
monotheism. Ghazali, therefore, could not swallow this poison and 
vehemently attacked the philosophers. 
In order to justify that the world is not eternal, Ghazali refutes the 
basic assumption of the philosophers. Philosophers claim that (i) every 
effect has a cause, (ii) cause must be the action of some force external to 
effect, (iii) the cause must immediately lead to effect and (iv) the world 
being an effect of eternal cause must also be eternal. Ghazali says that it 
is not necessary that there should be a cause for every effect. One can 
remember here that this is the contention of al-Baqillani also. The other 
point that there should be an external force for the effect is also refuted. 
He says that God's will is the cause of the world and that this cause does 
not lie outside His will but in itself The third point is also not accepted 
by him. He says that it is not logically necessary that the cause must have 
immediate effect, rather it may have a 'delayed effect'. In other words, 
the cause may be eternal and effect may be temporal. God can eternally 
think and will to create anything but the effect may come into existence at 
any specific time. Ghazali further says tliat God chose one particular 
moment rather than another for world's coming into being and that lies in 
itself He says that the difficulty arises with the philosophers because they 
miderstand the natme of Divine will in temis of man's will. They ignore 
the vast difference between the two. 
The other argument is related to space and time. According to 
philosophers, time is infinite. Ghazali holds that time is finite. He says, 
"We beheve that periods (of time) and time (itself) are created".^^ He 
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further says that those who believe time to be infinite and space to be 
finite are wrong in their approach because, according to AristoteHan 
position, space, time and movement in space are all related to one 
another. Therefore, if space is finite, time is also finite. 
Another argument advanced by the philosophers in this connection 
is related to matter. According to them, matter is eternal. They hold that 
the world before its coming into being must have either been possible or 
impossible or necessary. It cannot be impossible because it does exist and 
it cannot be necessary because it may be deprived of its existence, 
therefore, it is possible and its possibility must inhere in matter because it 
cannot inhere in possibility itself, nor in the agent nor in any other 
substratum. It means its substratum is matter and this matter is eternal. 
They argue, "Every originated thing is proceeded by the Matter in which 
it is. No originated thing is independent of Matter and Matter itself is not 
originated. It is only the Forms, Accidents and Qualities (like heat and 
coldness, blackness and whiteness and motion and rest) passing over 
matter which are originated".^^ Ghazah says that this is not true to have 
any notion like possibility because if there is nothing corresponding to the 
notion of impossibility, likewise there is nothing concrete in reality that 
may correspond to possibility. It is merely a concept like concept of 
impossibility. °^ And if we think like Aristotle that the world came into 
existence fi^om matter, it is mere a metaphysical jump Irom thought to 
actual existence and thus an ontological fallacy. ^ 
God's knowledge of the particulars 
The philosophers believe that God has knowledge and His 
knowledge, like His essence, is universal and beyond the limits of fime. 
There was no time when His knowledge was existing. There was no 
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concept of divisibility of time in past, present and future. Since His 
knowledge is universal therefore He knows the particulars only in a 
universal manner. 
It is elaborated as; any change in the universal and Divine 
knowledge is not pennissible. Ghazali says "We do admit that He knows 
things by a knowledge which is one from eternity to eternity and that His 
state is unchangeable. The philosophers only desire to reject change and 
to that extent, every one will agree with them". Ghazali differs from 
them because he does not see any change in the universality or oneness of 
His knowledge of a thing whose states change in accordance with the 
past, the present and the future. On the contrary, the philosophers believe 
that if there is any change in the object of knowledge, there will be 
change, to that extent, in knowledge itself and in the state of the knower 
also. They say, "Change means nothing but a difference in the knower. 
He who did not know something, and then comes to know it does 
undergo a change" . Ghazali says tliat if the periods of time create 
change and difference in the knowledge and hereby in the knower, the 
diverse Genera and Species should create more difference and disparity in 
the knower and on the basis of the philosophers' opinion one should 
reject the idea that God has the knowledge of the Genera and Species. But 
if they make no change and havoc in the oneness of Divine knowledge, 
the divisibility of time in the past, the present and the future, and the 
states of things accordingly should create no difference in its oneness. 
This problem has serious consequence, according to al-Ghazali. He 
charges with infidelity those who believe in it. Since this position had 
been adopted by Ibn Sina also, therefore, he was also charged with 
irreligiousity and infidelity. The consequence of this position, for al-
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Ghazali, is that it totally destroys the religious laws. He says, "It imply 
that, for instance, whether Zaid obeys God or disobeys Him, God caimot 
know this newly emerging states, since He does not know as an 
individual, i.e. as a person whose actions came to be after they had not 
been". " He fmther says that God cannot know even his infidelity or 
Islam because He knows only the infidelity-in-general or man in general 
in the absolute and universal manner, not in specific relation to 
individual. He says that He cannot know that the Prophet Mohammad 
(P.B.U.H.) has proclaimed his prophecy, because all such things have 
occurred in certain circumstances and in certain periods of time. And the 
knowledge of such circumstances will necessitate change in Him. This is 
why that he charges the upholders, including Ibn Sina, of this theory with 
infidelity. 
The Problem of Resurrection of Bodies 
This is the third point where al-Ghazali charges the upholders with 
infidelity. It is generally believed that there are two realities; one is 
spiritual and the other is material. Theist philosophers believe in these 
two realities, but at the same time, they also believe that spirit or soul is 
eternal while body is temporal. On this very basis they deny the 
resurrection of bodies. They say that souls will not return to bodies. Only 
souls will be punished or rewarded in the life hereafter. They say that 
Paradize, Hell and the Hurs with large eyes, etc are mentioned in the 
Quran and the Traditions as symbols. They have no physical existence of 
theirs. They have been mentioned only to facilitate common men's 
understanding of spiritual reward and punishment. Common people have 
no taste of spiritual happiness. As a child does not have the taste of sexual 
pleasure and we represent it to him by reference to a play or anything else 
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with which he is famihar. In the same manner these things are mentioned 
in the Quran in order o make understand the reahty of spiritual happiness. 
Otherwise they have no physical existence. These things are related to 
body or matter and there will be no body to taste them. On this very basis 
the philosophers deny bodily resurrection in the Doomsday. They say, 
"After the death of the body, the soul continues to have an everlasting 
existence either in the state of indescribably great pleasure, or in the state 
of indescribably great pain. In some cases, the pain or pleasure will be 
everlasting; in others, it will pass away in the course of time. As regards 
its degrees, men have different ranks which are marked by as great a 
variety as characterizes their mundane ranks. Thus; 
i. the eternal pleasure is for the pure and perfect souls, 
ii. the eternal pain is for the imperfect and impure souls, and 
iii. transient pain is for the impure but perfect souls." 
How can one make his soul perfect and pure and can save himself 
from eternal pain ? Philosophers say that soul can attain perfection from 
knowledge and purity from virtuous action and thereby it can attain 
eternal bliss and happiness. Knowledge comes through rational faculty 
and it deceives happiness from the cognition of intelligible. Body is an 
obstacle in the way of rational faculty which prevents it from discovering 
the intelligibles. This is why the pleasures we get are sensuous and 
pleasures attained through senses are inferior to spiritual happiness. 
Therefore we see the ascetic or devotee man never prefers sensuous 
pleasures to spiritual ones. After the death of a man if soul wants to have 
union with, for example, God or angels (intelligibles), body will be an 
obstacle there also and soul, consequently, will not be able to attain 
absolute bliss and perfect happiness. 
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Cognition of intelligibles also includes knowledge of God, His 
Attributes, His angels, His books, etc. 
So these are arguments on the bases of which philosophers deny 
the resurrection of bodies. 
Ghazali says that he believes in most of these things, like 
immorality of soul and that the spiritual pleasures in the Hereafter are 
superior to sensible pleasures in this world. But, at the same time, he also 
says that all these things he does not know on the basis of reasoning but 
on the authority of religion and revelation. Besides, these are some such 
elements as opposed to religion, for example, the denial of revivification 
and Hell, the denial of the existence of Hurs in Paradise and the denial of 
physical pains and pleasures. Ghazali says that all these things are 
mentioned in the Quran and the Tradition. He further says that sensuous 
pleasures and spiritual pleasures, when combined, make perfection and 
God promised us perfect bliss and happiness. 
The objections that all these things are mentioned as symbols, not 
as real, is removed by him as that there is no need of any interpretation 
other than to take them as real, because they are clear in their connotation. 
Interpretation is true where there is ambiguity and if there is no 
ambiguity, interpretation is not true. 
Philosophers justify their contention on the basis of the 
impossibility of bodily resurrection in real and actual form. They say, if 
we believe it to be true, it involves three alternatives. They say, 
"Therefore, resurrection will mean (a) the restoration by God of the body 
which had perished; (b) the recommencement of the existence of the 
body; and (c) restoration of life which had perished". All these three 
alternatives were refuted by Ghazali. The first was denied on the ground 
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that return means the continuity of one thing as well as the emergence of 
another. For example, if anyone is said to have returned to a city, the 
meaning is that he continued to exist elsewhere: that formerly he had 
been in the "city; and that now he resumes his being in the city which is 
similar to his original state." 
The second alternative was denied, up to some extent, on similar 
ground. Ghazali says that it is impossible because the body of a man is 
reduced to dust and gets mixed up with the air, the vapour and the water 
of the whole world. Therefore, the collection of the same body in its 
previous from, while it is changed, is impossible.^^ 
Now remains the third alternative, that is, the restoration of life or 
soul to a body made of any dust or substance. This was also denied by al-
Ghazali on the ground that substances or matters are infinite in number 
while the souls departed from body are finite, therefore, it is impossible. 
Secondly, the soul directs body, and dust, as long as it is dust, can not 
receive direction from soul. In order to get direction, its all elements 
should be mixed in the manner it may have resemblance with sperm or 
any other organism capable of receiving direction. Since it is impossible 
therefore this alternative is also impossible. 
Briefly, Ghazali justifies that reason is unable to certify the 
doctrine of resurrection of bodies. Reason is unable to affirm it or to 
reject it, therefore, we should believe in revelation, and revelation affirms 
its possibility. 
This is last point where al-Ghazali charges with infidelity those 
who deny bodily resurrection. 
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God's Essence and Attributes 
This has been essential problem for both the M'utzilites and the 
philosophers. The M'utazilah denied the Attributes under the influence of 
the Greek philosophers. This is evident from the fact that the arguments 
advanced by the M'utazilah are the same as propounded by the 
philosophers. They assert, says al-Ghazali, "It is not right to affirm 
attributes which are additional to the Divine essence, as our knowledge or 
power is an attribute additional to our essence. For (They assert) such a 
thing necessitates plurality." They further say that if we believe these 
attributes to be co-extensive with or co-existent even then they necessitate 
plurality and that plurality is impossible. 
Ghazali refutes their contention of plurality saying, at first, that 
how they are able to know that the plurality of this kind is impossible and 
that if anyone says so he only means that 'plurality of attributes is 
impossible' and there is no rational argument contradicting the possibility 
of many attributes. 
But the philosophers argue their point of view in two ways. One is 
that if we say an attribute and its subject we just mean that they are two 
things, that is, "77?w is not That, and That is not This. Now, (a) either the 
existence of each of the two will be independent of the other, or (b) each 
will need the other (c) one will be independent while the other is not."^° 
In the first case, both are necessary that will amount duality''\ In the 
second place, neither is necessary, because a necessary being must be 
self-subsistent. In the third alternative one, being independent, is cause 
and the other, being dependent, is an effect. It means that effect, being 
dependent, cannot inhere in its cause that is self-subsisting and 
independent, and there must be an external cause to unite them. 
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Out of these three alternatives, the second one is meaningless in 
respect with God's essence and attributes. 
There is no cause to assert that one needs other because essence 
and attributes coexist and attributes inhere in the essence. Now, there 
remain two alternatives. Ghazali refutes the first alternative, that is 
existence of both is independent, on the ground that duality is 
conceiveable where there is distinction between two things which are 
alike in all respects, therefore there is no duality. In the case of essence 
and attributes, there is no distinction between them because they are 
neither identical not separate and distinct from each other, and if they say 
that they are distinct and that this is a kind of compositions of essence and 
attribute in the case of the First Principle, it is, says Ghazali, an arbitrary 
assumption on the part of the philosophers that has no proof behind it. 
Now we take third alternative, that is, one is dependent and the 
other is independent. In other words, essence does not depend on the 
attributes while they depend on their subject. The philosophers' argument 
is that which depends on someone else cannot be a necessary cause and 
that it needs an efficient cause. Ghazali says, in the case of God's 
essence, if they believe that there is no need of any efficient cause 
because it is eternal and independent, what prevents them to say so in the 
case of attributes if they are also eternal and independent of an efficient 
cause ? 
He further says that if they mean by a necessary being, a being 
without a receptive cause, attributes are in this sense, not necessary. 
Nevertheless, they ai^ e eternal and need no efficient cause. He says that 
rational arguments do not deny anything to be independent and eternal if 
there is cause, that is, essence, recepdve to it. What they prove is only 
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that there must be an end of cause-effect series. Beyond this any claim is 
an arbitrary one. If we do not stop at any point it will are lead us ad 
infiniimn that inconceiveable. Therefore, it is God Who is the Last Cause 
and Who has attributes eternal and independent of an efficient cause. 
The second point of the philosophers is that if knowledge, power 
etc. are attributed to human being, it means that they do not enter into 
their quidity or essence, for they are only accidents. Similarly, if these 
attributes are ascribed to the First Principle, that is, God, they will not 
inhere in His essence. Rather, they will remain as accidents related to His 
essence and it is evident that accidents are inseparable in relation to the 
things, but, at the same time, they do not constitute their essence or 
quidity. Being accidents, they are always subordinate to their essence and 
essence is always their cause. Ghazali refiites their assertion that if they 
mean by their being subordinate to essence or by the assertion that 
essence is their efficient cause and that the accidents are effects of the 
cause, it is not true even in the case of human beings, what to say of 
Divine Being. In the case of human beings, essence is not an efficient 
cause of knowledge, power, etc. But it is true that accidents exist in their 
subjects and subjects are their substrata. Likewise attributes exist in the 
Divine essence and they are eternal and independent of an efficient 
cause. "^ ^ 
The problem with the philosophers is that they apply their methods 
and arguments upon Divine being in the same manner as they do it with 
His creatures, while there is no resemblance between them. Human 
qualities like knowledge, powers etc. are acquired and Divine attributes 
exist from eternity. 
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Causality 
He discusses this problem in his Tahafut in the seventeenth 
disputation where he refutes the alleged necessity of the causal 
connection maintained by the philosophers. They insist that there is 
logical connection between cause and effect and this connections is 
necessary. Ghazali challenges the validity of this necessity. He says, at 
the very outset of this problem, "In our view, the connection between 
what are believed to be cause and the effect is not necessary. Take any 
two things. This is not That; nor can That be This^ The affirmation of one 
does not imply the affinnation of the other; not does its demal imply the 
denial of the other. The existence of one is not necessitated by the 
existence of the other nor; its non-existence by the non-existence of the 
Other.' He gives the examples of quenching of thirst and drinking, 
hunger and eating, burning and fire, light and sun and healing and the use 
of medicine. He says that they are connected as the result of Decree of 
74 
God which proceeded their existence; not as the result of logical or 
necessary connections among them. He mentions their claim: fire is the 
agent of burning and it can not refrain from burning, after it comes into 
contact with any subject, and then he denies it. He says, "We say that it is 
God who through the intennediacy of angels, or directly is the agent of 
burning. Fire, which is an in inanimate - has no action. How can one 
prove that it is agent? He further says that it is our observation that fire 
is with burning or burning is with fire and observation shows only that 
one is with other not one is by other. He justifies his point of view with 
the example of a blind man whose eyes are diseased and when his disease 
is cured he sees different fonns of colours and thinks that the agent of the 
perception of these colours is the opening of his eyes. But if sun sets he 
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will know that the agent and cause was sun that impressed the colours 
upon his sight. It means that Ghazali wants to say that if we say anything 
to be agent, it is based on our observation and perception. He agrees that 
fire when comes into contact with anything it bums it. At the same time 
he also believes that when a certain prophet (Abraham) was thrown into 
the fire, he was not burnt. He says, it was so because either the attributes 
of fire had changed or the attributes of the prophet's person had changed. 
And this change had taken place because of God's direct interference or 
through His angels . Thus al-Ghazah justifies that there is an 
interference everywhere and it is God Who is sole agent and determinant 
and if there is any connection between two things it is by God's Decree. 
Wlienever He wants He will suspend the connections, but there prevails a 
causal nexus in nature and God does not intend to interrupt it. 
After refuting the beliefs of the philosophers in his he, according to 
his promise, wrote an invaluable and voluminous work entitled 'Ihya 
'Ulim al-Din' (Revivification of the Sciences of the Religion). This is the 
book which, as its title suggests, revives the sciences related to Islam. In 
this book, at the very outset, I mean, in the second section of the Chapter 
1, be classifies knowledge into two broad categories: praiseworthy and 
blameworthy. In the category of praiseworthy knowledge he includes, 
first of all, the knowledge of religious beliefs, actions and prohibitions 
and he names it as farz ain (Obligatory upon every Muslim). In the 
second category, that is, blameworthy, he includes sorcery, talismanic 
sciences, juggling and gambling. 
Among the religious sciences some duties are included in farze 
kefaya that are obligatory but not on every Muslim. Rather, it is 
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perforaied on behalf of whole community if some of them fulfil the duty. 
Farze-ain and Jarze kefaya are related to the religion. 
Worldly sciences are divided into praiseworthy, blameworthy and 
pennissible. The case of blameworthy knowledge is the same, but the 
praiseworthy knowledge includes medicine and mathematics because 
they are necessary for progress in the world. Pennissible sciences include 
poetry, history, geography and biology. 
After seeing this classification of knowledge one can easily 
conclude that he encourages those sciences that are religious and that can 
lead a man to the right path, because Ghazali always keeps in his mind 
that man, after his death, will be before his Lord at the Day of judgement 
where he is accountable for his deeds. Therefore, he rejects those sciences 
that are not contributive to this purpose, while he encourages even those 
worldly sciences that might contribute to this piupose or at least, to 
progress in worldly matters. It means that he does not ignore this life, 
though his stress is on the life after death. 
Besides, he mentions in this book, other religious matters like 
prayer, zakat, repentance, pilgrimage etc, but the discussion is 
theological, not philosophical. It suggests that Ghazali, ultimately, 
abandoned philosophy and returned to theology. 
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Conclusion 
The emergence of Muslim philosophy is not merely an 
accidental phenomenon, it is a result of serious contemplation 
and deliberate attempt. It is evident that Muslim philosophy, 
at least at the outset, worked through the religions contents of 
the religion. But the contents were treated rationally and 
logically to give them a shade of philosophy. We may 
controvert the philosophical disposition of the Muslim 
thought, but we cannot deny the logical excellence of the 
arguments used to explain the position of Islam on different 
issues. It is again true that Muslim philosophy takes up and 
interprets the problems from the religious angle, but the 
nature of the arguments makes it philosophical. We should not 
reckon only Asharite philosophers as eminent, while 
determining the definition of Muslim philosophy. We also 
have to consider the other earlier philosophers who raised the 
level of rational thinking and built up the arguments in the 
manner of pure philosophy. The history of Muslim philosophy 
records many such names, sources belonging to the Ikhwan-al-
Sifa and others to M'utazilah, who used philosophical 
paradigm in the explanation of religions issues. 
We have discussed at length in the main body of our thesis the 
problems which attracted the Muslim mind just after the death 
of the Prophet. Some of them were the product of social 
change and others were purely academic in nature. 
The Muslim society was a transformed face of the pre-Islamic 
Arab-society. Although this society suffered all kinds of 
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perversions and was dotted with evil, and the people even 
took pride in evil and in evil deeds, yet it had a tremendously 
pleasant literary history. It is evident from the exquisitely 
composed panegyrics. They are still regarded as the best piece 
of classical literature. They performed the evil in the manner 
of value. Islam after its advent caused a complete social 
transformation and brought not only happiness but also 
prosperity and peace. The change naturally resulted into a 
physical comfort and mental solace. The people who had 
constantly indulged in intrigues against their enemies and 
rivals now devoted themselves to the worship of God. They 
showed to Him their complete obeisance and surrendered unto 
Him all their passions. Their valour was now expressed in the 
wars wagged for God and His Prophet to extend His empire. 
The rule of evil gave way to the rule of Law. Their nasty 
instincts got transformed. Their piety became exemplary and 
they readily submitted to God's message. The changed social 
order provided them occasion for contemplation and 
reconstruction. 
In the life-time of the Prophet they cleared away all 
their doubts and suspicions about religious truth. All remained 
obedient except hypocrites who after the death of the Prophet 
posed serious threats to Islam and its followers. They were 
able to raise questions in the minds of the Muslims regarding 
vital problems like unity of God, justice of God, creation of 
the Quran and so on. Besides, the death of the Prophet gave 
rise to many controversies which resulted into social-political 
turmoil. The first one was regarding the appointment of the 
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Caliph of the Muslim Ummah. It was to be resolved 
immediately as the appointed Caliph had to lead the burial 
procession and the last prayers. The Arab chieftains, after 
hearing the shocking news of the Prophet 's demise, assembled 
at Saqifah with heavy hearts and worried mind to settle the 
issue. It was the first instance when the Muslim elders 
representing the noted Arab tribes had to come to a decision 
without the Prophet amidst them. The instance proved to be a 
bone of contention. It took quite a long time for them to come 
to an agreeable decision, but the agreement reached was not 
satisfactory to a section of Muslims, particularly those who 
advocated the Caliphate of Ali b. Abu-Talib who, they 
thought, was the rightful claimant but denied on feeble counts. 
It, however, remained contentious issue at the time of the 
appointment of Abu Bakr Umar and Uthman as Caliphs. The 
supporters of Ali felt relieved when Ali succeeded to this 
position but till then much had changed. Uthman, during his 
reign, took some very controversial decisions which 
ultimately led to his assassinations. 
Ali 's reign could bring no peace to the Muslim empire. 
He had to fight at least two important Battles with Amir 
Muawiyah who, after Uthaman's assassination, very strongly 
desired to rise to the Throne. Many Muslims regarded him as 
debauched and were dread against his succession. They could 
not tolerate him as their ruler. Besides, Al i ' s reign also saw 
the ugly face of a sharp division of Muslim Ummah into many 
groups, particularly after the Battle of Siffin which resulted 
into the emergence of three strong groups: the Shi ' i tes , the 
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Khangites and the Murzites. These groups later on attained 
religious sanctity. The socio-political turmoil did not only 
reduce the political strength of Muslim community but also 
harmed its religious solidarity. It was not, indeed, a good 
development. The Muslilm Ummah was divided to the extent 
that they refused to tolerate each other. The personal 
judgment is not encouraged in Islam, yet they regarded each 
other as infidel. This old-age tendency still dominates the 
Muslims and each of the communities, even in the present, 
takes pride in its being true Muslims. 
In the aftermath of socio-political turmoil there emerged 
a group which segregated itself from the actual scene and 
avoided to participate in the upheavals. Instead, it devoted 
itself to the path of knowledge in accordance with the interest 
and capacity. Some of its members resorted to the pursuance 
of worldly knowledge and others chose the path of gnosis and 
engaged themselves in the pursuit of taqwa penitence. The 
former looked after the exoteric part of religion and the later 
emphasized the esoteric aspect. Thus, latter and spirit both 
were taken care of with a positive approach. The former was 
the group of philosophers and the later comprised of the 
mystics of Islam. Both of them presented religion in their own 
way without indulging in useless castigation of each others. 
Their varied explanations were serious efforts to offer an 
acceptable solution of the ensuring problems. The attempts of 
this group were appreciated by the Muslim Ummah with a sigh 
of relief since they could clear the suffocation caused by the 
political chaos. The development marked a new beginning 
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which touched new horizon in the hands of the Mutazilah 
scholars. 
The Battle of Siffin posed a question of vital importance 
regarding the fate of the Muslim sinner. The erstwhile 
political group assumed religions importance. The khariyah, 
the Shiah and the Murjiah offered plausible solutions, but the 
Muslim community in general supported the approach of the 
Murjiah who deferred the judgment to God with the hope of a 
perdition. The khariyah were rather obstinate in their attitude 
and passed a cruel judgment on infidelity even against the 
Muslim sinners. In their explanations they always had Ali and 
Muawiyah in their mind. Their obstinacy went to the extent 
that they advocated for severe punishment even to their 
children. Their strong feeling of recompense denied their 
acceptability in both the communities, the Murjiah and the 
Shiah consequently, they were completely extinguished due to 
their strongly negative approach. Nevertheless, the khariyah 
held their conviction firm to their hearts. No atrocities could 
change their savage attitude. 
Besides, there were some other problems also, including 
freedom of will, which invited the attention of Muslim 
scholars belonging to the early phase of Kalam. It may be 
historically true that the freedom of will was the significant 
content of the intellectual efforts in the pre-Islamic Arab 
society and the thinkers were divided on the issue. Some 
advocated fatalism and others opposed it. Their point of views 
are evidently expressed in their literary works. This cannot 
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certainly be denied due to its being one of the initial questions 
that human consciousness came across. After the advent 
advocating fatalism or otherwise assumed philosophical 
significance, Jabr and Qadar became prominent schools which 
argued rather systematically fatalism and libertarianism 
respectively. Islam added another dimension to the problem by 
relating it to justice of God. It was certainly not the influence 
of Christian conviction of the original sin. The Jew influence, 
nevertheless, cannot be denied without argument. The freedom 
of will also led to the rise of yet another problem related to 
evil. The Muslim theologians always saw the Qadariyah with 
an eye of suspicion and regarded them as the advocate of 
dualism for their belief in man being creator of both his 
actions belonging to virtue and vice. The theologians might 
have a puritan approach and a prejudice against philosophers 
but the problem of evil remains unresolved. God being All-
Good could not be the creator of evil and man can create 
nothing but choose from within that which is created. 
The early mutakallimin, as we have described in the 
thesis, were seriously occupied with the discussion about the 
definition of Iman (faith) and its articles. It was deemed 
indispensable for the new converts who embraced Islam after 
being conquered to amalgamated elements of their ancestral 
faith. The discourse on faith also led to the question of 
infidelity (kufr). The philosophers pondered over it by taking 
into account the basic tenets of Islam. They preferred 
argumentative approach. Whereas the theologians, whereas, 
adopted a puritan approach which, however, was not positive. 
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The kharijah were rather severe in their attacks. The Murjiah 
were comparatively reasonable. They always avoided passing 
judgment. The problem of faith and infidelity is rooted in the 
Quran and the Tradition. No outside influence originated the 
discussion. The philosophers and the theologians both desired 
to keep the Muslims upright, but the attitude of the 
philosophers, particularly of the later mutakallimin, led them 
to deviation and distress. It was later on corrected by the 
Ashairah thinkers who adopted the theologians ' approach. It, 
of course, resulted into the decline of philosophical thinking. 
In the basic tenets of Islam unity of God is the most 
important article of faith. It is the initial point wherefrom one 
gets into the realm of Islam. Metaphorically speaking it might 
be called the gate of the religion, Islam. We have elsewhere 
printed out that the basic assertion in the wake of the 
acceptance of Islam is the negation of polytheism. It is 
suggestive of the historical fact that polytheism was practiced 
all through the world in various forms and shades, but the 
Semitic religions rejected it at one go in all its forms and 
shades. Nevertheless, its roots were so deep in society that it 
always reappeared in a new garb. Judaism and Christianity 
both taught this lesson but it was forgotten. The earlier three 
revealed books also preached the Oneness of God but it was 
forgotten. There was a great deal of omission and commission 
even in the revealed books. Their followers did not care for 
their teachings and included in them their own whims and 
fancies and thus marred the basic spirit of the guidance of 
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God. Finally the Quran was revealed with the promise of 
preservation and no change in its contents could be made. 
The Quran also taught the same basic lesson with the 
consciousness that it has been averted many times before. The 
Quran declared Judaism and Christianity as the shades of 
Islam and viewed it as different Shariahs (Legal systems) 
revealed in conformity with the need of the hour and the level 
of human consciousness. Polytheism, thus, was finally 
rejected but the religion being social phenomenon could not 
be changed. There has, and perhaps shall never, be a time 
when society admitted one religion; all have existed 
simultaneously. 
The unity of God ensured the emergence of some new 
problems. The first is related its definition. Monotheism in 
Islam is certainly not identical with that of Christianity and 
Judaism. Islam admits no shade of polytheism either in the 
form of Trinity or incarnated beings. It also rejects the 
concept of personage which is the hallmark of Christianity or 
some sections of Judaism. Right from the early days the 
Mutakallimin, on one hand, and the theologians on the other, 
tried to define and elaborate the concept of monotheism in 
Islam. They were always at variance with the Christian and 
Jew scholars who also argued their concept of monotheism. 
Their arguments were rooted in the Greek philosophical 
sciences. The Muslim scholars of Kalam very ably accepted 
the challenge and paid them in the same coins. The cause of 
Islam opened new vistas of knowledge which made them 
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perfect in these sciences. The platonics and peripatatics both 
defended the doctrine of unity of God better than the 
theologians who could not argue in the same manner and with 
the same force. 
Another problem related to the unity of God opened the 
debate on the Essence and the Attributes. The community of 
scholars was divided on the issue right from the early times. 
Some supported the common point of view and held the 
Attributes to be separate from the Essence and others went to 
the extent of denying them. The denial, of course, raised 
doubts about God's perfection. Wolfson and others wrongly 
assign its introduction from Christianity or Judaism. It is, 
however, undoubtedly a debate based on the Quran and the 
Tradition. 
The Muslim scholars engaged themselves in their 
interpretation. They never admitted any alien influences. The 
Essence and Attributes also gave way to yet another question. 
It was regarding the personality of God. Although it is 
difficult to ascribe personality to God, yet some Muslim 
scholars believed in the marifah of God. The 
anthropomorphic verses in the Quran were understood rather 
literally. For those who denied the Attributes it was 
unarguable. They never ascribed any form to God even by way 
of similes. Such a view was mainly supported by Shiite 
thinkers to justify the concept of Imamah based on the 
principle of hulul, incarnation. The idea seems to have been 
introduced under the influence of Christianity and 
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Manichaeanism which professed such belief. In this debate, 
we are of the opinion that the Mutazilah held a rational 
position. Thin interpretation of the Unity of God is rather 
realistic and most convincing. 
Yet another problem related to the Unity of God is the 
creation of Quran. Common Muslim's belief is quite evident, 
but it could not be acceptable to many of the philosophers 
belonging to different schools. Despite its creation, there are 
certain other discussions of vital importance. The Muslims 
generally believe that the Quran has no omissions and 
commissions and it has been preserved as it was not revealed. 
Some non-Muslim scholars, having taken a literal 
interpretation, objected to the compilation of the verses 
arranged in the present order, for the reason that it is not in 
conformity with the order as it was revealed. The Muslims are 
aware that the Quran was revealed in bits as and when the 
Prophet sought guidance from God or He deemed it fit to 
guide him. It took some twenty three years to complete. The 
order of revelation could not, however, be maintained. The 
Prophet himself had arranged it in this order. The compilation, 
nevertheless, became controversial on account of different 
manuscripts. It was finally resolved in the days of Uthman. 
The mutakallimin defended the order of the revelation and 
supported that the Quran has been preserved in letter and 
spirit. 
In accordance with the common belief God has made a 
promise to preserve the holy Quran and that there shall be no 
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commission whatsoever; such attempts have always been 
strongly opposed as and when made, but the possibili ty of 
omission cannot be ruled out. Not only the philosophers but 
also the theologians have admitted the omissions made from 
time to time. There is a great deal of discussion on the 
quantum of omission. Once the possibility has been accepted 
the number of omitted verses went on increasing to the extent 
that the Shiah community, at least covertly, believed in the 
ten paras (chapters) having been omitted. The number may 
have been exaggerated but the fact of omission not, however, 
be denied. It again became a point of objection for the 
hypocrites and non-believers but the Mutakallimin and the 
theologians strongly defended the sanctity of the holy Quran 
arguing that every omission has been made by the command of 
God. He being the creator has every right to reject whatever is 
deemed as not essential. The Mutakallimin, particularly the 
Mutazilah, remained awaken to all such controversies and 
deliberated upon them with an aim of defense, not 
apologetically but with forceful arguments and convincing 
contents. 
The rise of philosophy saw its dusk in the hands of Abul 
Hasan al-Ash'ari . We cannot ignore his contribution to Ilm-
al-Kalam and other related sciences, but his attitude towards 
philosophy reduced it to the level of common man. It has been 
stated that Abul Hasan al-Ashari started his career as a 
Mutazili but he suddenly changed his mind when he rightly 
noticed that the rationalism of the Mutazilah was being 
harmful to the common Muslims. He was to true to a great 
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extent, for the Mutazilah did not restrict their debates to the 
philosophical issues but also extended them to religion which, 
of course, is a common man's food. In the interpretation of 
the Unity of God they altogether denied the attributes. 
Besides, they projected God having limited powers; of course, 
with the presumption that the limits are self-imposed. It 
certainly shocked the common man. No Muslim other than the 
intellectuals could understand such presumptions. 
Ash'ari and some other thinkers had a genuine concern. 
They felt the severity of the hazards. Abul Hasan-al-Ash'ar i 
voiced their feelings and defended common Musl ims ' faith. 
Being originally a Mutazili he could not reject its doctrines 
altogether. He, therefore, took a midway position in most of 
the cases. In his attempts he sometimes invited confusion. His 
explanation of the attributes of God is a good instance of one 
such confusion. The position could not be well-argued; it, 
however, satisfies the common man. Ash'ari has convincingly 
argued the semi-determinism in explaining the freedom of 
will. It is, in our opinion, in conformity with the Quran and 
the Tradition, where we find support for Jabr and gadar both. 
While going through his writings one can conclude that Ash'ari 
had a philosophical insight which he used in the defense of theology. He 
desired to avert the influence of rationalism and, therefore, argued the 
case of religion to save it from the anticipated perils to the Muslim 
community and their religion. His efforts were intellectual in character. 
He never abandoned his philosophical training but his followers, 
particularly Ghazali made philosophy a common man's mind. His 
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attempts to defend theology proved to be disastrous for the growth of 
philosophy. It, in fact, declined and was reduced almost to naught. 
Ghazali's efforts, however so ever genuine yet they could, affect the 
growth of knowledge in all fields. The Muslim intellectuals thereafter 
were so deeply influenced by his thought that they could never return to 
pure philosophy. There are, no doubt, some big names like Razi, Ibn-
Taimiyah and others after him, but all of them spent their efforts in 
repeating him. Thus, Ash'ari started a tradition which caused the decline 
of knowledge in the Muslim empire, he, however, saved religion and 
marked its progress. 
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FOOT NOTES 
(i) Asflkir, Abu Qasim AH b. Hibatullah, Theqatuddin Ibn Asakir, 
(499-1106-571/1176). 'The Theology of al-Islam\ p. 145. 
(ii) Dhahaki, the author of "Al-Iherfi Khebere Man Ghahar'. 
(in) al-Saji, author of several books, including the book 'Ikhtelaf al-
Fuqaha', was a Shafe'ite Jurisprudent from whom 'al-Ash'ari 
related many traditions in his own book 'Kitah al-Tafsir' that is 
extinct 'The theology of al-Ash'ri', p. 156. 
(iv) ai-Marvazi, Ibrahim b. Ahmad al-Marvazi, Shafe'ite 
Jurisprudence, to him ended the chairmanship of Shafe'ites in Iraq, 
bom at Marv, stayed for a long time in Baghdad and died in Egypt. 
Wafayat vol. I p. 4. 
(v) al-Jubbai, Mohammad b. Abdul Wahhab, bom in 235 A.H. and 
died in 303 A.H.. 'The Theology ofal-Ash 'ari\ p. 158. 
(vi) This book has become extinct like his other several books. 
(vii) Hamuda Gharabah has done his research work on al-Ashari. 
(viii) Umer b. Abdul Aziz (61/81-101/720). His lineage is Umer b. 
Abdul Aziz b. Marwah b. al-Hakam al-Umawi al-Qureshi. He is 
included in Khulafae Rashideen', that is, fifth of pious Caliphs. He 
succeeded to the Caliphate in 99 A.H. Aalam by Khaimddin 
Zarkeli. 
(ix) Al-Shafe'i, Imam Moharmnad b. Idrees b. al-Abbas b. Uthman b. 
al-Shafi al-Qurashi al-Muttalibi, Ibn Abdullah. He was bom at 
Ghazna in Palestine in 150/767 and died in Egypt in 204/820. 
k'alam by Khaimddin Zarkali. 
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(x) Abu Hanifah, Noman bin Thabit, One of four legal Imams, bom in 
Kufa in 80/699. The Caliph Mansoor when wanted to appoint him 
as the Judge, he denied. Consequently he was imprisoned in 
Baghdad where he died in 150/767. A 'alam by Khairuddin Zerkali. 
(xi) Al-Thauri, Sufyan b. Syeed b. Masroq al-Thauri Abu Abdullah, 
Amirul Muminin of the science of Traditions. He was bom in Kufa 
in 97/716, but treveled to Makka and Madina, died in Basra in 
161/778. ^ atow by Zarkali. 
(xii) Al-Awza'i, Abu Amr Abdur Rahman b. Amr b. Yuhmid al-Awzai. 
He was bom at Balbak in 8/707 and lived in Baimit where he died 
in 157/774. Aalam by Zarkali. 
(xiii) Mahk b. Anas b. Malik al-Asbahi al-Humairi Abu Abdullah, Imam 
of Madina. One of four legal Imams, bom in Madina in 93/712 and 
died there in 179/795. He is the author of famous book 'al-
Mu'atta'. 'Aalam' by Zarkali. 
(xiv) Ahmad b. Hanbal, Abu Abdullah Ahmad b, Mohammad b. Hanbal 
al-Shaibani. One of the four legal Imams. He was bom in Baghdad 
in 164/780. When he denied to believe in the theory of createdness 
of the Quran, the Caliph Mu'tasim imprisoned him for eighteen 
months and he died in jail in 241/855. He wrote his 'Musnad' in 
six volumes 'Aalam'. 
(xv) Al-laith b. Sa'ad b. Abdur Rahman Abul Harith, bom in Egypt in 
94/713 and died in Cairo in 175/791. Imam al-Shafe'i said about 
him that he was more intelligent than Imam Malik, 'Aalam' by 
Zarkali. 
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(xvi) Al-Bukhari, Mohammad b. Ismail b. Ibrahim b. al-Mughirah al-
Bukhari, Hibrul Islam, Hafiz of the Traditions and the author of 
'al-Sahih al-Bukhari'. He was bom in Bukhara in 194/810 and 
died in 256/870, 'Aalam' by Zarkali. 
(xvii) Mushm, Abul Hasan Muslim b. Hajjaz b. Muslim al-Qushairi al-
Nisaburi. He was bom in Nishapur in 204/820. He collected twelve 
thousand Traditions in fifteen years in his 'al-Sahih'. He died in 
261/875.'.4a/aw'by Zarkali. 
(xviii) Ibn Khalqan, Ahmad b. Muhammad b. Ibrahim b. Abu Bakr b. 
Khalqan Abu al-Abbas. He was the judge in Syria. 
(?dx) St. Augustine. (354-430) Christian theologian and Bishop. A 
creative genius of mystical piety and great philosophical acumen, 
not only his thought seminal for the development of western 
Christianity, his moral values and personal piety remained norms 
for medieval and reformations Europe, bom in Taqasti (present day 
Souk-Ahras, Algeria to a pagan father Patriclus and a Christian 
mother Monica. On 20 August 430, while prayers were being 
offered in the Churches of Hippo, Augustine died. It was 
designated his day in the Lexicon of Roman Catholic saints. 
'Encyclopaedia of Religion', Vol. I, pp. 520-526. 
(xx) Abelard Peter (1079-1142), Logician and Christian theologian, 
bom at Le Pallet, outside of Nantes (Britanny) 'Encyclopaedia of 
Religion \ vol. I 
(xxi) Thomas Acquinas (Tommaso d'Aquino, 1225-1274), Italian 
Dominican theologian, doctor of the church, patron of Roman 
Catholic Schools and Christian saint. He has been honored with the 
scholastic titles Doctor Communis (thirteenth century) and Doctor 
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Angelicus (fifteenth century), among others. 'Encyclopedia of 
Religion', vol. 14, P. 485. 
(xxii) Peter Lambard (1100-1160) Christian theologian and teacher, bom 
in Northern Italy, went to France for study. He then taught in Paris 
at the Cathedral school of Notre Dame, 'Encyclopedia of 
Religion', vol. 11, p. 257. 
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